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Most philosophical work in molecular biology has historically centered on DNA, genetics, and 
questions of reduction. My dissertation breaks from this tradition to make proteins the object of 
philosophical and historical analysis. The recent history of structural biology and protein science offers 
untapped potential for history and philosophy of science. My ultimate goal for this dissertation 
therefore is to identify and analyze some of the key historical and philosophical puzzles that arise in 
these fields. I focus primarily on the shift from the static to the dynamic view of proteins in the late 
twentieth century. The static view treated proteins as stable, rigid structures, whereas the dynamic view 
considers proteins to be dynamic molecules in constant motion. In the first half of the dissertation, I 
develop a historical account of the origins of the static view of proteins. I show how this view led 
molecular biologists to adopt mechanistic explanation as their preferred strategy for explaining protein 
function. I then develop an account of the emergence of the dynamic view of proteins, arguing that 
thermodynamic theory and the theoretical commitments of scientists played an important and often 
overlooked role in driving this change. In the second half of the dissertation, I analyze the 
epistemological relationship between the static and dynamic concepts of the protein and argue that 
conceptual replacement is occurring. I then develop an account of ensemble explanation, a new type 
of explanation introduced to highlight the role of dynamics in protein function. I show that these 
explanations fail to fit existing philosophical accounts of explanation, ultimately concluding that my 
account is required to capture their epistemic structure.  
  
 v 
Table of Contents 
Preface ............................................................................................................................................ x 
1.0 Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 1 
2.0 Proteins in Classical Molecular Biology: The Static View, Protein Structure, and 
Mechanistic Explanations of Allostery ................................................................................... 9 
2.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 9 
2.2 The Static View of Proteins ......................................................................................... 11 
2.3 A Functional Role for Protein Dynamics: Koshland’s Induced-Fit Model of 
Catalysis............................................................................................................................... 15 
2.4 Another Role for Protein Dynamics: Monod’s Discovery of Structural Allostery. 20 
2.4.1 Feedback Inhibition ...........................................................................................21 
2.4.2 The Birth of Allosteric Inhibition .....................................................................26 
2.4.3 The Allosteric Transition and Changes in Protein Structure ........................31 
2.5 The MWC Model: The First Explanation of Allostery ............................................. 34 
2.5.1 The Model ...........................................................................................................35 
2.5.2 The MWC Model is Explanatory .....................................................................40 
2.5.3 The MWC Model and the Static View of Proteins ..........................................51 
2.6 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 55 
3.0 From Static to Dynamic: A Historical Account of the Emergence of the Dynamic 
View of Proteins ..................................................................................................................... 57 
3.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 57 
3.2 Origins of the Dynamic View....................................................................................... 58 
 vi 
3.3 Slow Reception of the Dynamic View ......................................................................... 64 
3.3.1 Allostery: The First Link Between Dynamics and Function ..........................64 
3.3.2 Reasons for the Slow Reception ........................................................................69 
3.4 True Believers and the Search for Anomalies ........................................................... 76 
3.4.1 Early Dynamicist Researchers ..........................................................................76 
3.4.2 The Thermodynamic Framework ....................................................................79 
3.4.3 The Search for Anomalies .................................................................................82 
3.5 Conclusions: Widespread Acceptance of the Dynamic View ................................... 95 
4.0 Protein Concepts, Representations, and Their Epistemic Relations ................................ 97 
4.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 97 
4.2 Protein Concepts and Representations ....................................................................... 99 
4.2.1 Concepts, Representations, and Conceptual Change .....................................99 
4.2.2 The Structural Concept and Its Representations..........................................104 
4.2.2.1 The Concept ......................................................................................... 104 
4.2.2.2 Structural Methods and the Epistemic Goals of ProteinS ................ 106 
4.2.2.3 Structural Representations ................................................................. 107 
4.2.3 The Dynamic Concept and Its Representations ............................................112 
4.2.3.1 The Concept ......................................................................................... 112 
4.2.3.2 Dynamic Methods and Epistemic Goals of ProteinD ........................ 116 
4.2.3.3 Dynamic Representations ................................................................... 119 
4.3 Inadequate Characterizations of the Relationship Between Protein Concepts .... 122 
4.3.1 Reduction ..........................................................................................................123 
4.3.1.1 Nagelian Intertheoretic Reduction ..................................................... 123 
 vii 
4.3.1.2 Explanatory Reduction ....................................................................... 130 
4.3.2 Kuhnian Paradigm Shifts ................................................................................137 
4.4 How to Make Sense of Changes in Protein Science ................................................. 141 
4.4.1 Two Levels of Analysis: Protein Concepts vs. Representations...................141 
4.4.2 Protein Concepts and Conceptual Replacement ...........................................142 
4.4.3 Relating Representations of Proteins: Abstraction and De-idealization ....149 
4.4.4 Philosophical Insights and Morals..................................................................158 
4.5 Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 163 
5.0 Ensemble Explanation of Protein Function: A Philosophical Account of a Novel 
Type of Explanation in the Biological Sciences ................................................................. 165 
5.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 165 
5.2 Account of Ensemble Explanation ............................................................................ 167 
5.3 Equilibrium Explanations.......................................................................................... 174 
5.3.1 Canonical Account of Equilibrium Explanation ...........................................175 
5.3.2 Ensemble Explanations are Not Equilibrium Explanations ........................179 
5.4 Interventionist Causation and Explanation in Equilibrium Thermodynamics .... 189 
5.4.1 Intervention on Equilibrium States ................................................................190 
5.4.2 Interventionist Interpretation of Ensemble Explanations............................197 
5.4.3 Ensemble Explanations are Causal ................................................................202 
5.4.4 Novelty of Ensemble Explanations in Biological Sciences ............................207 
5.5 Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 213 
6.0 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 214 
Bibliography .............................................................................................................................. 217 
 viii 
List of Tables 
Table 1 Three Semantic Components of Protein Concepts .................................................. 144 
 
 ix 
List of Figures 
Figure 1 Idealized Michaelis-Menton Plot. ............................................................................... 23 
Figure 2 Allosteric Transition (Changeux 2012). ..................................................................... 37 
Figure 3 Allosteric Protein Ligand Binding Curves (Monod et al. 1965). ............................. 39 
Figure 4 Symmetry-Preserving Allosteric Transition (Monod et al. 1965). .......................... 53 
Figure 5 Citation Data for Dynamic View Papers. .................................................................. 70 
Figure 6 Model of Myoglobin (Kendrew et al. 1958). ............................................................ 109 
Figure 7 Static Representations of Proteins. .......................................................................... 110 
Figure 8 Dynamic Representation of Proteins: Superposition of Structures. ..................... 121 
Figure 9 Dynamic Representation of Proteins: Ensemble Representation. ........................ 122 
Figure 10 Energy Landscape Ensemble Representation (Hilser et al. 2006). ..................... 154 
Figure 11 Two Domain Allosteric Protein. ............................................................................. 170 
Figure 12 Example of Ensemble Allostery.............................................................................. 173 
Figure 13 Causal Representation of Allostery........................................................................ 204 
Figure 14 Causal Representation of Allostery with Intermediate Causal Variables.......... 205 
Figure 15 Unified Causal Structure of Ensemble Explanation ............................................ 212 
 x 
Preface 
While only my name appears on the cover of this dissertation, many colleagues, friends, 
and family have contributed to its successful completion. I have been extremely lucky to receive 
guidance and support from many within the Pitt HPS family during my doctoral studies and while 
drafting this dissertation. I could not have finished it without the help and encouragement of Mike 
and Jim, my co-advisors. Mike has been my cheerleader throughout this process, and Jim has 
consistently offered speedy and thoughtful comments on my work. I am grateful for the intellectual 
guidance of my other two committee members, Sandy and Anya. This dissertation, and my 
scholarship, are better for their input.  
The Pitt HPS graduate community has fostered my growth as a scholar and as a person. I 
count my cohort-mates Siska de Baerdemaeker and Zina Ward among my closest friends and am 
grateful that Pitt HPS brought us together. Their friendship and support mean the world to me, and 
I cannot imagine a world in which I successfully completed this journey without them. I am 
grateful to the entire Pitt HPS grad community, especially Gal Ben Porath and Mahi Hardalupas. 
During the drafting of the dissertation, I have had the pleasure of co-working either in-person or 
remotely with many friends, colleagues, and even family, including Michael Begun, Yudi Feng, 
J.P. Gamboa, Gus Law, Siddharth Muthu Krishnan, Carrie Neal, Elizabeth Oestreich, and Ellen 
Smith. I am thankful for their encouragement and companionship. 
I owe a tremendous debt of gratitude to the friends and family who have supported and 
nurtured me during my long and winding academic journey, from a bachelors in biochemistry, 
through multiple masters in science and philosophy, until now, with the completion of my 
doctorate. Special thanks are due to Katie Campbell-Proszowska, Allison DuVal, Rachel Elaine 
 xi 
Cronmiller, and Franzi Seeger, who joined me at various points along the way and stood by me 
through the good times and the bad. I consider myself incredibly lucky to count two of my 
undergraduate professors, Jane Geaney and John Pagan, as friends and mentors for the past 15 
years. In addition, my partner, Kevin Vergara, has supported me through the rather grueling 
process of drafting this dissertation, helping me stay sane and grounded.  
I am forever grateful for my family for always being there for me. I am saddened that my 
dad, Peter Neal, did not live to see me finish this PhD, but I know he would have been proud of 
me. I am happy to share credit for my success with him, my mom, Kathleen Poll, and my great big 
sister, Rebekah Neal Hensley, as well as my sister’s family, Greg, Suzanne, and Oscar Hensley. I 
do not know if it takes a village, but in my case, it certainly took a loving and supportive family to 
help me achieve this dream. 
 1 
1.0 Introduction 
We start from the premise that proteins are at the heart of all living processes, uniquely versatile 
in their capability to do whatever is needed, and with the knowledge that proteins are increasingly 
being harnessed to serve practical needs of society, to cure disease, to safeguard crops, etc. As a 
result, proteins are now moving to centre stage in the theatres of medicine and biology. 
 
Charles Tanford and Jacqueline Reynolds (2003), Nature’s Robots: A History of Proteins, p. 6 
 
Since the middle of the twentieth century, our understanding and perceptions of life, health, 
and disease have become thoroughly molecular. During this time, the funding for molecular 
biology and biomedical research has soared, and the US and other governments have funded “big 
science” projects in molecular biology, such as the human genome project (Green et al. 2015). The 
faith in the molecularization of biology has always rested on the belief that molecular studies will 
reveal the underlying structures that control diverse biological processes from heredity to 
metabolism. By discovering the molecular structures and their clockwork mechanisms, researchers 
would bring order to the seemingly complex and disorderly biological world. In his Nobel lecture 
in 1965, Jacques Monod voiced this belief: “The ambition of molecular biology,” he claimed, “is 
to interpret the essential properties of organisms in terms of molecular structures” (207). But in 
the late twentieth century, there was dramatic shift in molecular worldview from static to dynamic. 
It was no longer enough to characterize molecular structures in order to understand biological 
functions. One also needed to understand the dynamics of biological molecules. Nowhere did this 
transition from the static to dynamic worldview play out more visibly than in structural biology 
with the study of proteins. Over the last half century, scientists have modified their concept of the 
protein to include both structural and dynamic properties. They have developed new models to 
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better represent protein dynamics, and they have replaced explanations that invoked static 
structures obtained from x-ray crystallography with explanations that capture the dynamic 
fluctuations within these structures in living organisms. 
As the epigraph from eminent scientists Charles Tanford and Jacqueline Reynolds 
suggests, proteins are becoming more and more important as an object of scientific inquiry. Within 
the molecular life sciences, many disciplines, including molecular and structural biology, 
biochemistry, enzymology, and molecular genetics, count proteins as among their objects of study. 
Proteins figure in explanations of almost all biological processes, from DNA replication and repair 
to cellular metabolism to innate immunity, as well as explanations of diseases such as sickle cell 
anemia, HIV, and COVID-19. Proteins also serve as sites of intervention in both laboratory 
techniques and medical treatments. Over the past century, the importance of proteins in these and 
other biological processes has become clearer, and many changes have occurred as scientists have 
shifted from thinking of proteins as rigid and static structures to dynamic molecules always in 
motion (Motlagh et al. 2014; Morange 2017, 2020). This shift from static to dynamic has led to 
changes in the methods scientists use to investigate proteins, the ways they conceptualize and 
represent them, as well as the explanations scientists give of their behaviors and functions. 
This recent history of protein science is ripe for historical and philosophical analysis. Most 
philosophical work in molecular biology has historically centered on DNA, genetics, and questions 
of reduction. Early work focused on genetics, debating the possibility of intertheoretic reduction, 
while more recently some philosophers of molecular biology have discussed explanatory reduction 
and developed accounts of mechanistic explanation. This dissertation breaks from this tradition to 
make proteins the object of philosophical analysis. It focuses specifically on the shift from the 
static to dynamic view of proteins in the late twentieth century. In the dissertation, I examine the 
 3 
historical reasons for this shift. I also address epistemological questions that arise in the context of 
representing proteins, rather than genes, and I characterize a novel type of non-mechanistic 
explanation that scientists have developed to explain dynamic protein behavior.  
My dissertation therefore advances the scholarly literature in important ways. It develops 
a historical account of the emergence of the dynamic view of proteins, which has been largely 
overlooked by historians and philosophers of biology. Although the origins of molecular biology 
have been the focus of much historical research, little has been done on this recent history in protein 
science (Morange 2018, Sarkar 2008). It also contributes to the literature on scientific explanation, 
introducing and characterizing a novel type of explanation in the biological sciences. Finally, my 
analysis of protein concepts, representations, and explanations has important implications for 
philosophical debates about unification in the biological sciences.   
Scientific explanation has been a central topic in philosophy of science, at least since 
Hempel’s characterization of the deductive-nomological model (Hempel 1965, Hempel and 
Oppenheim 1948). Recently, philosophers interested in the biological sciences have offered new 
accounts of explanation that aim to capture the explanatory practices of molecular biologists, 
geneticists, neuroscientists and others working in related fields. These philosophers have argued 
that mechanistic explanations, which explain the behavior of a system by describing the 
organization, activities, and causal roles of its component parts, dominate in these fields 
(Machamer et al. 2000, Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005, Craver 2007). Although mechanistic 
explanation certainly plays an important role in the explanatory practices of the life scientists, my 
account of ensemble explanations of protein behavior demonstrates that mechanistic explanations 
do not have a monopoly on explanatory practices in protein science. In fact, the recognition of the 
importance of protein dynamics for protein function has caused a major shift in explanatory 
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practices in the field because mechanistic explanations, which are modeled after machines, cannot 
easily accommodate the fast timescale dynamics that cause proteins to undergo constant structural 
fluctuations. My account of ensemble explanation of protein behavior therefore undermines the 
claims that mechanistic explanation is the only or dominant type of explanation in the molecular 
life sciences. It shows that scientists have had to develop a new type of explanation—ensemble 
explanation—to account for the dynamic properties of proteins. 
Throughout the dissertation, I focus primarily on one protein function, namely, allostery, 
or the phenomenon whereby binding at one site on protein affects binding at a second site (Cui 
and Karplus 2008). I analyze older mechanistic explanations as well as newer ensemble 
explanations of allostery, which aim to account for the role of dynamics in enabling proteins to 
carry out this function. Interest in ensemble explanations, however, extends far beyond the 
community of biologists studying allostery. The dynamic behavior that these explanations aim to 
capture is common; for this reason, ensemble explanations are useful for explaining other protein 
functions as well as the behavior of other biomolecules. Indeed, historian and philosopher of 
biology, Michel Morange (2017) has expressed excitement that explanations of this sort have the 
potential to provide unified explanations of many phenomena, for example, explaining protein 
folding, catalysis, and allostery in one fell swoop.  
This dissertation is comprised of four substantive chapters, and although they all share a 
common theme, each chapter is self-contained. In the first two chapters, I develop a history of 
proteins in the twentieth century, as studied by molecular and structural biology, focusing on the 
shift from the static to dynamic view of proteins. In the final two chapters, I develop a 
philosophical analysis of this shift. I first analyze the epistemological relationships between the 
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static and dynamic view of proteins and then develop a novel philosophical account of explanation 
associated with the dynamic view.  
In Chapter 2 (“Proteins in Classical Molecular Biology: The Static View, Protein Structure, 
and Mechanistic Explanations of Allostery), I describe the origins of the static view of proteins in 
the early twentieth century, which held that proteins were compact, rigid, and static molecules. 
Because of this view, protein dynamics were largely ignored, since they were not thought to play 
a role in protein function. In the first part of the chapter, I consider the development of two accounts 
of protein function in the 1950s and 1960s that seemed to break from the static view: Daniel 
Koshland’s induced-fit model of catalysis and Jacques Monod’s model of allostery. I analyze the 
role of protein dynamics in these two accounts of protein function and assess their compatibility 
with the static view. I argue that neither account of protein function represented a serious challenge 
to the static view of proteins. In the second part of the chapter, I focus my analysis on the 
development of the Monod-Wyman-Changeux (MWC) model of allostery, since this episode 
played a central role in the birth of structural biology. While some recent scientific commentators 
have claimed that the MWC model is not explanatory, I argue that it fits philosophical accounts of 
mechanistic explanation. Although it is an abstract, how-plausibly model, it nevertheless reveals 
the underlying molecular mechanism that explains the allosteric effect.  
In Chapter 3 (“From Static to Dynamic: A Historical Account of the Emergence of the 
Dynamic View of Proteins”), I shift my attention to the dynamic view of proteins. Here, I develop 
a historical account of the origin and spread of the dynamic view that answers two historical 
puzzles: (1) why did the dynamic view emerge in the 1970s and 1980s as an alternative to the 
dominant static view? and (2) what explains the long time lag between the origin of the view and 
its eventual acceptance? The answer to both questions, I contend, reveals the importance of theory 
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in this history. I argue that the theoretical understanding of protein dynamics was the primary 
driver behind the emergence of this new view of proteins. The application of thermodynamic 
principles to proteins led to the development of the dynamic view, and commitment to these 
principles led a small group of scientists to seek out anomalous cases of protein dynamics that 
could not be explained by the static view. These researchers slowly accumulated empirical 
evidence for the dynamic view, and their empirical findings eventually convinced the majority of 
protein scientists. Explaining the uptake of the dynamic view therefore involves the discovery of 
anomalies aided by new technologies, but the commitment to treating proteins as small 
thermodynamic systems ultimately drove that search for anomalies. For this reason, I conclude 
that the emergence and spread of the dynamic view of proteins view was, at its core, theory-driven. 
In Chapter 4 (“Protein Concepts, Representations, and their Epistemic Relations”), I turn 
my attention from historical analysis to consider the epistemic relations between protein concepts. 
Specifically, I characterize the epistemic relationships that obtain between the structural and 
dynamic protein concepts and their associated representations. A major innovation of my 
philosophical approach to this topic is the identification of two levels of analysis. I argue that we 
must distinguish the epistemic relationship that obtains between the two protein concepts from the 
epistemic relationships that obtain among their associated representations. From my analysis of 
the concepts, I argue that conceptual replacement, rather than reduction or integration, is occurring 
in protein science. The conceptual core of the structural concept includes beliefs about proteins 
that privilege structure over dynamics that are rejected by the dynamic concept. The dynamic 
concept replaces those beliefs with ones that recognize structure and dynamics as co-determinants 
of protein function. On my view, this revision in the inferential role of the concept is too drastic to 
count as reduction and instead constitutes conceptual replacement. At the level of representations, 
 7 
however, I argue that dynamic and structural representations of proteins are typically related via 
abstraction. In other words, a structural representation can be obtained by abstracting away 
dynamic information from a representation that includes both dynamic and structural properties of 
proteins. Because protein dynamics and structure are largely partitionable subfeatures of proteins, 
the inclusion or exclusion of one of them in a representation has little effect on the other. Therefore, 
scientists can often transition between structural and dynamic representations of proteins via 
processes of abstraction or de-idealization.   
In Chapter 5 (“Ensemble Explanation of Protein Function: A Philosophical Account of a 
Novel Type of Explanation in the Biological Sciences”), I develop an account of ensemble 
explanation of protein behavior. These explanations deserve philosophical attention, since they are 
becoming increasingly common in structural and molecular biology as scientists recognize the 
importance of dynamic properties of proteins. To capture protein dynamics, these explanations 
represent a population of protein molecules as an ensemble of structurally distinct microstates. 
They cite changes in the equilibrium distribution of protein molecules across microstates, caused 
by perturbations, to explain protein functions. After developing my account, I compare ensemble 
explanations to two different philosophical accounts of explanation: equilibrium explanation and 
causal explanation in thermodynamics. I argue that ensemble explanations do not fit the model of 
equilibrium explanations because the equilibria in ensemble explanations do not play the right 
explanatory role. Instead, I argue that ensemble explanations are a species of causal explanation, 
similar to but distinct from causal explanations in thermodynamics. They are, moreover, distinct 
from mechanistic explanations of protein behavior. My account shows that scientists have not 
simply modified mechanistic explanations to include protein dynamics. Instead, they have 
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developed ensemble explanations as a novel type of explanation to deal with the added complexity 
of protein dynamics. 
Ultimately, this project aims to contribute to the still nascent history and philosophy of the 
molecular life sciences. In my view, the molecular life sciences—biophysics, biochemistry, and 
structural and molecular biology—offer untapped potential for history and philosophy of science. 
By examining historical, epistemological, and methodological questions that arise in these sciences 
and relating them to debates in general philosophy of science, my dissertation will hopefully be of 
interest to historians and philosophers of science, as well as those with more specialized interest 
in structural and molecular biology. 
 
 9 
2.0 Proteins in Classical Molecular Biology: The Static View, Protein Structure, and 
Mechanistic Explanations of Allostery 
2.1 Introduction 
Because of their role in carrying out most biological functions, proteins have been an 
important object of scientific inquiry since the late nineteenth century (Fruton 1999). Research in 
the twentieth century quickly gave rise to the static view of proteins. On this view, globular 
proteins, such as enzymes, were thought to be compact, rigid, and static molecules. When coupled 
with the structure-function rule, which held that protein structure determined protein function, the 
static view offered a heuristic for explaining the behavior and function of proteins (Sarkar 2008). 
In the 1970s and 1980s, a new dynamic view of proteins gradually emerged as a challenge to the 
prevailing static view. It held that proteins were dynamic molecules undergoing constant structural 
fluctuations. The second chapter of this dissertation recounts the emergence of this new view and 
its slow adoption by molecular and structural biologists. In this chapter, however, I begin by 
attending to the previous period—the late 1950s through the 1960s—when the static view of 
proteins remained largely unchallenged. This was the heyday of classical molecular biology, what 
one commentator has called “the decade of the rigid macromolecule” (Phillips 1981, 497).  
During the reign of the static view, however, not all molecular biologists were committed 
to the view that macromolecules were entirely rigid; they developed two new accounts of protein 
function that posited a limited role for protein dynamics. First, in 1959, Daniel Koshland presented 
his induced-fit model of enzyme catalysis, which held that an enzyme changed conformation upon 
binding its substrate. Then, in the early 1960s, Jacques Monod and his colleagues at the Pasteur 
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Institute developed a model of allostery, which posited that allosteric proteins could adopt one of 
two conformations. My first objective in this chapter is to provide a historical account of the 
development of these two cases. I analyze the role of protein dynamics in these two accounts of 
protein function and assess their compatibility with the static view of proteins. Ultimately, I argue 
that although they did posit a limited role for protein dynamics in protein function, neither account 
of protein function represented a serious challenge to the static view of proteins.  
My second objective leads me to focus more closely on Monod’s discovery and 
characterization of allostery, or what he called “the second secret of life” (Ullman 1979, 167). 
Important for cellular and metabolic regulation, allostery is the phenomenon whereby binding at 
one site on a protein affects binding at a distant site. Through a series of important papers in the 
early 1960s, Monod and his colleagues established a structural framework for explaining allostery 
that set the research agenda for the field until the turn of the century.1 But, despite the foundational 
role of allostery within structural biology, its history has been largely overlooked by historians of 
science. Angela Creager and Jean-Paul Gaudilliere’s (1996) account of the early evolution of the 
concept is one noteworthy exception. The recent 50-year anniversary of the discovery of allostery 
and the development of influential Monod-Wyman-Changeux (MWC) model has produced a 
flurry of scientific retrospectives recounting the history of allostery.2 Using these new sources, as 
well as previously published papers and unpublished archival sources, I revisit this history, tracing 
the development of the concept of allostery from 1961 through the publication of the MWC model 
in 1965. In addition to fleshing out earlier historical accounts, my main aim here is more 
 
1 See Monod and Jacob (1961), Monod et al. (1963), Monod et al. (1965). 
2 For recent scientific retrospectives of the history of allostery, see Changeux (2011), (2012), and (2013) and Gerhart 
(2014) as well as the special issue of the Journal of Molecular Biology devoted to the 50-year history of this topic 
(Edelstein 2013).    
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philosophical. Recent scientific commentators have claimed that the MWC model was merely 
phenomenological and did not explain allostery. I disagree. I analyze the model and argue that it 
fits philosophical accounts of mechanistic explanation. On my view, the MWC model is an abstract 
model as well as a how-plausibly model, since many of its structural posits were not yet confirmed 
in 1965, but it is nevertheless a mechanistic explanation of allostery. 
In what follows, I first describe the development of the static view of proteins in the early 
twentieth century (Sec. 2.2). I then discuss Koshland’s induced-fit model of catalysis (Sec. 2.3) 
and Monod’s account of allostery (Sec. 2.4) within the context of the static view of proteins, 
arguing that both accounts can be accommodated within the static view. I next turn my attention 
more squarely to the MWC model of allostery (Sec. 2.5). I present and analyze the model and then 
argue that it should be construed as a mechanistic explanation of allostery.   
2.2 The Static View of Proteins 
For the first half of the twentieth century, the dominant view of protein structure held that 
globular proteins were rigid, compact, and largely static molecules. Experimental evidence and 
theoretical support for this characterization of proteins came from the work of organic chemists 
and protein scientists since the end of the nineteenth century. By 1900, Gerrit Mulder and other 
chemists had established that proteins were primarily composed of amino acids (Fruton 1999, 
Tanford and Reynolds 2001). Concurrent work by Emil Fischer and Franz Hofmeister in Germany 
suggested that the amino acids in proteins were joined together into long chains by a single bond 
type, named the “peptide” bond by Fischer (Fischer and Fourneau 1902, Fischer 1906, Hofmeister 
1902). Although there were some early holdouts, the theory of the peptide bond and the linear 
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structure of amino acids would become textbook science by 1920. While it was a significant 
advance in understanding protein structure, the peptide bond did not explain how these long chains 
of amino acids were folded into 3D structures. Experimental results soon indicated the diameters 
of globular proteins in solution were much smaller than the linear amino acid chains of which they 
were comprised. This finding, along with other results measuring the electric charge on proteins, 
led many researchers in the 1920s and 1930s to adopt a view of proteins as compact, spherical 
molecules, which carried a high density of surface charges that made them water soluble (Tanford 
and Reynolds 2001).  
Early work on protein crystallography, beginning in the mid-1930s, lent additional support 
to this static view of proteins. In 1934, John Bernal and Dorothy Crowfoot Hodgkin published the 
first x-ray crystal structure of a globular protein—pepsin (Bernal and Crowfoot 1934). The crystal 
structure revealed that pepsin had an ordered structure. Bernal later described those first crystal 
structures as being of “exceptional perfection” (Bernal 1939, 663). He claimed that the regularity 
of the crystals “indicated that not only were the molecules of the proteins substantially identical in 
shape and size, but also that they had identical and regular internal structures right down to the 
atomic dimensions” (Ibid.). In other words, this early crystallographic evidence was taken to show 
both that protein molecules had rigid structures, with each molecule fixed in place, and that all 
protein molecules of the same type had the same 3D structure. 
The crystallographic work of John Kendrew on myoglobin and Max Perutz on hemoglobin 
in the 1950s and 1960s further bolstered the rigid view of proteins. Their studies showed that these 
proteins were composed of densely packed polypeptide chains (Green et al. 1954, Kendrew et al. 
1958, Perutz et al. 1960). In her contribution on protein structure to a four-volume compendium 
entitled The Proteins (1953), which aimed to review the current knowledge of the topic, Barbara 
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Low highlighted the structural findings from crystallography that supported the static, structural 
view of proteins: x-ray diffraction patterns indicate that many proteins have high electron density 
rods in a “close-packed array,” which “probably correspond to coiled peptide chains in the 
molecular structure” (Low 1953, 240). However, she acknowledged the limitations of these 
findings and the need to obtain more and better high-resolution protein structures: 
At best, a “bird’s eye” long-distance view of some protein molecules has been derived. It 
is, however, far from a detailed or precise description of the molecular architecture from 
which may be identified the sequence of amino acids along the chains, the nature of the 
intrachain coils or folds, interchain packing, and finally, the 3N Cartesian coordinates of 
the equilibrium positions in space of the N atoms in the molecule. (Ibid.) 
 
As this passage from The Proteins (1953) shows, structural biologists recognized the promise of 
x-ray crystallography for the study of proteins by the 1950s. Although the available structures at 
that time provided only coarse-grained information about the interior structure of globular proteins, 
the evidence they did provide corroborated the static view of proteins. Moreover, crystallographers 
and protein scientists were confident that improvements in x-ray crystallography would eventually 
reveal the complex molecular architecture that enabled proteins to maintain stable 3D structures. 
Contemporaneous theoretical work on protein structure reveals that scientists working on 
protein structure from a theoretical perspective were also committed to the static view of proteins. 
Perhaps the most famous of those working on the problem of proteins structure in the 1950s was 
Linus Pauling. Using approximations of interatomic distances and bond angles obtained from x-
ray crystal structures, Pauling and colleagues developed a plausible model for the secondary 
structure of amino acids in the interior of a globular proteins: the -helix (Pauling et al. 1951). To 
build the model, they adopted a principle of maximum hydrogen bonding. Maximizing the number 
of hydrogen bonds between amino acids in the chain restricts the rotational degrees of freedom 
available to a polypeptide chain without any additional structure. The structure that maximized the 
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number of these internal bonds would consequently be the most rigid and stable helix possible. 
Thus, in theoretical work of this sort, the rigidity of globular proteins was an assumption the 
modelers built into their models. 
This experimental and theoretical work on protein structure was complemented by earlier 
work on protein function that also endorsed a rigid and static view of proteins. The dominant theory 
of enzyme catalysis, from the 1890s until the 1950s, was the lock-and-key, or template, model of 
catalysis. Introduced by Fischer in 1890 to explain the specificity of enzymes for their substrates, 
this model of catalysis hypothesized a rigid fit between an enzyme (lock) and its specific substrate 
(key) (Fischer 1890, 1894). Daniel Koshland offered a description of Fischer’s lock-and-key 
model in 1958: “In essence this theory said that the enzyme was a rather rigid negative of the 
substrate and that the substrate had to fit into this negative to react” (1958, 99). According to 
Koshland, with minor modifications and refinements, this model was the accepted view through 
the mid-1950s, since it offered “the best framework for explaining” the phenomenon of enzyme-
substrate specificity (Ibid., 99). On this view, enzymes can carry out their catalytic function only 
if they maintain a fixed 3D structure that complements their substrates. 
From the end of the nineteenth century up until the 1950s, research on protein structure 
and function converged on a static view of proteins. With the acceptance of this static, structural 
view of proteins, protein scientists in the mid-twentieth century naturally expected the emerging 
technology of x-ray crystallography, which offered detailed but static representations of proteins, 
to be the key to elucidating protein structure and answering questions about protein function. 
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2.3 A Functional Role for Protein Dynamics: Koshland’s Induced-Fit Model of Catalysis 
The account of protein structure generally accepted by the 1950s did not recognize a 
functional role for protein flexibility or dynamics. That changed when Daniel Koshland introduced 
his induced-fit model of enzyme catalysis at the “Symposium on Amino Acid Activation” at the 
meeting of the National Academy of Science in November 1957 (Koshland 1958). Presented as a 
correction to Fischer’s lock-and-key model of protein catalysis, the induced-fit model proposed 
that substrate binding causes an enzyme to change conformation. According to the model, it is this 
induced change in enzyme conformation that brings the catalytic groups on the enzyme into the 
proper orientation with the substrate in order to catalyze the reaction. Koshland’s induced-fit 
model was a major advance in the history of protein science and the understanding of protein 
structure. Proteins, which were previously viewed as wholly rigid and static, were for the first time 
thought to undergo conformational changes essential to the performance of their function. 
Nevertheless, I argue that the protein flexibility proposed by Koshland’s model did not 
significantly challenge the static view of proteins; instead, the model proposed a modification that 
was easily incorporated by it. 
The induced-fit model of enzyme catalysis was designed to overcome certain explanatory 
problems that beset the lock-and-key model (Koshland 1958, 1959, 1963). According to the lock-
and-key model, the enzyme contains “a relatively hard and inflexible active site” that directly 
complements the stereospecific structure of the substrate (Koshland 1959, 245). While this 
explains why larger compounds analogous to the substrate show no catalytic activity (i.e., they are 
“keys” too large to fit into the “lock” formed by the active site), it fails to explain why smaller 
compounds also fail to react. That is, the lock-and-key model offers no explanation for why smaller 
substrate analogues with the same reactive sites as the substrate would not react. These molecules 
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are small enough to fit into the active site cavity, yet kinetic studies had shown that they also fail 
to react (Koshland 1958, 1959). Koshland introduced his induced-fit theory to account for this 
puzzling experimental observation. 
His theory had three main postulates: (1) catalysis requires “precise orientation” of the 
substrate and catalytic groups on the enzyme, (2) substrate binding causes significant changes “in 
the three-dimensional relationship of amino acids at the active site,” and (3) these substrate-
induced changes in protein structure “bring the catalytic groups into the proper orientation for 
reaction,” while the binding of non-substrate molecules will not (Koshland 1958, 100). According 
to the induced-fit model, only the substrate or substrate analogues of similar size will be able to 
react with the enzyme. A substrate analogue that is larger or smaller than the actual substrate will 
fail to establish the necessary linkages with the active site on the enzyme and will consequently 
fail to react.  
This model of catalysis rejected the static picture of the enzyme of the lock-and-key model. 
According to Koshland, the results of enzyme modification studies suggest that it is unlikely that 
“a rigid ‘positive’ substrate fits a rigid ‘negative’ template” (Koshland 1963, 1540). To replace the 
lock-and-key metaphor, Koshland introduced a new metaphor for the induced-fit model: “the 
substrate induces a structural change in the molecule, as a hand changes the shape of a glove” 
(1963, 1540). As the glove metaphor illustrates, Koshland’s theory retained the notion of fit, or 
structural complementarity, between the enzyme and substrate, but it emphasized that the fit is 
obtained “only after the changes induced by the substrate itself” (Koshland 1958, 100, emphasis 
in original).  
In recounting the history of protein dynamics, the importance of the induced-fit model 
cannot be overstated. For the first time, proteins were recognized as flexible molecules that 
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undergo structural changes in order to perform their functions. Nevertheless, in the initial 
presentations of the theory, Koshland (1958, 1959) downplayed its novelty, arguing that earlier 
studies had already demonstrated that proteins were flexible.3 Citing studies showing the reversible 
denaturation of certain enzymes when exposed to urea, Koshland argued that they provided 
evidence for a structural change in proteins, since the denatured proteins exhibited changes from 
their native counterparts in their optical rotation, sedimentation rates, and other properties that 
depended on the 3D structure of the protein (Koshland 1958). While these studies do indeed show 
that enzyme structure can change under certain conditions (e.g., transitioning from a folded active 
conformation to an unfolded, denatured conformation and back again), they do not show that this 
flexibility is a part of normal protein function. Urea denaturation is a laboratory technique involved 
in protein purification, and the action of an enzyme under these conditions has little bearing on 
normal enzyme function (Bonner 2019). The novelty of the induced-fit model is that the enzyme 
flexibility and conformational change it postulates are essential to the normal functioning of 
enzymes.  
It would be a mistake, however, to think that Koshland’s induced-fit theory represented a 
significant challenge to the prevailing static of protein structure. Rather, the induced-fit model was 
a friendly amendment that was easily accommodated within the static, structural view of proteins. 
Although Koshland’s theory introduced dynamics and flexibility into a molecule previously 
considered static and rigid, that motion was carefully circumscribed in a way that allowed it to fit 
 
3 In a much later commemorative lecture, Koshland provides his rationale for downplaying the novelty of the induced-
fit theory with its postulation of functionally relevant protein motions: “The theory of Emil Fischer was deep in the 
hearts of scientists and journal editors, so I had great difficulty getting the original ideas published or convincing 
skeptics, but we did obtain more evidence from my own laboratory, and soon others joined in” (Koshland 1994, 2378). 
Koshland’s memory of publishing his theory reinforces my claim that the static view of proteins, which acknowledged 
no place for enzyme flexibility or dynamics, was still the prevailing view in the late 1950s.     
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within the existing static framework. The dynamics that occurred upon substrate binding merely 
enabled the enzyme to switch between two structures—one conformation for the enzyme-substrate 
complex and one for the free enzyme. These structures were hypothesized to be discrete and fully 
determined by the binding context: “the protein changes shape under the influence of the substrate 
and returns to its original shape after the products have been released from the enzyme surface” 
(Koshland 1959, 247). Hence, each of these two possible enzyme conformations—bound and 
free—were assumed to have structures that were stable and rigid.  
Koshland himself highlights the conformity of this limited kind of protein dynamics with 
the static view of proteins. In his discussion of protein structure-function relationships, he 
approvingly cites Kendrew’s crystallographic work on myoglobin, which he claims showed that 
the “folding of linear arrays of amino acids” is “precisely defined,” forming a “unique three-
dimensional” structure for this protein (Koshland 1963, 1533). Moreover, he is hopeful that the 
“‘moment of truth’ is not far off” when crystallographers will be able to determine the 3D structure 
of enzymes, in both their bound and free forms, in much the same way (Ibid. 1540). If Koshland 
saw the protein flexibility postulated by his theory as a refutation of the static view of proteins, he 
would certainly not cite these structural studies so enthusiastically. Although he considered the 
induced-fit model of catalysis as a replacement for Fischer’s lock-and-key model, he also saw his 
account of limited enzyme flexibility as compatible with the prevailing static view of protein 
structure. Whereas before 1958 every protein had one rigid conformation, after the introduction of 
the induced-fit model, some proteins—viz., enzymes—would be assumed to have two 
conformations, each of which would have its own precise, well-defined, and stable structure.  
Although Koshland’s work in the late 1950s and early 1960s highlights the “dynamic 
interaction” between the enzyme and substrate and the “flexible nature” of the enzyme (Koshland 
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1963, 1540; Koshland 1958, 101), the protein flexibility postulated by the induced-fit theory is 
strikingly different from the dynamic motions relevant to the dynamic view of proteins that first 
appeared in the late 1970s. The flexibility Koshland describes in his 1959 paper entitled “Enzyme 
Flexibility and Enzyme Action” did not arise from the inherent “jigglings and wigglings of atoms” 
(Feynman et al. 1963). Instead, the enzyme is flexible because it responds to an exogenous 
substance—viz., the substrate—in order to adopt a different conformation. The two structures the 
enzyme adopts are internally stable; they are not hypothesized to undergo any motion except when 
acted upon by the substrate. Koshland’s primary goal is to distinguish his theory from Fischer’s 
lock-and-key theory, rather than the static view of protein structure. Hence, he claims that the 
conformational changes postulated by his induced-fit model should typically be “big” and 
“significant” structural changes (Koshland 1994, 2377). Moreover, he explicitly argues that the 
induced-fit model does not apply to the sort of protein dynamics that would arise from random 
thermal fluctuations that cause the protein to deviate from its average structure:  
The important feature from the induced fit theory is that the alignment of catalytic groups 
and binding groups must be optimized for the transition state, and the attainment of the 
state is unfavorable energetically unless it is supplied with the energy of the substrate 
binding. If the protein movements were easy to attain, they would occur spontaneously 
often enough to have little effect on catalysis. (Ibid., 2378) 
 
Even in 1994, when accounts of protein dynamics were already beginning to appear, Koshland 
confirmed that the induced-fit model aimed to describe relatively large translational motions that 
enable an enzyme to switch between two discrete structural conformations and not the small, fast 
timescale motions that are at the heart of dynamic accounts of proteins. In sum, Koshland’s work 
on enzyme flexibility in the late 1950s and early 1960s represented an important advance because 
it was the first to argue that protein motion could be relevant for protein function. However, it did 
not pose a significant challenge to the prevailing view of protein structure. 
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2.4 Another Role for Protein Dynamics: Monod’s Discovery of Structural Allostery 
Around the time that Koshland was advocating a new role for protein dynamics in catalysis, 
another set of scientists studying enzymes were considering a potential role for dynamics in a 
different protein function, namely, allostery. Allostery, or the phenomenon whereby binding at 
one site on a protein affects binding at a distant site, was discovered and characterized by Monod 
and his colleagues at the Pasteur Institute in the early 1960s. Building upon previous work on 
feedback inhibition, Monod introduced the term “allosteric inhibition” in 1961 to generalize the 
phenomenon, focusing on features of protein structure that enable a ligand that is structurally 
dissimilar from the substrate to bind an enzyme in order to regulate its function.  
In this section, I draw upon archival and published sources, scientific retrospectives, and 
the historical analysis of Angela Creager and Jean-Paul Gaudilliere (1996) to document this early 
history of allostery. I focus primarily on the role Monod and his colleagues at the Pasteur Institute 
played in characterizing and explaining allostery from 1961 until the publication of the MWC 
model in 1965. My periodization largely tracks their three major publications during this time. 
However, I begin by describing the biological research in the 1950s on bacterial feedback, or end-
product inhibition, since Monod drew heavily upon this earlier research (Sec. 2.4.1). I then analyze 
Monod’s concluding remarks to the 1961 Cold Spring Harbor meeting in which he first introduced 
and characterized the concept of “allosteric inhibition.” I argue that the concept shifted attention 
from the biological function of feedback to the physical structure of enzymes (Sec. 2.4.2). I then 
show how Monod and his colleagues at the Pasteur Institute refined the concept in a review article, 
published in the Journal of Molecular Biology in 1963. The review sketched a molecular 
mechanism that posited changes in protein structure to explain allostery (Sec. 2.4.3). Because of 
 21 
its importance in this history, I reserve my discussion of the MWC model itself for the following 
section (Sec. 2.5).  
2.4.1 Feedback Inhibition 
Monod coined the term “allosteric” in his concluding remarks to the Cold Spring Harbor 
meeting in 1961, but the history of allostery actually began the decade before. It originated with 
the discovery of “feedback inhibition” in the laboratories of two American researchers 
investigating cellular regulation in bacteria. H. Edwin Umbarger at Harvard and Arthur Pardee at 
Berkeley both independently discovered the phenomenon of feedback inhibition in the mid-1950s 
(Umbarger 1956; Yates and Pardee 1956b). They found that the enzyme at the beginning of a 
biosynthetic pathway could be inhibited by the end product of the pathway. Umbarger, for 
example, showed that the enzyme threonine deaminase, the first step in the biosynthesis of the 
amino acid isoleucine, was inhibited by isoleucine, its end-product.  
The discovery of feedback inhibition occurred as these researchers were attempting to map 
out different metabolic and biosynthetic pathways in E. coli. Although Umbarger studied amino 
acid synthesis and Pardee investigated nucleic acid synthesis, both researchers used similar 
experimental methods, which were becoming common in the burgeoning fields of bacterial 
genetics and cell regulation (Dixon and Webb 1964). Researchers in these fields induced mutations 
into E. coli and isolated mutants that required certain metabolites in order to survive (e.g., 
particular amino or nucleic acid intermediates). They hypothesized that the mutant strains were 
lacking an enzyme in a particular biosynthetic pathway. The absence of a functional enzyme would 
lead to the accumulation of the metabolites from the preceding steps in the pathway, but the 
bacteria could overcome this “enzymatic blockade” when the metabolite normally synthesized by 
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the defective enzyme was added to the cell culture. Researchers were thus able to identify the 
intermediate steps in various biosynthetic pathways by identifying the metabolites that 
accumulated. While conducting research of this sort, Umbarger and Pardee confirmed earlier work 
indicating that particular amino acid and nucleic acid biosynthetic pathways were inhibited by the 
presence of the end-product of the pathway. What made their discoveries noteworthy, however, 
was the fact that they identified the first enzymatic step in the respective pathways as the point of 
inhibition and then sought to characterize the mechanism of inhibition of these enzymes under 
negative feedback control.4 To accomplish this aim, they turned to the methods of biochemistry 
and enzyme kinetics.  
By the 1950s, kinetic assays were a standard tool for the study of enzymes. Reflecting on 
his time as Monod’s graduate student in the late 1950s and early 1960s, Jean-Pierre Changeux 
recalls how Malcolm Dixon and Edwin Webb’s Enzymes quickly became “the bedside book of 
biochemistry students” such as himself (Changuex 1993, 625). This textbook summarized the great 
progress on enzymes and enzyme kinetics in the first half of the twentieth century. During that 
time, work in enzyme kinetics focused on the formalization of reaction kinetics, identifying how 
to mathematically describe and experimentally quantify the process of enzyme-substrate formation 
and transformation into products.  
The simplest kinetic assays, both in the 1950s and still today, measure either the appearance 
of product or the disappearance of substrate over time. From this data, researchers calculate certain 
catalytic properties of enzymes, such as their maximum velocity (Vmax). Typically, the values of 
 
4 When Novick and Szilard (1954) showed that the synthesis of a tryptophan precursor was inhibited by tryptophan, 
they hypothesized that the end-product was inhibiting an enzyme early in the pathway. Umbarger, however, was the 
first to work “directly at the enzyme-level” in order to show that the first enzyme in the pathway was “strongly and 
specifically inhibited” by the metabolic end-product (Monod and Jacob 1961, 390-1).  
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these properties are estimated from Michaelis-Menten plots. Named after the pioneering work of 
Leonor Michaelis and Maud Menten (1913), the Michaelis-Menten plot is a substrate saturation 
curve that depicts the velocity of the reaction at different substrate concentrations with fixed 
enzyme concentration. Standard Michaelis-Menten plots take the form of a rectangular hyperbola 
(Fig. 1).  
 
Figure 1 Idealized Michaelis-Menton Plot. Enzyme activity plot, showing dependence of enzyme velocity (V) on 
substrate concentration. Image by Thomas Shafee, distrubuted under a CC BY 4.0 license 
<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0>, via Wikimedia Commons. 
 
They enable the estimation of Vmax, which is the asymptote of the hyperbolic function, as 
well as the Michaelis constant (Km), which is the substrate concentration at half Vmax (Km describes 
the binding affinity of the substrate for the enzyme). Different enzymes, or even the same enzyme 
under different conditions, will have different values for Vmax and Km reflected in changes in the 
slope of the curve or the value of the asymptote. However, the rectangular hyperbola of the 
Michaelis-Menten plot was thought to be a largely invariant feature of enzyme kinetics that could 
accurately describe most enzymes under most conditions (Dixon and Webb 1964).  
The presence or absence of inhibitors, for example, was a condition often interpreted within 
the Michaelis-Menten framework. Many biochemists and enzymologists in the early twentieth 
century were interested in understanding the effects of inhibitors on enzyme kinetics. At that time, 
competitive inhibition, in which the inhibitor competes with the substrate for binding at the active 
site, was the best understood type of inhibition. Researchers were able to identify and characterize 
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these inhibitors by comparing Michaelis-Menten plots conducted in the presence and absence of 
the inhibitor. Although the features of the saturation curves for an enzyme would differ depending 
on the presence and relative concentration of inhibitor, they would all be accurately represented 
by rectangular hyperbolas. In this case, the asymptote (Vmax) would remain the same, but the slope 
of the curve would become less steep in the presence of the inhibitor. Inhibitors caused changes in 
the Michaelis-Menten plots that altered the plots in predictable ways but left the mathematical 
structure of the hyperbola intact.  
When Umbarger and Pardee identified enzymes with unique inhibitory properties at the 
beginning of biosynthetic pathways, they were able to turn to these standard tools of enzyme 
kinetics to characterize their behavior. The earliest experiments in both labs used crude cell 
extracts rather than purified enzymes to measure the kinetic properties of these enzymes. Despite 
this limitation, Umbarger’s and Pardee’s laboratories were able to approximately quantify the 
inhibition of threonine deaminase and ATCase, respectively, by measuring the Vmax and Km of 
these enzymes in the presence and absence of their inhibitors. Based on the substrate saturation 
curves, which showed that the inhibitor did not change the maximum velocity but required higher 
substrate concentrations to reach it, they initially classified feedback inhibition as a type of 
competitive inhibition. In his one-page letter to Science in 1956 and again in his follow-up study 
with Barbara Brown in 1958, Umbarger noted that the inhibition of threonine deaminase did not 
follow standard Michaelis-Menten kinetics; in other words, the saturation curve in the presence of 
the inhibitor could not be described by a rectangular hyperbola.5 In presenting and discussing the 
novelty of his discovery, however, Umbarger (1956) downplayed the heterodox kinetics. Instead, 
 
5 In a paper drafted in 1961, Gerhart and Pardee (1962) would also note the heterodox kinetic behavior of ATCase, 
but, as Umbarger did in his earlier work, they downplayed these findings. 
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he emphasized the fact that threonine deaminase was specifically and strongly inhibited by the 
end-product of the pathway, isoleucine, rather than by intermediate metabolites in the pathway or 
other amino acids.6 Similarly, Pardee and Yates included a table showing that it was only the end-
product and not other pyrimidine intermediates that inhibited ATCase.7 In these early publications, 
both Umbarger and Pardee emphasize this peculiar feature of enzymes at the beginning of 
biosynthetic pathways and the biological importance of feedback inhibition.     
Within this scientific context in the 1950s, the concept of feedback inhibition referred to a 
biological phenomenon that was an important regulatory property of certain biological systems. 
The concept emphasized the role of feedback inhibition in the regulation of the cell and the 
maintenance of normal functioning. Strictly speaking, feedback inhibition was not a property of a 
particular enzyme, but rather it was a feature of a metabolic regulatory system. Umbarger (1956), 
for instance, justifies studying feedback inhibition in E. coli “because of the complexity of so many 
biological systems” (848). In contrast, he claims E. coli offers the researcher “less complex 
systems for study of internal regulation” (Ibid.). Although they studied the kinetic properties of 
particular enzymes, Umbarger and Pardee used the concept of feedback inhibition to refer not to 
an enzyme in isolation, but instead to an enzyme embedded within a particular regulatory 
context—viz., a biosynthetic pathway.  
The discoverers of feedback inhibition did not speculate on the molecular basis of 
inhibition. Their early work focused on the biological role of feedback inhibition. They did not 
study threonine deaminase and ATCase to determine their structural properties or any other 
features that might explain how their respective end-products inhibited these enzymes. The 
 
6 In fact, Umbarger (1956) includes only two sets of empirical data, and one is a table including exactly this 
information: “Table 1. Specificity of Inhibition of Threonine Deaminase.” 
7 See Table I in Yates and Pardee (1956, 764). 
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concept of feedback inhibition in the 1950s, which was to become the precursor for Monod’s new 
concept of “allosteric inhibition,” was thus a thoroughly biological concept.   
2.4.2 The Birth of Allosteric Inhibition 
In the summer of 1961, researchers working on cellular and metabolic regulation gathered 
in Long Island, New York, for the annual Cold Spring Harbor Symposium on Quantitative 
Biology. The topic of “Cellular Regulatory Mechanisms” brought together two groups of scientists 
studying protein synthesis and regulation. The first group focused on elucidating the genetic basis 
for protein synthesis, while the second studied the biochemical regulation of proteins. Many in 
both groups focused their attention on the synthesis and regulation of enzymes, in particular. 
Among those studying enzyme regulation were scientists who analyzed the genetic control of 
enzyme activity as well as those who studied the biochemical regulation of enzymes. The 
contingent from the Pasteur Institute was well represented in both of these camps: Jacob and 
Monod presented their model of gene control of enzyme synthesis (i.e., the lac operon model), 
work that would win them the 1965 Nobel Prize, and Changeux, Monod’s graduate student, 
presented his work on threonine deaminase in the section on feedback control. It is no wonder, 
then, that Arthur Chovnik and Umbarger, the main organizers of the conference, gave Monod and 
Jacob the prime speaking slot at the close of the program on July 12th. 
In their concluding remarks, Monod and Jacob sought “to reconsider the problem of 
cellular regulation as a whole” (389). Since Bernard Davis had already emphasized the ubiquity 
and physiological importance of regulatory mechanisms in his opening remarks eight days earlier, 
Monod and Jacob chose to “center attention on the mechanisms” of control (389). Their 
presentation was abstract and programmatic. They classified distinct types of cellular control 
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mechanisms and then presented “possible, plausible, and actual” mechanisms that fit their 
classificatory scheme (389). It is in the published version of these “General Conclusions” that 
Monod first introduces the concept of “allosteric inhibition” (390). 8 He presents this new concept 
as arising from an identification and high-level generalization of the key features of feedback 
inhibition, and he justifies the need for it by claiming that this generalized phenomenon is likely 
to be common.  
In the published conclusion to the Cold Spring Harbor meeting, Monod distinguishes 
allosteric inhibition from feedback inhibition, providing ample evidence that he intends for 
“allosteric inhibition” to refer to structural and mechanistic features of proteins rather than 
functional properties of biological systems. Through Monod’s summary of research on feedback 
inhibition, along with his discussion of the other mechanisms of cellular regulation discussed at 
the meeting, we can identify at least three ways that he distinguishes “allosteric inhibition” from 
“feedback inhibition.” First, Monod uses this new concept to signal a shift in focus from 
physiological effects to causal mechanisms. Both Umbarger and Pardee had discussed how 
feedback inhibition functioned in the “cellular economy” to promote the efficient use of energy 
and resources, but neither of these researchers had speculated on the molecular basis for the 
inhibitory mechanism in the late 1950s. Second, Monod suggests that the new concept of allosteric 
inhibition will require different research strategies. Whereas the physiological effects of feedback 
inhibition could be investigated via kinetic analysis, understanding the mechanisms of allosteric 
inhibition would require structural studies of proteins. Relatedly, a third distinguishing feature of 
allosteric inhibition was that it referenced the three-dimensional structure of an individual protein. 
 
8 Changeux (1993) claims this new terminology was added only in the published version.  
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A constant theme throughout Monod and Jacob’s summary of the state of research on 
cellular regulation is that understanding the observed regulatory effects would require the 
discovery of underlying causal mechanisms. They begin their remarks by attempting to “classify 
and define a priori the main types of cellular regulatory mechanism” (Ibid., 389). What they 
conclude from this logical exercise is that “all these mechanisms…are directedly related to the 
specific molecular structure of the enzymes, or other proteins, concerned” (Ibid., 390). Thus, their 
focus on understanding molecular mechanisms, rather than physiological effects, brought with it 
a new emphasis on protein structure that was absent from previous work on feedback inhibition. 
Understanding molecular mechanisms, on this view, entailed understanding certain aspects of 
protein structure. The new concept of “allosteric inhibition” was no exception: it referred to 
structural and mechanistic features of certain proteins.  
In the first mention of “allosteric inhibition” in the published conclusion to the 1961 
symposium, Monod presents it as a synonym for feedback or endproduct inhibition. However, the 
discussion in the section entitled “Endproduct or ‘Allosteric’ Inhibition” reveals that Monod 
intends for this change to be more than a mere change in name. In this section, he begins by 
summarizing the results of previous research on feedback inhibition, highlighting Umbarger’s 
work on threonine deaminase and praising it for revealing that the inhibitory relationship only 
exists between the endproduct and the first enzyme in a biosynthetic pathway. He then notes the 
functional importance of this phenomenon before introducing the new concept: 
As the reports here have shown, endproduct inhibition is extremely widespread in bacteria, 
insuring immediate and sensitive control over the rate of metabolite biosynthesis in most, 
if not all, pathways. From the point of view of mechanisms, the most remarkable feature 
of the Novick-Szilard-Umbarger [feedback] effect is that the inhibitor is not a steric 
analogue of the substrate. We propose to designate this mechanism as “allosteric 
inhibition.” (Ibid., 391, emphasis in original) 
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While introducing this new concept of allosteric inhibition, Monod draws a distinction between 
the observed feedback effect, on the one hand, and the mechanism that accounts for it, on the other. 
In this passage, he transitions from consideration of the biosynthetic “pathways” under feedback 
control to “the point of view of mechanisms,” and he introduces the concept of “allosteric 
inhibition” to refer to “this mechanism” that explains feedback inhibition rather than the feedback 
effect itself.   
Further support for this interpretation of “allosteric inhibition” comes from Monod’s 
identification of the concept with structural features of proteins. In the above passage, Monod 
emphasizes the fact that the allosteric inhibitor is “not a steric analogue of the substrate.” This 
finding is of critical importance, according to Monod, because it suggests that the inhibitor does 
not bind the enzyme at the active site. Because specific binding requires structural 
complementarity between the enzyme and ligand, if two ligands—e.g., substrate and inhibitor—
were structurally dissimilar, then they would be unlikely to bind the enzyme at the same site. This 
inference leads to the conclusion that the enzyme has two binding sites, the active site where the 
substrate binds and the allosteric site where the inhibitor binds.  
Earlier at the 1961 symposium, Changeux had presented evidence from his work on 
threonine deaminase in support of this two-site model for allosteric enzymes. He argued that the 
“dissimilarity of structure” between threonine (substrate) and isoleucine (inhibitor), along with 
experimental evidence that certain treatments of the native enzyme would lead to loss of inhibitor 
but not substrate binding, supported a model of this enzyme in which it has two distinct, 
nonoverlapping binding sites (Changeux 1961, 316). Monod expressed his support for this 
hypothesis in his concluding remarks: “This [i.e., the desensitization experiments] leads to the 
conclusion that two distinct, albeit interacting, binding sites exist on native threonine deaminase” 
 30 
(Monod and Jacob 1961, 391). Monod’s endorsement of the two-site model reveals that he was 
already considering the potential for structural features of enzymes to explain the observed 
feedback effect. This focus on the molecular mechanism of the effect, and protein structure in 
particular, differs from earlier work on feedback inhibition. Umbarger’s and Pardee’s research on 
feedback inhibition did not so much as speculate about the mechanism of the effect. In fact, in 
their publications in the late 1950s, these researchers did not even mention the structural 
dissimilarity between the substrates and inhibitors that Monod identifies in 1961 as the “most 
remarkable feature.” 
The centrality of the heterodox reaction kinetics further distinguishes Monod’s account of 
allosteric inhibition from the previous work on feedback inhibition. In their published reports from 
the meeting, both Changeux and Monod emphasized how the desensitization of the enzyme led to 
the loss of heterodox kinetics, leading them to conclude that the sigmoidal reaction curve of the 
enzyme was “directly related to its competence as a regulatory enzyme” (Monod and Jacob 1961, 
391). Although Umbarger and Pardee had noted the heterodox kinetics in their publications in the 
1950s, both had classified the inhibition as competitive without much further consideration.9 
Monod, in contrast, stressed the novelty of the mechanism in his concluding remarks: 
“Competitive inhibition, in this system, therefore is not due to mutually exclusive binding of the 
inhibitor and substrate, as in the classical case of steric analogies” (Monod and Jacob 1961, 391, 
emphasis in original). This novel molecular mechanism that Monod identifies then forms part of 
his justification for introducing “allosteric inhibition.” He hypothesizes that this mechanism “may 
 
9 Umbarger did postulate that the nonstandard kinetics curve might indicate the reaction was bimolecular, requiring 
two substrate molecules to bind the enzyme (Umbarger 1956, Umbarger and Brown 1958). By the time of the 1961 
meeting, Umbarger also entertained the two-site hypothesis, albeit less enthusiastically than either Changeux or 
Monod: “The site at which catalysis and endproduct inhibition occur need not be and perhaps never are, identical” 
(Umbarger 1961, 306).  
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therefore be a general one for enzymes subject to allosteric inhibition” (Ibid.). With the 
endorsement of the two-site model, Monod thus distinguishes “allosteric inhibition” from 
“feedback inhibition” in two ways. First, he makes heterodox reaction kinetics, depicted in the 
sigmoidal curve, a crucial feature of allosteric enzymes, and second, he shifts the focus from 
biological pathways to molecular mechanisms, identifying those mechanisms with certain features 
of protein structure.  
While the new concept of allosteric inhibition refers to the molecular mechanism 
responsible for the observed feedback effect, Monod does not claim to have offered a fully worked 
out account of that mechanism. In fact, his discussion of future research suggests that he thinks 
more empirical work is necessary in order to make this abstract concept more concrete. He presents 
the concept as a reasonably high-level and abstract concept—one which unlike feedback inhibition 
refers to protein structure and molecular mechanisms—while recognizing that the lower-level 
structural and mechanistic details still needed to be filled in.  
2.4.3 The Allosteric Transition and Changes in Protein Structure 
After the Cold Spring Harbor meeting, Changeux had great difficulty obtaining any useable 
new experimental data on threonine deaminase. Consequently, Monod and his colleagues at the 
Pasteur Institute shifted their attention to theoretical considerations, publishing a review article on 
allostery in 1963 (Creager and Gaudillere 1996). With this review, they reinforced and expanded 
their commitment to the two-site model and to structural explanations of allosteric enzymes more 
generally. In that paper, they considered three possible models for the interaction between the 
substrate and inhibitor on the enzyme (Monod et al. 1963): the first, in which the substrate and 
inhibitor binding sites are overlapping and inhibition occurs via steric hindrance (Model I); the 
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second, in which the two binding sites are nonoverlapping but sufficiently close that the substrate 
and inhibitor have direct attractive or repulsive interactions (Model II); or the third, in which the 
two binding sites are nonoverlapping and the interaction between the inhibitor and substrate is 
indirect, “mediated entirely by the protein” (Model III) (Ibid., 311). They argued that the available 
kinetics data for allosteric proteins were “incompatible with Model I and difficult to reconcile with 
Model II” (Ibid.). They thus conclude that allosteric proteins conform with Model III: they have 
two distinct binding sites. Since the substrate and inhibitor do not interact directly, they conclude 
that the allosteric interaction, which enables binding at one site to affect binding at a distant site, 
must be transmitted through structural changes within the protein itself. 
Unlike in 1961 when Changeux first introduced the two-site model, the account of allostery 
in the 1963 review aimed to solve the problem of action at a distance posed by allostery. Although 
the two-site model emerged as the consensus from the 1961 meeting, none of its proponents so 
much as speculated as to how the binding of the inhibitor at the allosteric site led to an effect on 
catalysis at the active site. In the 1963 review, Monod and his colleagues introduced the allosteric 
transition as a solution to this problem.10 On this account, binding of the inhibitor at the allosteric 
site caused the protein to undergo a conformational change—the allosteric transition—that altered 
the catalytic properties of the active site:  
The formation of the enzyme-allosteric effector complex…is assumed…to bring about a 
discrete reversible alteration of the molecular structure of the protein or allosteric 
transition, which modifies the properties of the active site, changing one or several of the 
kinetic parameters which characterize the biological activity of the protein. (Monod et al. 
1963, 307, emphasis in original) 
 
 
10 In their contribution to an edited volume on cell differentiation, Jacob and Monod (1963) write, “The sum of these 
observations very strongly suggests that the action of allosteric inhibitors is not due to a direct interference, by steric 
hindrance, with the binding of substrate, but rather to an induced alteration of the shape or structure of the enzyme 
protein, resulting in misfit or reduced fit of the substrate at the active site.” (33, emphasis added). It is possible that 
this chapter was drafted before the review article. 
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The allosteric transition thus explained how binding of one molecule at one site on a protein 
indirectly affected binding of another molecule at a distant site: the allosteric effect was “mediated 
entirely through the protein…by a conformational alteration” (Ibid., 310). Monod and his 
colleagues admitted that, at that time, the postulation of a “specifically inducible conformational 
alteration of protein structure” outstripped the evidence. Nevertheless, they argued that the 
available evidence, although limited, supported the conclusion that the binding of the effector 
caused an allosteric protein to switch between two distinct conformational states.  
At the time, there was very limited structural data on the few known allosteric enzymes, 
and neither ATCase nor threonine deaminase had been crystallized. Therefore, in order to assess 
their structural claims, Monod and his colleagues included hemoglobin in their 1963 review as an 
“honorary” allosteric enzyme. First suggested by Bernard Davis in the discussion of Changeux’s 
research at the 1961 Cold Spring Harbor meeting, this analogy between allosteric enzymes and 
hemoglobin was based upon striking qualitative similarities in the kinetics and oxygen-binding 
behavior of these proteins, as both exhibit the same heterodox sigmoidal saturation curve.11 
However, hemoglobin had a distinct advantage over bacterial enzymes. Because of its medical 
interest, hemoglobin had been the target of much x-ray crystallographic work. By 1963, Max 
Perutz had published the structure of hemoglobin, and his results suggested that oxygen-binding 
induced a conformational change in the protein (Perutz et al., 1960, Muirhead and Perutz 1963). 
Hence, by treating hemoglobin as an honorary allosteric enzyme, Monod and his colleagues saw 
 
11 Davis, “Discussion” in Changeux (1961). In an earlier paper, Wyman suggested that hemoglobin might be 
considered an “honorary” regulatory enzyme (Wyman and Allen 1951), but this paper was unknown to the Monod 
lab until Monod and Changeux had begun to collaborate with Wyman in 1963 (Changeux 1993). For a review of the 
history of this analogy, see Brunori (1999).  
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a way to provide some empirical evidence for the claim that allosteric proteins undergo a 
conformational change during the allosteric transition. 
Although certain aspects of structural allostery would not be fully elaborated by Monod 
and his colleagues until they developed their formal model in 1965, they had already identified 
certain features of allosteric proteins and laid out a general molecular framework for explaining 
allostery in their 1963 review. Building on their previous work, they continued to identify the 
common features of allosteric enzymes under feedback control. They highlighted structural 
features in particular, aiming to “formulate certain generalizations concerning the functional 
structures responsible” for allosteric regulation (Monod et al. 1963, 306). The major innovation of 
the review was the introduction of the allosteric transition, which described a conformational shift 
in the protein between two distinct structures. Protein dynamics were therefore already implicit in 
this account, since the allosteric transition requires a protein to shift from one conformation to 
another. I contend that this limited role for protein dynamics was easily accommodated by the 
static view of proteins. However, I will wait to defend this claim until after I present the MWC 
model, since it retains the allosteric transition and further explicates the dynamics required for a 
protein to shift between conformational states (see Sec. 2.5.3). 
2.5 The MWC Model: The First Explanation of Allostery 
Monod’s contribution to the history of allostery culminated in 1965 with the publication of 
the MWC model. In this paper, he and his colleagues completed the research program that he and 
Jacob had laid out in their concluding remarks to the Cold Spring Harbor meeting in July 1961. 
With Wyman and Changeux, Monod developed an explanatory model that revealed the molecular 
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mechanism responsible for the observed allosteric effect. In this section, I consider the model both 
historically and philosophically. I aim to accomplish three tasks. First, I briefly present the MWC 
model, arguing that it includes both a mathematical description as well as a particular physical 
interpretation (Sec. 2.5.1). I then argue that the MWC model offers an explanation for allostery 
(Sec. 2.5.2). Drawing upon philosophical work on explanation in the biological sciences, I argue 
that the model is best construed as an abstract mechanistic explanation. Based on the historical 
evidence, I further argue that Monod and his colleagues intended to offer the MWC model as an 
explanation for allostery. I then consider the relationship between the model, which posits a limited 
functional role for protein dynamics, and the static view of proteins (Sec. 2.5.3). Ultimately, I 
conclude that the features of proteins posited by the model do not require a significant departure 
from the dominant view.    
2.5.1 The Model 
In their highly influential 1965 paper, Monod, Wyman, and Changeux presented what 
would become known as the MWC model of allostery. The model has two parts. It includes a 
qualitative description of allostery based on the hypothesis that allosteric proteins have certain 
structural features, and it also includes a mathematical model. The mathematical model, which 
was derived from the application of principles of equilibrium chemistry to proteins with these 
unique structural features, was able to reproduce the sigmoidal kinetics behavior of allosteric 
proteins. Let us briefly consider these two parts of the MWC model in turn.  
Allosteric proteins, according to the model, were oligomeric proteins, composed of at least 
two identical monomers, and each monomer contained one stereospecific binding site for the 
substrate and one for the allosteric ligand. The protein molecule was hypothesized to be capable 
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of adopting one of two conformations, and the affinity of the protein for its ligands differed in each 
conformation: in the R (relaxed) state, the protein bound the substrate with high affinity, while in 
the T (tensed) state, the protein bound the inhibitor with high affinity. Finally, the model posited 
that any change in conformation would preserve the molecular symmetry of the molecule, so that 
a dimeric protein could either be in the RR conformation or the TT conformation.  
According to Monod and colleagues, when given a protein with these features, the 
allosteric effect will occur if the binding of an allosteric ligand shifts the equilibrium between the 
R and T conformations. For example, if the 𝑅 ⇌ 𝑇 equilibrium favors the T conformation (i.e., 
most of the protein molecules are in the T state) and the allosteric activator is added, it will stabilize 
those protein molecules already in the R conformation and shift the equilibrium to increase the 
proportion of the protein molecules that are in the R conformation. By shifting the 𝑅 ⇌ 𝑇 
equilibrium towards the R conformation, the allosteric activator thereby increases the proportion 
of protein molecules capable of binding the substrate with high affinity, since the high affinity 
substrate binding site exists only in the R conformation. 
Although the 1965 MWC paper does not include any figures depicting this process, Monod 
presented one during his Nobel lecture in December 1965 and Changeux included a more detailed 
one in his doctoral dissertation (Fig. 2).12 This figure depicts the major posits of the model. It 
shows the preservation of symmetry through the transition between R and T states. Moreover, the 
visible changes in the binding sites show that the R state has higher affinity for both the allosteric 
activator and substrate, whereas the T state has higher affinity for the allosteric inhibitor. 
 
12 Similar pictorial representations of allostery can now be found in practically any biochemistry textbook (e.g., Garrett 
and Grisham 2011). 
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Figure 2 Allosteric Transition (Changeux 2012). Schematic diagram of an allosteric dimer undergoing an 
allosteric transition from the relaxed (R) state (état relaché, left) to the tensed (T) state (état contraint, right). The 
diagram shows the differential binding affinities of these two states for the three ligands: substrate (S), allosteric 
activator (A), and allosteric inhibitor (I). It also depicts the dissociation between the dimer and the monomer 
(monomère). Redrawn from the original diagram included in Changuex’s 1964 doctoral thesis. Republished with 
permission from Changeux (2012); permission conveyed through Copyright Clearance Center, Inc. 
 
Monod provides a clear statement of how this model accounts for the observed behavior of 
allosteric proteins in his lecture notes for a course at the Collège de France in 1967. In a dimeric 
allosteric protein, the two possible conformations have different affinities for the allosteric 
activator F, with the R state having greater affinity for the activator. Monod writes, “In the presence 
of F, the [R] state is stabilized.” 13 In other words, the preferential formation of the protein-activator 
complex R-F shifts the equilibrium between the T and R states toward the latter. The cooperative 
effect then occurs because the “presence of an F associated with one of the dimers will increase 
the affinity of the other dimer for F.”14 Thus, the allosteric effect occurs because the binding of 
the effector to one subunit of a dimer in the R state effectively stabilizes that entire dimer in that 
state, leaving the second subunit primed to bind a second effector molecule. 
In the 1965 paper, Monod and his colleagues develop this qualitative description into a 
formal, mathematical model. Using the methods and principles of thermodynamics and 
 
13 Fonds Monod, emphasis in original, translated by the author. I have changed Monod’s notation for the two 
conformational states from A and A’ to T and R, respectively, in order to match the modern notation used throughout 
this chapter.  
14 Ibid., emphasis in original. 
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equilibrium chemistry, they show that a protein will be allosteric if it has (1) two accessible 
conformational states, T and R, in which (2) the equilibrium between these two favors the T state, 
and (3) the R state has greater binding affinity for the allosteric ligand. Furthermore, they note that 
the cooperative effect will be “more marked…when the 𝑅 ⇌ 𝑇 equilibrium is strongly in favour 
of T” and when the affinity of the protein for the allosteric ligand is much greater if the protein in 
the R state rather than the T state (Monod et al. 1965, 91).  
From their mathematical treatment of the model posits, they derive a saturation function 
(𝑌𝐹̅̅̅) for an allosteric protein given by the following equation:   
𝑌𝐹̅̅̅ =
𝐿𝑐𝛼(1 + 𝑐𝛼)𝑛−1 +  𝛼(1 − 𝛼)𝑛−1
𝐿(1 − 𝑐𝛼)𝑛 + (1−∝)𝑛
 
Here, n is the maximum number of ligand molecules that can bind the protein when it is fully 
saturated. For example, n = 2 for a dimer, with one ligand binding site per protomer subunit, and 
n = 4 for hemoglobin, which is a tetramer, with one oxygen-binding site per subunit. The 
normalized ligand concentration,  is calculated from the actual ligand concentration, F, by the 
following equation:  




in which KR is the dissociation constant of the protein in the R state for the ligand.15 By plotting 
the saturation function over the normalized ligand concentration, Monod and his colleagues 
constructed binding plots that show the dependence of the allosteric effect on the allosteric 
constant (L) and the ratio of the microscopic dissociation constants (c=KR/KT). It replicated the 
 
15 The smaller the KR the stronger the affinity of the protein in the R state for the ligand. 
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sigmoidal saturation curve discovered by Changeux, Pardee, and Umbarger for allosteric enzymes 
as well as the oxygen-binding curves of hemoglobin. 
 
 
Figure 3 Allosteric Protein Ligand Binding Curves (Monod et al. 1965). Theoretical curves for ligand binding at 
different concentrations for allosteric proteins with different values for allosteric (L) and dissociation constants (c). 
Republished with permission from Monod et al. (1965); permission conveyed through Copyright Clearance Center, 
Inc. 
 
These plots for a tetramer (n = 4), such as hemoglobin, depict the effect of both the allosteric 
constant (Fig. 3a) and ratio between dissociation constants (Fig. 3b) on the strength of the observed 
allosteric effect. When L = 1, the T and R conformations are in equilibrium, and there is no 
allosteric effect (Fig. 3a, leftmost curve). Instead, the saturation function simplifies to produce the 
hyperbolic curve of classic Michaelis-Menten binding kinetics. As L becomes larger and the 
equilibrium shifts to favor the T state over the R state, the sigmoidal character of the curve 
increases. The ratio between the dissociation constants, c, has a similar effect (Fig. 3b). If c = 1 
(i.e., if KR = KT and the ligand binds each protein conformation with the same affinity), then the 
saturation function once again reduces to the classic Michaelis-Menten equation. In contrast, as 
the value of c approaches 0, the allosteric ligand (F) preferentially binds the R state, and the 
allosteric effect—as evidenced by the sigmoidal character of the saturation curve—increases. 
 40 
This mathematical model, along with the qualitative interpretation, aimed to reveal the 
molecular mechanism responsible for allostery. The cooperative effect, which produces the 
sigmoidal saturation curve, occurs when the binding of a certain ligand to one protein subunit 
increases the binding affinity for that same ligand on the other subunits. In the paper, Monod and 
his colleagues used hemoglobin as their primary example. According to the model, hemoglobin 
exists in two states, one in which all four subunits are in the T conformation and one in which they 
are all in the R conformation. These two states are in thermodynamic equilibrium, and in the 
absence of oxygen that equilibrium favors the T state, i.e., the conformation with low affinity for 
oxygen. When oxygen is present, it binds and stabilizes the R state, thereby shifting the equilibrium 
in favor of the R state. If a single oxygen molecule binds one of the four subunits of a molecule of 
hemoglobin that happens to be in the R state, it stabilizes the molecule in that conformation. 
Because of the symmetry constraint, the stabilization of one subunit of hemoglobin in the R state 
also stabilizes the other three in the same conformation, and these three subunits are now locked 
in the high affinity conformation, ready to bind additional oxygen molecules.  
2.5.2 The MWC Model is Explanatory 
The 1965 MWC model paper has been hugely influential. It is one of the most highly cited 
theoretical papers of all time, with over 7,500 citations, and the model itself is now textbook 
science, included in most introductory biochemistry texts.16 Part of the reason for this success is 
the fact that the MWC model included both a mathematical model and a simple qualitative 
 
16 According to Web of Science, the citation count as of May 30, 2021 is 7,501. As a testament to its durability and 
contemporary relevance, it has garnered at least 100 citations each year for the past 15 years.  
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interpretation relating the model posits to various structural properties of proteins. In this section, 
I will argue that the MWC model provides an explanation of allostery. More specifically, I claim 
that when taken together, the mathematical model along with the physical interpretation of the 
model and model variables constitute an abstract mechanistic explanation for allostery. This claim 
is not uncontroversial. In recent scientific reviews, some allosteric researchers have claimed that 
the MWC model was not an explanatory model of allostery but was instead merely a 
phenomenological model. The MWC model, they suggest, was able to fit the binding curves for 
hemoglobin and allosteric enzymes, but it did not provide an explanation for this behavior of 
proteins.17 Through a close reading of the 1965 paper and other historical sources, I aim to show 
that Monod, Wyman, and Changeux intended to offer their model as an explanation for allostery, 
and more importantly, I will argue that it fits contemporary philosophical accounts of mechanistic 
explanation. What has led recent scientific commentators astray, I suggest, is the failure to 
recognize that mechanistic explanations can vary along two different axes: (1) from concrete to 
abstract and (2) from how-possibly to how-actually explanations. I will argue that the MWC model 
of allostery is an abstract how-plausibly mechanism.   
The primary aim of phenomenological models is to “save the phenomena.” They aim to 
capture the phenomenon of interest, often providing a concise mathematical description of it, but 
they do so in a way that is largely “detached from theoretical considerations” (Bueno et al. 2012). 
 
17 For example, Hilser and his colleagues claim that the MWC model of allostery is merely phenomenological, and 
the first explanation for allostery was not offered until Perutz filled in the mechanistic details in the 1970s: “It is well 
known that…the MWC…model [is] phenomenological, and consequently, [does] not provide insight into how the 
structure facilitates allosteric communication between sites. It was the birth of structural biology and the development 
of the influential stereo-chemical model by Perutz that first addressed this issue and set the course for future allosteric 
studies” (Motlagh et al. 2014, 331). Similarly, Cui and Karplus (2008) claim that the MWC model is 
“phenomenological” and does “not answer the fundamental question of how the binding of a ligand or its modification 
yield the allosteric effect at an atomic level of detail” (1296). 
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Thus, a phenomenological model might bring two seemingly different phenomena together “under 
a common principle” or a shared mathematical description, but it will not go much beyond what 
is given directly by the phenomenon (London 1950, 30).18 Insofar as a mathematical model is 
merely a matter of fitting a curve to the data, it can be construed as phenomenological. No matter 
how well the curve fits the data or how accurately the model predicts new data, such a model is 
not taken to be explanatory. Especially if a mathematical model has many unconstrained 
parameters, it might be able to achieve good fit with the data, but the parameters in the model 
responsible for the goodness of fit have no straightforward physical or realist interpretation and 
thus fail to be explanatory (Epstein and Forber 2013).      
Key to my argument, then, is the following: the MWC model was not primarily a 
phenomenological model, even though it shared some features with such models. Monod and his 
colleagues show that the mathematical model—viz., the saturation function (𝑌𝐹̅̅̅)—fits the available 
binding and kinetics data from hemoglobin and allosteric enzymes. But their primary goal is not 
to develop a concise mathematical description of the data. Instead, they aimed to explain the 
observed data by revealing the underlying molecular mechanism that was responsible for the 
behavior. The authors themselves downplay the importance of the mathematical description and 
the goodness of fit between their model and the data and instead highlight its abstract explanatory 
features: 
We feel…that the main interest of the model which we have discussed here does not reside 
so much in the possibility of describing quantitatively and in detail the complex kinetics of 
allosteric systems. It rests rather on the concept, which we have tried to develop and justify, 
that a general and initially simple relationship between symmetry and function may explain 
 
18 This is how Fritz London described a phenomenological model in order to claim that the London and London model 
of superconductivity was not a phenomenological model, since it was not limited in this way. In addition to Bueno et 
al. (2012), see Cartwright et al. (1995) and Suarez and Cartwright (2008) for differing interpretations of this particular 
model and a fuller discussion of phenomenological and theoretical models. 
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the emergence, evolution and properties of oligomeric proteins. (Monod et al. 1965, 116-
7) 
 
What is important to the scientists themselves is their physical interpretation of the model—i.e., 
the fact that relatively simple structural posits about proteins and their binding properties can 
account for the observed data.  
The construction of the mathematical MWC model is also quite different from the 
construction of phenomenological models, as described by Nancy Cartwright and her colleagues 
(Cartwright et al. 1995, Suarez and Cartwright 2008). Monod and his colleagues built their model 
following what Cartwright calls the “theory-driven view of models.” They simply applied the 
principles of equilibrium chemistry to proteins that had the particular structural features and 
binding properties that they had postulated. Moreover, the only unconstrained variable in the 
quantitative model is the allosteric constant L. (The ratio between the dissociation constants c is 
derived from observables.) For this reason, they take the fit between the model and the data as 
providing some confirmatory evidence for the empirical posits about protein structure used to 
construct the model. Although the model was constructed after the data were available, Monod 
and his colleagues can reasonably claim that their model correctly “predicts” these data, since they 
only used the postulates of the model and standard calculations of equilibrium chemistry (Worrall 
1989).The ability of the MWC model to replicate the binding curves of actual allosteric proteins 
lends support to the model, since the fit did not arise from illicit tweaking of unconstrained 
parameters (Epstein and Forber 2013). When they consider the MWC model’s ability to capture 
the phenomena, Monod and his colleagues highlight not the fit between the model and the data, 
but rather the physical interpretation of the model which shows how a few structural features of 
proteins can account for the observed allosteric behavior. In this way, it was not merely a 
redescription of the phenomenon in mathematical terms, but an explanation. 
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According to most philosophical accounts, mechanistic explanation involves decomposing 
a biological system into its component parts and showing how the components, with their given 
activities, are organized in such a way that they generate the overall behavior of the system 
(Machamer et al. 2000, Bechtel and Abrahasen 2005, Craver 2007). The interactions between the 
components are taken to be causal, while the relationship between the components and the system 
is constitutive. A mechanism explains by showing that the causal interactions among lower-level 
components are responsible for the observed system-level behavior. The MWC model of allostery, 
as presented in the 1965 paper, fits this description. It cites structural features of proteins and their 
causal interactions with various ligands to explain the observed sigmoidal saturation curve taken 
to be the hallmark of the allosteric effect.  
The model attributes certain features to allosteric proteins: they are oligomeric (i.e., they 
have more than one subunit), they have two distinct binding sites for the substrate and allosteric 
ligand on each subunit, they are capable of adopting one of two conformations, and they maintain 
molecular symmetry such that the subunits in a single molecule are always in the same 
conformation. Using these structural posits, along with principles of equilibrium chemistry, the 
MWC model shows why a set of proteins with these features will produce the characteristic 
sigmoidal curve. At the molecular level, an individual protein is hypothesized to be interconverting 
between the R and T states, spending more time in the T state, since it is by definition more 
thermodynamically stable. However, when the protein molecule encounters the allosteric ligand 
in the R state, it binds the ligand. This binding event is stereospecific and occurs at only the 
allosteric binding site because of the structural and electronic complementarity between the ligand 
and the binding cavity on the protein. This binding event essentially traps the protein in the R state, 
preventing it from converting back to the T state, much like a nail stuck into a cog would prevent 
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the cog from turning. Because an allosteric protein maintains molecular symmetry, by trapping 
one of the monomers in the R state, the allosteric ligand also traps the other monomers in the R 
state, thereby priming them to bind the second ligand at its binding site. This mechanistic account 
explains why the binding curve of an allosteric protein, such as hemoglobin, is shifted to have 
higher saturation at lower concentrations, compared to a non-allosteric protein. The binding of one 
oxygen molecule traps the entire molecule in the R state, and because hemoglobin has four 
identical subunits, this means that the other three subunits are now trapped in a conformation with 
high affinity for oxygen-binding.  
This description of the molecular mechanism of allostery is an abstract mechanism schema, 
since it blackboxes certain features of the mechanism. Mechanistic explanations fall along a 
continuum from concrete mechanisms, which include many molecular details, to abstract 
mechanisms, which use functional abstractions or otherwise blackbox certain lower-level features. 
Although Carl Craver has argued that mechanistic explanations that include more lower-level 
detail are more explanatory, other philosophers have acknowledged that mechanistic explanations 
can be abstract without sacrificing explanatory power.19 Indeed, some have suggested that abstract 
mechanistic explanations can be useful in certain circumstances since they can provide a unifying 
account of phenomena (Levy 2014). The MWC model is relatively abstract. It does not specify the 
relationship between the protein and the allosteric ligand in any detail, other than to claim that it 
must be stereospecific. For instance, it does not show how the orientation of the ligand matters or 
how certain chemical functional groups on the ligand interact with others on the protein. Similarly, 
 
19 Craver (2007) and, especially, Kaplan and Craver (2011) seem to favor a “more details the better” conception of 
mechanistic explanation (but see also Kaplan and Craver (2020), in which they contest this characterization). 
Machamer et al. (2000) discusses abstract mechanistic explanations that are not incomplete. Levy (2014) presents a 
more developed account of abstract mechanistic explanation. 
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the model does not explain how the protein switches between the two conformations, nor does it 
explain how the protein maintains molecular symmetry during these conformational shifts. What 
the model does explain, however, is that a protein with just the limited number of features posited 
by the model will behave in a particular way to bring about the observed allosteric behavior.  
Monod and his colleagues find the abstraction of the model to be one of its virtues. It 
explains the sigmoidal binding curve characteristic of allosteric proteins by making only a few 
structural assumptions about these proteins. Other than the symmetry requirement and the 
assumption of distinct stereospecific binding sites for the various ligands, the model is silent about 
the 3D structure of the allosteric protein:  
No particular assumption has been, or need be, made about the structure of the specific 
sites or about the structure of the protein, except that it is a symmetrically bonded oligomer, 
the symmetry of which is conserved when it undergoes a transition from one to another 
state. It is therefore a fairly stringent, even abstract model, since co-operative interactions 
are not only allowed but even required for any ligand endowed with differential affinity 
toward the two states of the protein. (Monod et al. 1965, 93, emphasis in original) 
 
What strikes Monod and his colleagues as most useful about the model is the fact that such an 
abstract model can account for the observed allosteric effect without getting mired in the details 
of any specific protein. They would likely agree with the sentiment expressed by philosopher 
Arnon Levy: “Rather than highlighting the vices of omitting mechanistic detail, [they] emphasize 
the virtues of abstracting from it” (2014, 471). On their view, the abstract nature of the model is a 
benefit, since it allows them to explain the allosteric behavior of proteins in the absence of atomic 
details of protein structure.  
In addition to being abstract, Monod and his colleagues present the MWC model as a how-
plausibly model. Evidence for this claim comes from the full title of the paper: “On the Nature of 
Allosteric Transitions: A Plausible Model.” Biologists often distinguish between “how-possibly” 
and “how-actually” models (Brandon 1990).
 
How-possibly models satisfy the minimum 
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constraints placed on the explanation by the empirical data, but the mechanisms they posit are 
relatively unsupported by the evidence (Craver 2007). For instance, a how-possibly model may 
attribute activities to components that are only conjectured to exist. In contrast, how-actually 
models invoke only real components, activities, and the causal relationships that connect them to 
bring about the explanandum phenomenon: “They show how a mechanism works, not merely how 
it might work” (Ibid., 112). “How-plausibly” models fit between these extremes; they invoke fewer 
unknown components, activities, and organizational features and satisfy more constraints than 
how-possibly models. Monod and his colleagues intended for their model of allostery to be more 
than a how-possibly model, merely fitting the constraints imposed by the binding data. For this 
reason, they spent nearly half the paper presenting theoretical arguments and empirical evidence 
to support the structural posits of the MWC model.   
At the time, there was limited structural data to confirm the postulates of the model. 
Regarding the claims about molecular symmetry and its conservation, Monod and his colleagues 
conceded that “next to nothing is known, from direct evidence, regarding this problem” (Ibid., 
106). However, they argued that there were both good theoretical reasons and some compelling 
evidence from structural studies of hemoglobin to suggest that the postulates of the model were 
plausible. When Monod first began drafting the model sometime in 1963, he already had access to 
some empirical evidence that suggested that the subunit structure of allosteric proteins might be 
important to their function. His student Changeux (1963) offered an explanation for the 
“desensitization” effect that involved subunit structure. Through his experiments on threonine 
deaminase, he demonstrated that the enzyme lost its allosteric behavior during urea denaturation 
because it dissociated into monomers. Also, Gerhardt and Pardee (1963) had presented evidence 
at the 1963 Cold Spring Harbor Symposium that cited changes in the subunit structure of ATCase 
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to explain its allosteric activity. In their paper the following year, they presented a model of 
ATCase allostery, in which effector binding altered the subunit structure of the protein (Gerhardt 
and Pardee 1964).20 Empirical results such as these provided some support for the postulate that 
allosteric proteins were oligomeric.  
The claim that the subunit structure of allosteric proteins was symmetrical was an important 
innovation of the MWC model. There was less empirical evidence for this postulate of the model, 
but Monod was committed to it for largely theoretical reasons (and perhaps aesthetic reasons). 
More so than either Wyman or Changeux, he was committed to the idea that oligomeric proteins 
would be most likely to have symmetric subunit structure. He arrived at this conclusion, in part, 
from thermodynamic considerations.21 In a letter to Wyman in September 1964, Monod considered 
the merits of the “general claim that the symmetric states of molecules are, in principle and all 
other things being equal, more stable than asymmetrical states.” He concluded, “Although I cannot 
prove this statement with any precision, I remain convinced that there is some truth to it.”22 
Monod’s commitment to this general thermodynamic claim about protein symmetry would show 
up again in the published paper, but this time it came with a theoretical argument.  
In the paper, Monod and his colleagues began from certain facts about oligomeric proteins 
that had been gleaned from experimental work: (1) these proteins were stable under a range of 
conditions (i.e., they did not readily dissociate into monomers), (2) the association between the 
 
20 This model was later discovered to be incorrect. 
21 In a commemorative issue of the Journal of Molecular Biology on the 50th anniversary of the publication of the 
1963 review, Changeux recounts the origins of the 1965 MWC model paper. He attributes the symmetry 
considerations mostly to the ‘personal reflections of Jacques Monod about the three-dimensional organization of 
proteins’, as well as communication with Wyman, Francis Crick, and others. He claims, however, that he was not very 
involved in these discussions and was not too keen on that section of the published paper: “The final version of the 
manuscript included at the end a section about thermodynamic considerations on symmetry that I found far from my 
way of thinking” (Changeux 2013).   
22 Letter from Wyman to Monod dated January 10, 1963 (Fonds Monod). 
 49 
subunits in these proteins was highly specific (i.e., monomers of a normally oligomeric protein 
would readily re-associate), and (3) the association between subunits did not involve covalent 
bonds but rather “a multiplicity of non-covalent bonds” (Monod et al. 1965, 106). They then 
considered two possible types of association between the subunits in these proteins: isologous and 
heterologous. Isologous association required that “any group which contributes to the binding in 
one [subunit] furnishes precisely the same contribution to the other [subunit]” (Ibid.). This 
reciprocal association results in a two-fold axis of rotational symmetry. Heterologous association, 
in contrast, has no element of symmetry. It occurs when binding site pairings between the subunits 
are unique. Heterologous associations lacking symmetry would likely give rise to long chains of 
polymers of different lengths. The properties of these polymers would be incompatible with the 
known properties of oligomers, such as their stability and specificity. The general properties of 
oligomeric proteins therefore suggested that these proteins were comprised of few subunits that 
formed a “closed structure where all the [subunits] use the same binding sets,” which necessarily 
introduced elements of symmetry into their structure (Ibid., 108).23 Through theoretical arguments 
such as this, Monod attempted to show that the symmetry constraint of the model was plausible.   
Monod and his colleagues looked to hemoglobin as another avenue to provide evidence 
that the structural posits of the MWC model were plausible. Wyman had studied hemoglobin and 
its binding interactions long before his collaboration with Monod and had previously suggested 
that hemoglobin behaved similarly to certain regulatory enzymes (Wyman and Allen 1951, see 
 
23 Monod reaffirmed his commitment to these arguments in a 1968 address at a Nobel Symposium on biological 
symmetry. He poses the question: “Are there reasons to believe that these small aggregates [monomers arranged in 
quaternary structures] are constructed according to some symmetry rule?” His response: “A fairly strong general 
argument (based on considerations of finiteness, stability and self-assembly) can be made in response to…[this] 
question.” (Monod 1968, 23) Interestingly, it seems Monod’s reasoning and conclusion has withstood the test of time. 
In a review on protein structure and function, Goodsell and Olson (2000) state that “the majority of soluble and 
membrane-bound proteins in modern cells are symmetrical, oligomeric complexes” (105). Thus, according to the 
authors, “symmetry is the rule rather than the exception for proteins" (107).  
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also Brunori 1999). In the 1950s, he had also hypothesized that a connection between the 
cooperative binding of hemoglobin and changes in its subunit structure (Wyman 1948, 1951, 
1963). By the time of their collaboration on the MWC model, Monod and Wyman both recognized 
that hemoglobin offered the best empirical support for the structural postulates of the model.  
In the paper, they pointed to two sources of evidence from crystallographic studies of 
hemoglobin to show their abstract mechanism of allostery was, indeed, a plausible mechanism. 
First, they presented Perutz and colleagues (1960) structure of hemoglobin, which showed that its 
four subunits interacted via isologous associations and thus contained two elements of symmetry,  
as offering the clearest “direct experimental evidence” for the symmetry constraint of the model 
(Monod et al. 1965, 108). Second, they argued that Perutz’s crystallographic work on hemoglobin, 
together with Kendrew’s work on myoglobin, suggested that the allosteric properties of 
hemoglobin were related to changes in its subunit structure that occurred upon oxygen binding. 
Myoglobin, which had been crystalized in 1960 by Kendrew, is naturally a monomer, but 
otherwise it is similar to one subunit of tetrameric hemoglobin (Kendrew et al. 1960). Unlike 
hemoglobin, it is non-allosteric and has greater affinity for oxygen. Whereas the conformation of 
myoglobin did not change upon oxygen-binding, hemoglobin exhibited a marked difference in 
conformation between its oxygen-bound and free forms, suggesting that a change in subunit 
structure was responsible for the observed allosteric behavior.  
Perutz’s work provided additional support for the model. He had been able to obtain crystal 
structures for hemoglobin in its free state (reduced hemoglobin) as well as in its oxidized state 
(oxyhemoglobin) (Perutz et al. 1960; Muirhead and Perutz, 1963; Perutz et al. 1964). In the 
language of allostery, Perutz and his colleagues had isolated and crystalized hemoglobin in both 
the T (free) and R (oxygen-bound) state. Therefore, Monod and his colleagues could thereby point 
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to the structural differences between these two states as evidence in favor of the MWC model. The 
T and R states of hemoglobin showed that although there were significant differences in their 
quaternary structures, both maintained the symmetry of the tetramer. According to Monod and his 
colleagues, the crystal structures of hemoglobin provided “a virtually complete illustration of the 
model” (Monod et al. 1965, 112). 
This evidence from protein crystallography, coupled with Monod’s theoretical arguments 
about protein structure, played a central role in the explanation of allostery. It showed that the 
basic structural posits of the MWC model were plausible features of allosteric proteins. Therefore, 
this evidence allowed Monod and his colleagues to argue that the model was not a mere how-
possibly model able to reproduce the sigmoidal binding curve, but instead was a how-plausibly 
model, citing only features of protein structure that were likely to obtain. With the publication of 
the MWC model in 1965, Monod and his colleagues thus made good on his suggestion from 1961: 
they demonstrated that the allosteric behavior of proteins could be explained via reference to a 
shared molecular mechanism.   
2.5.3 The MWC Model and the Static View of Proteins 
The MWC model of allostery showed that protein dynamics were relevant to their function. 
Specifically, allosteric proteins were hypothesized to undergo an allosteric transition between two, 
discrete 3D conformations, the R and T states. Nevertheless, I argue that the MWC account of 
allostery did not present a severe challenge to the prevailing static view of proteins. Although the 
model hypothesized that allosteric proteins could exist in one of two states, both these states 
exhibited all the features attributed to proteins under the static view. And even though a protein 
must be sufficiently flexible to transition between these two conformations, the MWC model 
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focused attention on the structural features of the two end-state conformations and not the 
dynamics required to transition between them. Like the two protein structures posited by 
Koshland’s induced-fit model of catalysis, the two states of an allosteric protein were easily 
accommodated by the static view of proteins.  
The MWC model backgrounds the motion that occurs during the allosteric transition and 
foregrounds the structural features of the two end-state structures. Although protein dynamics are 
inevitable if the protein is to undergo an allosteric transition, these dynamics are not the focus of 
the explanation of allostery. Because the model posits a preexisting equilibrium between the R and 
T states, it blackboxes the dynamic motion that enables the interconversion between states. Recent 
scientific commentators have noted the curious way in which the MWC model and other accounts 
that focus on protein structure manage to efface the protein dynamics required of allosteric 
proteins: 
Explanations of allosteric effects have typically addressed only an interconversion between 
principal conformations of proteins, paradoxically both highlighting and ignoring their 
fundamental flexibility. (Clarkson and Lee 2004, 12456) 
 
Although an allosteric protein is dynamic, according to the MWC model, one does not need to 
know anything about that motion in order to explain allostery. Instead, the explanation focuses 
solely on the structural features and binding properties of the two static end-state structures.  
The one place in the 1965 paper where Monod and his colleagues do explicitly consider 
the dynamic interconversion between the R and T states occurs in their discussion of symmetry. 
They describe various possible mechanisms to support their claim that any allosteric transition 
between two states is likely to be symmetry-preserving. They argue that changes in bond 
connectivity are likely to be the drivers of conformational changes. For example, they consider a 
model in which the T state is, by itself, unstable (Fig. 4).  
 53 
 
Figure 4 Symmetry-Preserving Allosteric Transition (Monod et al. 1965). Hypothetical symmetry-preserving 
model of dissociation between identical subunits in a dimeric protein. Republished with permission from Monod et 
al. (1965); permission conveyed through Copyright Clearance Center, Inc. 
 
In this case, the RT transition state is also highly unstable. If this unstable, asymmetrical state were 
to occur spontaneously, then it would immediately transition to one of the stable, symmetrical 
states. It would either be stabilized in the TT conformation, which requires the breaking of bonds 
within the other subunit, leading it to also adopt the T conformation so that the two subunits could 
form stabilizing bonds. Or the subunit in the unstable T state would collapse back into the stable 
R state, leading the molecule back to the RR state. Monod and his colleagues include general 
hypothetical mechanisms of the allosteric transition, such as this, in order to support their argument 
that these transitions will be symmetry-preserving.  
This discussion, however, also supports my contention that the protein dynamics required 
to transition between states is relatively unimportant to the MWC model. Monod and his 
colleagues’ analysis of this transition show that the asymmetrical transition state is highly unstable 
and therefore highly transitory. According to their reasoning, any asymmetrical intermediate will 
be extremely short-lived, so any protein molecule is likely to spend nearly all of its time in either 
of the symmetrical end states. This description of the allosteric transition therefore justifies the 
model’s focus on the end-state structures, rather than the intermediate. The dynamics required for 
the protein to shift between states are included in the model only as a posit that an allosteric protein 
can exist in two distinct conformations: two states “are reversibly accessible to allosteric 
oligomers” (Monod et al. 1965, 90). Even in this case where the discussion of protein dynamics is 
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most explicit, it still functions to reinforce the stability and discreteness of the two end-state 
structures. Most often, however, the author’s discussion of the symmetry requirement focuses only 
on the end states, without any reference to the protein dynamics necessary to transition between 
states. On my view, the entire symmetry discussion suggests that Monod and his colleagues are 
largely wedded to the static view of protein structure, since it makes little sense to make claims 
about geometric symmetry for molecules without stable 3D conformations. 
Further evidence for Monod’s commitment to the static view of proteins comes from other 
papers and lectures he delivered in the mid-1960s. These sources show that Monod was committed 
to the static view of proteins as well as the structure-function rule, which held that the molecule 
structure of proteins and other biomolecules determined their functions (Sarkar 2008). He argues 
that the elucidation of protein structure, especially via x-ray crystallography, is the best way to 
advance knowledge of protein function more generally (Monod 1968). In his Nobel lecture in 
December 1965, he makes even more sweeping claims about the role of structural studies in 
molecular biology. He claims that “the ambition of molecular biology is to interpret the essential 
properties of organisms in terms of molecular structures” (Monod 1965, 207).24 Although “that 
objective has already been achieved for DNA,” Monod acknowledges that there was still much 
work to be done before the same could be said of proteins (Ibid.). Nevertheless, he claims the 
MWC account of allostery represents a step toward this goal of offering structural explanations for 
protein functions. 
 
24 This is a strikingly different conception of the role of structure in molecular biology than the one Martin Karplus—
one of the proponents of the dynamic view of protein—would advocate in two decades: “The long-range goal of 
molecular approaches to biology is to describe living systems in terms of physics and chemistry….Great progress has 
been made over the last thirty years in applying the equations to chemical problems involving the structures and 
reactions of small molecules.” (Karplus 1988, ix) 
 55 
Although the MWC model of allostery implicitly posits a functional role for protein 
dynamics, the dynamics that enable transitions between two discrete conformational states are 
taken as background conditions of the model. Monod and his collaborators do not acknowledge 
any functional role for the fast timescale, dynamic motions of proteins—viz., the wigglings and 
jigglings of their atoms—that form the core of the later dynamic view of proteins. Thus, this 
account of allostery is strikingly different from the accounts of dynamic allostery that would begin 
to emerge in the 1980s. It requires that an allosteric protein adopt one of two “discrete states” 
(Monod et al. 1965, 116). And these two states are assumed to be compact, rigid, and static, and 
therefore accessible via x-ray crystallography. The role of molecular symmetry in the MWC model 
also assumes that the R and T states have stable structures, since without it, there could be no axis 
of symmetry. For these reasons, the MWC model of allostery, like Koshland’s induced-fit model 
of catalysis, does not pose a significance challenge to the prevailing static view of proteins.  
2.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have conducted a historical and philosophical analysis of some of the 
scientific work on proteins since the late nineteenth century. My primary focus has been accounts 
of protein structure and function during the heyday of classical molecular biology in the mid-
twentieth century. I have shown how the static view of proteins, which held that proteins were 
compact, rigid, and static molecules, became the prevailing view during this time. Because of this 
view, protein dynamics were largely ignored, since, unlike protein structure, they were not thought 
to play a role in protein function. Against this backdrop, two different accounts of protein function 
were developed in the late 1950s and early 1960s that posited a role for protein dynamics: 
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Koshland’s induced-fit model of enzyme catalysis and Monod and his colleagues’ model of 
allostery.  
In the first part of the chapter, I developed a historical account of the emergence and 
evolution of these two cases, and I argued that these accounts of protein function were easily 
accommodated by the static view of proteins. In both cases, the scientists claimed that a certain 
type of protein could adopt two different structures, but each protein structure had a discrete, fixed, 
and stable 3D structure, in accord with the static view. In the second part of the chapter, I looked 
more closely at the development of the MWC model of allostery, since this episode played a central 
role in the birth of structural biology. I presented an updated historical account of the evolution of 
the concept of allostery, first introduced by Monod in 1961 and then focused on the MWC model 
itself. While some recent scientific commentators have claimed that the MWC model is not 
explanatory, I argued that it fits philosophical accounts of mechanistic explanation. When it was 
published in 1965, the model was a how-plausibly model, since some of the structural posits were 
not yet confirmed empirically. Nevertheless, it was (and still is) an abstract explanation, revealing 
the common features of allosteric proteins and the molecular mechanism of allostery while 
omitting details. Therefore, I concluded that the MWC model is an explanation for allostery, 
namely, an abstract mechanistic explanation.  
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3.0 From Static to Dynamic: A Historical Account of the Emergence of the Dynamic View 
of Proteins 
3.1 Introduction 
In structural and molecular biology, proteins are one of the primary objects of study. Over 
the past century, as the importance of proteins in a myriad of biological processes has become 
clearer, the concept of the protein has evolved significantly. This chapter focuses on the most 
recent stage of this evolution, namely, the origin of the dynamic view of proteins in the second 
half of the twentieth century and the challenge it posed to the static, or structural, view of classic 
molecular biology. Although the origins of molecular biology have been the focus of much 
historical research, little has been done on this recent history (Morange 2018, Sarkar 2008). The 
rise of the dynamic view, or what Michel Morange (2020) has called the “new view” of proteins, 
raises two interesting historical puzzles. First, why and how did the dynamic view emerge in the 
1970s and 1980s as an alternative to the dominant structural view? And, second, what explains the 
quarter-century time lag between the origin of the dynamic view and its eventual widespread 
acceptance in the 2000s and 2010s? 
The answer to both of these questions highlights the importance of theory within this 
history. Although technological advances and the discovery of anomalies played a part, I argue 
that theoretical understanding of protein dynamics was the primary driver behind the emergence 
of this new view of proteins. The application of general thermodynamic principles to proteins 
fostered the dynamic view in the 1970s and 1980s, and commitment to these principles led a small 
cadre of scientists to seek out anomalous cases of protein dynamics that could not be explained by 
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the structural view. These researchers slowly accumulated empirical evidence for the dynamic 
view from the mid-1980s through the 1990s, and their empirical findings, along with additional 
evidence for protein dynamics resulting from new technologies, eventually convinced the majority 
of protein scientists. Explaining the uptake of the dynamic view therefore involves the discovery 
of anomalies aided by new technologies, but the commitment to treating proteins as small 
thermodynamic systems ultimately drove that search for anomalies. Hence, I argue that the 
emergence of the dynamic view of proteins as a competitor to the structural view was, at its core, 
theory-driven. 
In what follows, I will present this history in four stages: the origins of the dynamic view 
of proteins in the 1970s and 1980s (Sec. 3.2), its slow reception (Sec. 3.3) and the role of true 
believers and their search for anomalies in the mid-1980s and 1990s (Sec. 3.4), and finally, the 
widespread acceptance of this new view of proteins in the 2000s and 2010s (Sec. 3.5). 
3.2 Origins of the Dynamic View 
The static view, which represented proteins as molecules with rigid and largely static 
structures, was the prevailing view of proteins leading into the 1970s. Closely tied to experimental 
work, this view “followed from the dominant role of high-resolution X-ray crystallography,” 
which “led to an image of biomolecules with every atom fixed in place” (Brooks et al. 1988, 3). 
Advances in protein crystallography since the 1940s had produced a tranche of new structures of 
proteins. The future looked sufficiently bright that in 1970 a group of researchers started work on 
a repository for all this new structural data, which would become the Protein Data Bank in 1976 
(Berman 2008). By 1980, the databank would include nearly 70 protein structures. As Alan 
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Cooper, a key player in the history of protein dynamics, recalled in a recent interview, the 1970s 
were “a time when the field was being dominated by protein crystallographers” who were 
producing, “for the very first time, images of protein molecules”.25 Despite the “immeasurable 
value” of x-ray crystallography, the focus on this technique caused many protein scientists to have 
“too rigid a view of the protein as it actually exists in solution,” since it obscured the dynamic 
properties of proteins (Robson 1977, 577).  
Against this backdrop, a small group of researchers, who were committed to treating 
proteins as thermodynamic systems, developed the dynamic view of proteins. They argued that the 
static view failed to accurately represent proteins, in part, because the structures obtained via x-
ray crystallography abstracted away all the dynamic fluctuations of proteins in solution: 
The structures determined by X-ray diffraction of protein crystals in particular are 
inevitably biased toward a rigid picture because the molecules are “frozen” by the 
constraint of crystal packing and periodicity. (Robson 1977, 577) 
 
Introduced as a corrective, the dynamic view thus aimed to present a more accurate picture of 
proteins based upon theoretical rather than experimental analysis.  
Proponents of the dynamic view showed that if you applied the principles of statistical 
thermodynamics to proteins, then you would be led inexorably to the conclusion that they were 
constantly undergoing structural fluctuations (Cooper 1976). The individual protein molecule is a 
relatively small thermodynamic system, and the electrostatic interactions that maintain the 3D 
structure are relatively weak (Frauenfelder 1983). Therefore, constant collisions between the 
protein and solvent—i.e., "the continual Brownian-motion-like buffeting by solvent molecules”—
would supply enough thermal energy to disrupt these weak interactions and cause the protein to 
be in constant motion (Cooper 1980, 489). “Such thermal pummeling” of the protein would 
 
25 Video interview by the author with Alan Cooper, 27 May 2019.   
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“induce fluctuations in thermodynamic properties” and cause significant fluctuations in structure 
(Ibid.). For individual protein molecules, these structural fluctuations would be random, and 
molecules would be rapidly interconverting among many energetically quasi-degenerate 
microstates. 
The thermodynamic properties of the system that reveal that individual protein molecules 
will adopt different microstate conformations are left out of the static view of proteins. According 
to Cooper, this fact explains an apparent tension between the two views of proteins. The results of 
x-ray crystallography show “a compact structure in which the polypeptide chain is precisely folded 
to give a tightly interlocking, rigid molecule,” while theoretical and experimental evidence for the 
dynamic view suggests a “fluid, dynamic structure for globular proteins involving rapid 
conformational fluctuations” (Cooper 1976, 2740). The tension is dissolved, according to Cooper, 
when one recognizes that the representation of protein structure obtained via x-ray crystallography 
describes the bulk properties of the population of protein molecules. The crystal structure obscures 
the dynamics of individual protein molecules by collapsing all the conformational substates into a 
single average structure—a structure that is unlikely to exist in solution. Because the energy 
distribution function is skewed toward higher energies, “it is highly improbable that at any instant 
of time even one individual protein molecule [in solution] has the average structure” (Karplus and 
McCammon 1986, 42).  
By applying thermodynamic principles to proteins, the dynamic view sought to capture the 
structural fluctuations of individual molecules in solution rather than the average structure. It 
depicted an individual molecule as conducting a biased walk through conformation space, 
“wandering in a haphazard and non-periodic fashion amongst a multitude of possible 
conformational states,” (Cooper and Dryden 1984, 107). This picture of protein molecules led 
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proponents of the dynamic view to reject a key assumption of the structural view. They denied that 
a population of protein molecules in solution would adopt a single discrete structure. As Gregorio 
Weber memorably describes it, the static, structural protein does not exist: 
The protein molecule model resulting from the X-ray crystallographic observations is a 
"platonic" protein, well removed in its perfection from the kicking and screaming 
"stochastic" molecule that we infer must exist in solution. (Weber 1975, 65) 
 
The thermodynamic analysis of proteins demonstrated that individual protein molecules were in 
constant motion, and any population of protein molecules in solution exists in a multiplicity of 
conformational microstates. 
The early proponents of this new view of proteins were all well-versed in thermodynamics. 
Hans Frauenfelder, Georgio Careri, and Alan Cooper were trained as physicists, but like many 
others at the time, switched to molecular and structural biology and biophysics. The most famous 
of this group, Frauenfelder completed his degree in physics in Switzerland before taking up a 
position in the Department of Physics at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign in the 1950s. 
Once there, he turned his attention to the physics of proteins, publishing influential theoretical and 
experimental work on protein thermodynamics over his forty-year career. Careri followed a similar 
trajectory. According to an obituary written by Frauenfelder, Careri first “establish[ed] [his] 
reputation in physics” and then “[saw] the light and switch[ed] to the life sciences” (Frauenfelder 
2012, 3). He began his career studying the statistical physics of liquids, but later focused his 
attention on the physics of proteins. He also wrote a number of reviews advocating the dynamic 
view of proteins that “had considerable impact” (Ibid.). Cooper studied physics as an 
undergraduate at the University of Manchester in the 1960s, but switched to biophysics for 
graduate school after attending a lecture that “suddenly made [him] realize that there were 
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fascinating problems in biology that might by solvable by physical approaches.”26 He later 
conducted postdoctoral work at Oxford and Yale, before taking up a professorship at the University 
of Glasgow in 1976. 
Although not trained in physics, the intellectual pedigrees of Weber and Martin Karplus 
also prepared them to study the thermodynamic aspects of proteins. After completing an MD at 
the University of Buenos Aires, Weber won a fellowship for graduate study at Cambridge, where 
he worked under the well-known enzymologist, Malcolm Dixon (Jameson 1998). He then 
pioneered fluorescence quenching techniques that are now widely used in the field of protein 
science. This technique proved well-suited to study the dynamics of proteins in solution. 
Consequently, Weber became one of the early advocates for the dynamic view of proteins. Karplus 
began his studies at Caltech in biology but ultimately transferred to chemistry to work with Linus 
Pauling (Karplus 2006). The theoretical background he developed during his time at Caltech 
helped him to build the first molecular dynamics (MD) simulations of proteins that would win him 
the Nobel prize in 2013. Despite their differences, these early adopters of the dynamic view all 
shared a strong background in thermodynamics.  
Because of their professional training, these early proponents of the dynamic view were 
primed to think about proteins as thermodynamic systems. In a book-length review of protein 
dynamics for Advances in Chemical Physics, Karplus and his colleagues claimed  that “to chemists 
and physicists,” unlike others trained in biology, “it is self-evident that polymers and proteins 
undergo significant fluctuations at room temperature” (Brooks et al 1988, 3). This way of thinking, 
along with their theoretical training, enabled them to be capable champions of the dynamic view 
of proteins in the 1970s and 1980s. As proselytizers for the view, they saw that part of their role 
 
26 Cooper interview, 27 May 2019. 
 63 
was to show the importance of dynamics to those who might not be at home around thermodynamic 
equations. In the introduction to a 1984 review, Cooper acknowledges that the thermodynamics 
and mathematics that are necessary in order to arrive at the dynamic view are not everyone’s cup 
of tea: 
I will attempt…to approach the problem of protein dynamics and function much as a 
physicist or physical chemist might have done from basic principles, without having had 
our advantage of seeing the structures or playing with the models. This may seem bizarre, 
and will certainly not be to everyone's taste. It will involve some mathematics (ugh!) and 
some thermodynamics (even more ugh!)… (Cooper 1984, 181-2) 
 
For scientists like Cooper, the goal was to share their insights from the application of physics to 
biology. They took it as their task to help others, especially those who were not theoretically 
inclined, see the inevitability of the structural fluctuations at the heart of the dynamic view.  
Although there were certainly multiple motivations for defending the dynamic view, the 
primary justifications for these early defenders were theoretical. The limited empirical evidence 
then available was insufficient to account for their strong adherence.27 Instead, I argue, it was their 
commitment to the thermodynamic principles that underwrote their commitment to the dynamic 
view, since they saw the dynamic view as an inevitable consequence of these principles. One only 
had to apply certain principles of thermodynamics to proteins to conclude that they must be 
dynamic. The thermodynamic principles invoked were simple and uncontroversial, and the 
thermodynamic analysis did not require attributing any special biological properties to proteins:      
These dynamic fluctuations are simply a consequence of the thermodynamic uncertainty 
of small systems and are not a particular property of protein molecules as such—even a 
lump of mild steel the size of an individual protein molecule would show similar 
fluctuations. (Cooper 1980, 490) 
 
 
27At that time there was limited evidence that proteins were dynamic from H-D exchange experiments, fluorescence, 
and other techniques. For contemporaneous reviews of the available empirical evidence, see Debrunner and 
Frauenfelder (1982) and Englander and Kallenbach (1984).  
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In a recent interview, Cooper confirmed this theoretical commitment to the dynamic view. When 
I asked him how he knew in the 1980s that proteins were dynamic, he responded, “otherwise I’d 
have to abandon all the physics I’d ever learned.”28 For Cooper and other early proponents, the 
dynamic view followed directly from unassailable thermodynamic principles. 
From this analysis, we see that the dynamic view was not proposed in the 1970s and 1980s 
because of the failure of the static view to explain empirical data, nor was it based on any new 
technological advances that revealed protein dynamics empirically.29 In fact, many of the early 
advocates of the dynamic view blamed technological advances in crystallography for “creat[ing] 
the misconception…that the atoms in a protein are fixed in position” (Karplus and McCammon 
1986, 42). Rather, the early adopters of the dynamic view developed and defended it primarily for 
theoretical reasons, and they were well-positioned to draw conclusions from treating proteins as 
small thermodynamic systems because of their training in physics and chemistry. 
3.3 Slow Reception of the Dynamic View 
3.3.1 Allostery: The First Link Between Dynamics and Function 
In the 1970s, these early defenders of the dynamic view typically left open the question of 
whether the inevitable dynamic fluctuations in protein structure were relevant to protein function. 
They focused instead on correcting the overly rigid view from x-ray crystallography in order to 
 
28 Cooper interview, 27 May 2019. 
29 Historian of biology, Michel Morange (2020) has suggested that technological advances were the primary driver of 
this change, while structural biologist Vincent Hilser has suggested that it was the discovery of anomalies (Hilser et 
al. 2012, Motlagh et al. 2014). 
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more accurately represent proteins. It was not until the early 1980s that these scientists would 
begin to consistently consider the possibility that dynamic fluctuations were necessary for protein 
function.  
In their early papers, defenders of the dynamic view stressed the inaccuracy of the static 
view of proteins. They demonstrated that protein dynamics were an inevitable consequence of 
thermodynamic principles and showed how the dynamic view was necessary in order to account 
for certain experimental observations.30 However, there was little explicit discussion of how 
structural fluctuations were causally relevant to protein function.31 For example, in a critical note 
in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences published in 1976, Cooper presented the 
dynamic view of proteins as necessary in order to understand experimental results, such as 
fluorescence quenching and relaxation studies, and explain away the apparent paradox between 
the representation of proteins that emerged from these techniques and the static representation 
from x-ray crystallography (Cooper 1976). But he does not go so far as to claim that the dynamic 
fluctuations at the heart of this view are essential for the proper functioning of proteins. His only 
mention of protein function comes at the end of the note, and the connection he draws between 
dynamics and function is relatively weak: the “complete understanding of the nature and function 
of protein molecules will require knowledge not only of their mean properties, but also of their 
dynamic characteristics” (2741). The major goal of Cooper and others in these early years seems 
 
30 See, for example, Cooper (1976, 1980, 1984), Frauenfelder (1983), McCammon et al (1977). 
31 The question of functional relevance turned around the interconversions between conformational microstates that 
arose from the “wiggling and jiggling” of the atoms in protein molecules. Large translational motions, that 
approximated rigid body motion, were already documented at that time, for hemoglobin, myoglobin, and lysozyme 
(Cooper 1980). For example, the crystal structure of deoxymyoglobin showed that the heme groups, which bind 
oxygen, were buried in the interior of the protein, inaccessible to oxygen. Motion of the protein would therefore be 
required for it to bind oxygen.   
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to be to correct the misrepresentation of proteins as static, regardless of the role of dynamics in 
protein function. 
By the 1980s, these defenders of the dynamic view become more emboldened and 
consequently more explicit in discussing the causal relevance of dynamics for protein function. 
For example, in his concluding remarks at the Ciba Foundation Symposium on “Mobility and 
Function in Proteins and Nucleic Acids” in March 1982, Frauenfelder claimed that one major goal 
of the meeting was to learn “if dynamic motion is essential for biological function” (Frauenfelder 
1983, 329). Cooper posed similar questions about the relationship between protein dynamics and 
function at the conclusion of a crystallography meeting on dynamics the following November.32 
He began the final discussion by asking a series of questions:  
Do dynamics have function? Are there any aspects of protein function for which dynamics 
offers the only explanation? Can dynamic processes provide alternative explanations of 
apparently well-understood phenomena? (Cooper 1983, 36) 
 
According to his abstract, he then proceeded to offer examples that aimed to answer these questions 
in the affirmative: he clearly believed that the dynamic properties of proteins played a causal role 
in carrying out their biological functions. However, Cooper’s rhetorical strategy—he claims some 
of his conclusions may be “(possibly) outrageous”—suggests that in the fall of 1983 the connection 
between dynamics and protein function was still tenuous and not widely accepted outside the 
community of early adopters of the dynamic view.  
By the time of this crystallography conference in the fall of 1983, Cooper was already 
working with his graduate student David Dryden to develop a model of dynamic allostery. Their 
formal model, published in July 1984, provided the first proof of principle that protein dynamics 
could be the cause of at least one protein function. Allostery, or the phenomenon whereby binding 
 
32 I thank Cooper for telling me about this conference and sharing the conference program with me.  
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at one site on a protein affects binding at a second site, is a property of proteins that has an 
important regulatory function (Changeux and Edelstein 2006). Since the 1960s when Jacques 
Monod first identified the phenomenon and developed the influential MWC model, explanations 
of allostery had focused on protein structure.33 These explanations held that allosteric proteins 
could adopt one of two rigid structures, an active and an inactive conformation. The binding of an 
allosteric inhibitor at one site would induce a conformational change, shifting the protein into an 
inactive conformation that could not bind the substrate molecule at the active site. This structural 
change thus explained how binding at one site on a protein could affect binding events happening 
at a distant site. Cooper and Dryden’s model of dynamic allostery was strikingly different. It 
demonstrated that changes in protein dynamics, rather than structure, could be the cause of 
allostery. Their model showed how the binding of an allosteric inhibitor could induce changes in 
the flexibility of the protein that could transmit a signal from one binding site to a distant binding 
site, without any changes to the average structure of the protein.  
In interviews with Cooper and Dryden, they have both indicated that their motivation for 
developing the model was to demonstrate that protein functions could arise from changes in 
dynamics, rather than structure. There was good theoretical evidence as well as limited empirical 
evidence that proteins were dynamic, and they suspected that dynamics were relevant to function. 
Dryden recently reflected on their thinking at the time:  
We [knew]…that…protein dynamics is there. The question [was] can we make it do 
something? That was [Cooper’s] question to me….what things can we do with dynamics? 
Can we do allostery with dynamics? That was the fundamental question that I guess we 
started with: can you do allostery without a conformational change, just through 
dynamics?34 
 
33 For early examples of structural explanations of allostery, see Monod and Jacob (1961), Monod et al. (1963, 1965), 
and Koshland et al. 1966. The highly influential MWC model developed in Monod et al. (1965) has over 7,400 
citations and is highly cited today (Web of Science accessed 10 December 2020).  
34 Video interview by the author with David Dryden, 24 June 2019. 
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Dryden recalled Cooper saying to him that allostery would be a good topic, since it “had been 
dominated by structural ideas” and “the contribution of entropy to allostery [had] been ignored.”35 
According to Cooper, their model of dynamic allostery aimed to address the question, “What 
functions can be explained in terms of dynamics, or at least equally well in terms of dynamics as 
might be explained in terms of static conformational changes?”36 It offered a way to show that 
inevitable dynamic motions could provide sufficient energetic coupling between two sites on a 
protein to produce an allosteric effect.  
With the model, Cooper and Dryden sought to use basic principles from statistical 
thermodynamics to demonstrate that protein dynamics could be the cause of this biological 
function. Throughout the paper, they highlight how their model uses only uncontroversial 
physics—what they call “textbook statistical thermodynamics”—and assumes no special 
biological properties of proteins (1984, 104). The “dynamic phenomena are not unique to 
biological macromolecules,” they claim, but instead are “simply a manifestation of heat energy” 
(Ibid.). In other words, proteins just happen to be small enough that the stochastic fluctuations in 
thermal energy are likely to have a significant effect on their structure. They also provide 
interpretations of the mathematical representations included in the model to make them accessible 
to those outside biophysics.37 Yet, although their model demonstrated for the first time that the 
 
35 Ibid. 
36 Cooper interview, 27 May 2019. 
37 Cooper’s papers, including Cooper and Dryden (1984), are typically written with clear physical interpretations of 
the mathematics and rationales for any assumptions. According to Cooper, he was often “trying to rationalize things 
for a biochemistry audience”—an audience that was unlikely to be trained in physics and thermodynamics.  He 
claimed that the physical picture was often more important for understanding a phenomenon than the mathematical 
description: “For me, the mathematical description is necessary sometimes, although not always. But I've got to have 
a physical picture, something I can [use to] explain to myself as well as others to support [the mathematical 
description], and I guess that's the way I write papers on whatever subject.” Cooper interview, 24 May 2019. 
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protein dynamics are relevant to protein function, it was met with a collective shrug by most 
protein scientists. 
3.3.2 Reasons for the Slow Reception 
The reception of this paper, along with another important paper in protein dynamics, can 
serve as a rough proxy for the slow uptake of the dynamic view of proteins (Fig. 5).38 Citation data 
for Cooper and Dryden’s paper, as well as the early Molecular Dynamic (MD) simulation 
published by Karplus’ group in 1977, show relatively little activity in the 1980s and 1990s (aside 
from an early spike in interest for the novel MD simulation method) but reveal a marked uptick 
beginning in the early 2000s, when interest in the dynamic view first began to break into 
mainstream structural and molecular biology. These “sleeper” papers raise the question: what was 
happening within the community of protein scientists and structural biologists from the mid-1980s 
that might explain this quiet reception?39 In what follows, I discuss four different factors that help 
explain the lack of traction of the dynamic view within the wider community of structural 
biologists and protein scientists during this time.  
 
 
38 I include McCammon et al. (1977) here in order to show that the citation trend is unlikely to be an artifact of the 
Cooper and Dryden (1984) paper. The results from Karplus’ lab reported in McCammon et al. (1977) provide some 
of the earliest evidence for protein dynamics, although they do not link these dynamics to function. They use a new 
computational method: molecular dynamic (MD) simulation. Karplus, who would go on to win the 2013 Nobel prize 
in chemistry for this work, was already well-established at Harvard and much better known than Cooper at the 
University of Glasgow. Karplus’ paper was published in Nature, whereas Cooper’s was published in the European 
Biophysics Journal. Despite these different pedigrees, the citation data for both papers reveals the same trend 
(excluding the initial spike in interest in Karplus’ use of the new method): both see their citations remain relatively 
flat through the 1980s and 90s, but then begin to increase in the 2000s. 
39 See Gringas (2010) and Ke et al. (2015) for recent characterizations of sleeper, or sleeping beauty, papers in the 
philosophical and scientific literatures, respectively.  
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Figure 5 Citation Data for Dynamic View Papers. Citations for Cooper and Dryden (1984) and McCammon et al. 
(1977), 1977-2019. Citation data obtained from Web of Science. Accessed on 10 December 2020.  
 
With the publication of Cooper and Dryden’s model of dynamic allostery in 1984, there 
were two possible explanations for this protein function: it could be caused by changes in structure 
or changes in dynamics. Most scientists at the time were committed to the static view of proteins, 
and they saw the debate about the cause of protein functions as a relative significance debate 
(Beatty 1997). When they acknowledged Cooper and Dryden’s dynamic account at all, they tended 
to downplay its significance. They admitted that the model of dynamic allostery might obtain 
empirically but suggested this was likely to be rare. For example, Russell Petter and his colleagues 
constructed a synthetic allosteric compound, and its allosteric behavior, they claimed, was fully 
explained by structural changes. In a footnote, they cite Cooper and Dryden (1984), noting that 
“alternative mechanisms have been advanced to account for cooperative behavior which do not 
require conformational changes,” but then stress that such dynamic changes are not significant in 
their allosteric system (Petter et al. 1990, 3861, fn 20). Scientists, such as Petter, could thus pay 
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structural studies. This limited acknowledgement of dynamic allostery functioned as a way for 
them to flag their awareness of the new literature on protein dynamics and dynamic allostery while 
continuing to research and explain allostery using the classic structural accounts.  
Scientists adopting this strategy would often acknowledge that proteins are composed of 
atoms that are in constant motion but contend that these dynamic fluctuations are minor and could 
be abstracted away. Cooper and Dryden’s (1984) model of dynamic allostery without structural 
change, they would argue, was an extreme case unlikely to obtain in many biological systems. 
Compared to changes in structure, changes in dynamics, were insignificant. Responding to 
Cooper’s earlier work on protein dynamics, Thomas Creighton adopted this strategy: 
There is thus extensive evidence for varying degrees of flexibility in the folded states of 
proteins. This has often been considered to be inconsistent with the static models derived 
by crystallography. However, it is a general thermodynamic requirement that a small 
system with the thermal properties of proteins have transient fluctuations involving 
relatively large energies, even at thermodynamic equilibrium (Cooper 1976). What is not 
yet clear is the magnitude of the conformational changes which are produced by this 
thermal energy. (Creighton 1978, 247) 
 
In this passage, Creighton acknowledges protein dynamics, but he later dismisses them as rare or 
insignificant, citing simulation evidence (e.g., “high energy barriers appeared to prevent the 
interior atoms from wandering far from their positions observed crystallographically”) and x-ray 
evidence (e.g., “in no instance has substantial change of the conformation of a globular structural 
unit been observed”) (Ibid., 247-8). Creighton, Petter, and other scientists who adopted this 
strategy were thus quite similar to the arch-adaptationist described by Gould and Lewontin (1979): 
“You acknowledge the rival, but circumscribe its domain of action so narrowly that it cannot have 
any importance in the affairs of nature” and then “congratulate yourself for being such undogmatic 
and ecumenical chap” (151). Regardless of the specifics of their arguments, these researchers 
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acknowledged the new evidence for the dynamic view but at the same time defended the status 
quo, continuing to use static structures to draw inferences about protein function. 
Another factor that helps explain the slow uptake of the dynamic view arises from the fact 
that protein dynamics occur across a vast range of spatiotemporal scales and are empirically 
accessible by different methods. Philosophers of physics describe this problem as the “tyranny of 
scales.” It arises because many systems “manifest radically different, dominant behaviors at 
different length scales” (Batterman 2013, 255). Although scientists have developed ways to 
explain behavior at different scales, “it is often hard to relate these scale-based models to each 
other” (Ibid.).  
This problem played out in studying protein dynamics in the 1980s and 1990s since much 
research “center[ed] on the detailed application of certain physical and chemical techniques and 
on the analysis of data obtained from their application to specific systems” (Richards 1983, 2).  
The vast difference in timescales of different protein motions exacerbates this problem. The 
dynamic fluctuations at the heart of the dynamic view are often incredibly fast, occurring at the 
pico- to nanosecond timescale, whereas the large translational motions that were cited in structural 
explanations of allostery were typically in the millisecond to second timescale. Experimental 
methods focus on only one set of dynamic properties at a given timescale; thus, the dynamics 
observed via one technique could not be seen by the other. The landmark MD simulation of the 
globular protein BPTI presented by Karplus’ group in 1977 is a case in point (McCammon et al. 
1977). Because the simulation modeled the dynamic fluctuations of the protein for 8.8 ps, only 
those motions on the picosecond scale (e.g., oscillations of individual atoms, rotation of side 
chains) could be captured by this method (Case 2000). This MD simulation would be unable to 
resolve the large, 13° rotation of the hemoglobin subunits that Max Perutz (1970) discovered in 
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his crystallographic studies of allostery in hemoglobin. Because these different methods gave 
empirical access to dynamic features of proteins at different scales, scientists researching the 
“same” phenomenon—viz., allostery—could work largely independently, with surprisingly little 
productive crosstalk.  
Obtaining evidence for distinct dynamic properties required completely different models 
and theoretical assumptions as well as methods, and it was a nontrivial matter to integrate the 
results at different scales. Those endorsing the dynamic view of proteins recognized this problem: 
the use of different techniques to study proteins was inevitable, since “there exists no single method 
which covers the whole range of interest from picoseconds to seconds” (Demchenko 1986, 125). 
However, the majority of researchers who operated under the dominant static view of proteins 
overlooked it, since their method of choice, x-ray crystallography, rendered invisible the rapid 
local dynamics at the core of the dynamic view. The challenge of integrating these different 
methods, combined with the methodological entrenchment of x-ray crystallographers, further 
explains why the dynamic view of proteins received such little traction in the 1980s and 1990s. 
A third factor relates to the perception of theoretical work by the larger community of 
structural biologists and protein scientists and the related problem of publishing such work. The 
early proponents of the dynamic view were largely persuaded of its merits based upon theoretical 
considerations, and much of their work cited theoretical conclusions that resulted from applying 
thermodynamic theory to proteins. They often found it difficult to publish theoretical work in high 
impact journals. In an autobiographical essay, Karplus described his difficulties in publishing such 
a paper in 1971:   
We submitted the paper, which received excellent reviews, but came back with a rejection 
letter stating that because there was no experimental evidence to support our results, it was 
not certain that the conclusions were correct. This was my first experience with Nature and 
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with the difficulty of publishing theoretical results related to biology, particularly in high 
impact journals. (Karplus 2006, 29) 
 
According to Karplus, theoreticians are still in this Catch-22 today: “if theory agrees with 
experiment it is not interesting because the result is already known, whereas if one is making a 
prediction, then it is not publishable because there is no evidence that the prediction is correct” 
(Ibid., 29).  
This same problem beset Cooper and Dryden when they were choosing where to publish 
their model of dynamic allostery in the spring of 1984. When asked why they published the paper 
in the European Biophysics Journal, Cooper recalled an experience similar to Karplus’ that he had 
earlier in his career and his desire to avoid a repeat experience with the model of dynamic allostery 
paper:  
I was probably conscious of the fact that it's going to be a fairly controversial idea. If I tried 
to go to one of the more highly cited Nature or Science or wherever I'd have brought out a 
bit of a battle to get it published. And I didn't want to get involved in that kind of argument. 
The 1976 paper that came out in PNAS [Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences] 
had previously been rejected by Nature for…what I seem to recall were fatuitous reasons—
just that the referee didn't understand the argument.40 
 
Dryden remembered a corroborating fact about their publication decision: “Alan [Cooper] knew 
the editor of the European Biophysics Journal…. So that's why Alan chose that, because he knew 
that the editor wouldn't throw it out on its ear straight away.”41 Thus, even though their goal was 
to influence the molecular and structural biologists who were wedded to the static view of proteins, 
they ultimately published in a place where it was likely to be read only by those already interested 
in biophysics. The general bias against theoretical work, along with the fact that these papers were 
“a little bit controversial” since they were “getting away from the static picture” and “trying to 
 
40 Cooper interview, 24 May 2019. 
41 Dryden interview, 24 June 2019. 
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overcome some of these ideas from the majority,” led to the marginalization of many early papers 
that championed the dynamic view.42 And this, in turn, slowed the uptake of the dynamic view by 
the wider community of protein scientists. 
Relatedly, explanations of protein behavior that invoke statistical thermodynamics are very 
different from those that cite changes in structural features. This contrast is evident when we 
compare Cooper and Dryden’s model of dynamic allostery to the classic structural models of 
allostery (Monod et al., 1965, Koshland et al. 1966). The former requires knowledge of statistical 
thermodynamics and mathematics, along with reasoning about thermodynamic equilibrium, 
whereas the latter treat proteins as molecular machines and require only mechanistic reasoning 
about structural, or conformational changes. Writing in a review in 1980, Cooper acknowledged 
this difference and cited it as a reason why dynamic explanations of protein function were slow to 
be adopted: 
The concept that “conformational changes” are involved is widely accepted and is a 
comforting view since we might then picture the mechanism as similar to the relative 
motions of springs and levers and pulleys familiar from macroscopic machines. (Cooper 
1980, 474) 
 
Historian of molecular biology Michel Morange (2012) reiterates this point, specifically in the 
context of teaching. He claims that anyone who has taught biochemistry and structural biology 
knows that mechanistic explanations of protein behavior that cite structural changes are 
“understood much more rapidly” than thermodynamic explanations that cite changes in 
equilibrium (Ibid., 14). Advocates of the dynamic view used types of reasoning and explanation 
that differed from those used by most molecular and structural biologists, who were trained to infer 
function from structure, and this difference is another factor that accounts, in part, for the slow 
 
42 Cooper interview, 27 May 2019. 
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spread of the dynamic view. Taken together, these four factors help to explain why the dynamic 
view of proteins received little traction outside the small community of early adopters in the 1980s 
and 1990s. 
3.4 True Believers and the Search for Anomalies 
3.4.1 Early Dynamicist Researchers 
The rise of the dynamic view depended on the small community of researchers who were 
studying protein dynamics empirically during this time. Like the earliest proponents of the 
dynamic view, they were already committed to treating proteins as small thermodynamic systems, 
and it was their theoretical commitment, I argue, that led them on their quest to discover anomalies 
that would ultimately undermine the static view of proteins. 
Within this group of dynamicists, researchers typically fell into one of two camps. On the 
one hand, there were the true believers, who were proselytizers for the dynamic view. In their 
publications, they explicitly argued that their findings demonstrated the inadequacy of the static 
view and refuted previous explanations of protein function that cited only structure. For example, 
Gregory Reinhart, a true believer par excellence, titled one of his papers on allostery, “The Failure 
of a Two-State Model,” arguing that the evidence for dynamic allostery in a particular enzyme 
system showed the inadequacy of allosteric models that cited structural changes between an active 
and inactive conformation (Johnson and Reinhart 1997). True believers often used multiple 
experimental systems and different techniques in their quest to discover anomalous cases that 
could not be accommodated by the static view. On the other hand, there were the workhorse 
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dynamicists. These researchers were also committed to the dynamic view of proteins, but they did 
not actively promulgate the view nor did they present their findings as refutations of structural 
explanations. Often, they worked on one experimental system, and they were methodologically 
entrenched within a particular technique, content to engage primarily with others using similar 
techniques or working on the same system.  
Among the scientists working on dynamics in the 1980s and 1990s, the true believers bore 
most of the responsibility for promoting the dynamic approach to studying proteins. They were 
proselytizers for the view with deep-seated commitments to dynamics arising from application of 
the principles of thermodynamics. Reinhart is one of the most prominent scientists who fits this 
description. He completed his doctorate in Biochemistry at the University of Wisconsin Madison 
in 1979. By the early 1980s, he had established his own lab at the University of Oklahoma, 
investigating the regulation of metabolic enzymes, such as phosphofructokinase (PFK). His 
theoretical commitment to dynamic rather than structural approaches to protein function was 
evident from the beginning of his career: he published two theoretical papers in the 1980s touting 
the superiority of thermodynamic approaches to allostery (Reinhart 1983, 1988).  
In his empirical work, Reinhart discovered and characterized different cases of dynamic 
allostery. His lab conducted activity assays on PFK and other enzymes with various ligands to 
ascertain their role in regulating enzyme activity.43 Their research demonstrated that the interaction 
between PFK and its many ligands included different allosteric couplings in which the binding of 
one ligand would affect the binding of a second or even third ligand. They identified cases in which 
the binding of a ligand did not result in significant structural changes in the protein, indicating that 
 
43 See, for example, Reinhart and Hartleip (1986, 1987), Reinhart et al. (1989), Johnson and Reinhart (1994a, 1994b, 
1997), Braxton et al. (1996) 
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the allosteric linkage was caused by changes in protein dynamics.44 Highlighting these empirical 
results, Reinhart argued that the MWC model of structural allostery was an inadequate framework 
for explaining complex enzyme-ligand interactions. As the lab continued to accumulate cases of 
dynamic allostery in PFK and other regulatory enzymes, Reinhart almost always framed the 
group’s empirical findings as anomalies that could only be explained by the dynamic view.45  
Other scientists working on protein dynamics during this time—the workhorse 
dynamicists—were not proselytizers for the dynamic view, but their research also demonstrated 
the importance of dynamics for protein function. Mikael Akke and his colleagues working on the 
calmodulin superfamily of calcium-binding proteins in the 1990s provide good examples of 
scientists of this sort. Akke began investigating the dynamic behavior of Calbindin D9k upon Ca2+ 
binding during his graduate work split between the University of Lund in Sweden and the Scripps 
Research Institute in La Jolla, California. He then continued this work after joining the faculty at 
the University of Lund in 1998. His research focused primarily on this one experimental system, 
using one technique, namely, NMR.46 It demonstrated that changes in protein dynamics 
 
44 For instance, in one early study, Reinhart showed that the inhibitory effect of MgATP, a known allosteric inhibitor 
of PFK, was attenuated by decreasing the pH (Reinhart 1985). These results indicated that H+ functions as a third 
ligand and that H+ binding is positively coupled to substrate binding. 
45 For examples of Reinhart and his colleagues presenting evidence for dynamic allostery as evidence against structural 
models, such as the MWC model, see Reinhart et al. (1989) and Johnson and Reinhart (1997).  
46 In their research during the 1990s, Akke and his colleagues match the description of workhorse dynamicists in two 
ways. First, they focus their attention on one experimental system—the calmodulin superfamily. Of the papers Akke 
published between 1990 and 1996, for example, nearly 80% (17/19), studied the dynamic-driven allosteric behavior 
of proteins in the calmodulin superfamily. Second, their work on protein dynamics relies largely on only one 
technique, namely, NMR. In fact, much of their early work in the 1990s aimed at developing and perfecting the use 
of NMR as a probe of protein dynamics (Skelton et al 1992, 1993; Akke et al. 1993, 1994). Both of these features of 
Akke and his collaborators help to explain why they were able to continue to publish evidence of dynamic allostery 
throughout the 1990s without much engagement at all with structural accounts of allostery. The research communities 
in which they considered themselves members were ones that were already committed to the study of protein dynamics 
in a particular protein family using a specific experimental technique. At that time, Akke and his collaborators were 
already committed to studying protein dynamics using NMR, and their work focused on demonstrating the causal 
relevance and importance of these dynamics in generating allosteric behavior within the calmodulin superfamily of 
proteins. 
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contributed to allostery in calmodulin, and he cited his findings as validation of Cooper and 
Dryden’s model of dynamic allostery (Akke et al. 1991, 1993). But he did not stress the difficulties 
his findings posed for the static view and structural accounts of allostery. In fact, unlike Reinhart, 
he did not cite previous structural models of allostery in his papers at all. His discussion engaged 
more with scientists working on calmodulin than others advocating the dynamic view of proteins. 
Rather than focusing on the negative import of his findings for structural models, Akke’s primary 
goal was to show that “entropic effects associated with the protein dynamics play an important 
role” in the production of allosteric coupling in calmodulin (Akke et al. 1991, 173). Like the true 
believers, Akke and other workhorse dynamicists furnished empirical evidence for the dynamic 
view through their research in the 1980s and 1990s, but they did so without framing their results 
as a refutation of structural explanations.  
3.4.2 The Thermodynamic Framework 
Despite their different approaches, both the true believers and workhorse dynamicists had 
strong theoretical commitments to dynamics, and their research produced empirical results that 
supported dynamic rather than structural explanations of protein function. A key reason for their 
success in discovering dynamic anomalies was their commitment to a thermodynamic 
framework.47 Whereas previous structural explanations of protein function were qualitative, 
dynamic explanations were quantitative. Moreover, the thermodynamic framework provided a 
method for researchers to distinguish structural and dynamic contributions to function.  
 
47 Cooper (1976, 1980) and Reinhart (1983, 1988) lay out this thermodynamic framework and apply it to allostery. 
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In order to analyze allostery, for instance, researchers used the Gibbs free energy equation: 
∆∆G = ∆∆H – T∆∆S. The binding of an allosteric inhibitor to a protein could induce changes in 
dynamics, which would be captured by the entropy term (∆S), or structural changes, which would 
be reflected in the enthalpy term (∆H). Taken together, the changes in these two values would 
determine the sign and magnitude of the allosteric coupling between two ligands. For positive 
allostery, ∆∆G is negative because the binding of the allosteric ligand makes the binding of the 
second ligand more favorable. If ∆∆G is positive, then the allosteric ligand is a negative effector 
since it makes the binding of the second ligand less favorable. This framework provided a way to 
quantify the energetic coupling between two ligands at distinct binding sites. It also enabled 
researchers to distinguish the enthalpic and entropic contributions to coupling so that they could 
determine whether dynamic or structural changes in the protein were responsible for allostery. 
That is, they could use the Gibbs equation to identify which component was larger and therefore 
responsible for determining the sign of the coupling free energy.  
Cooper and Dryden’s (1984) model used this framework to demonstrate that dynamic 
allostery is entropy-driven: 
We have shown that dynamically mediated cooperativity should be entropy driven: that is, 
binding of a second ligand is made thermodynamically more favorable because of a less 
negative ∆∆S. (Ibid., 108-9) 
 
In their paper, they presented two models of dynamic allostery, that is, two different processes that 
could lead to sizeable coupling energies driven by changes in entropy. First, they showed how 
ligand binding could affect vibrational normal modes in the protein—without any concomitant 
structural changes—which would in turn influence the binding of a second ligand at a distant site. 
Second, they developed a model to show how ligand-binding might lead to an allosteric response 
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by changing the distribution of conformational substates in a population of protein molecules in 
solution, without changing the average structure.  
In this second case, they sought to model what would later come to be called the 
“conformational entropy” of the protein (Igumenova et al. 2006, Frederick et al. 2007). The 
conformational entropy can be thought of as a measure of the number conformational microstates 
that are accessible to the protein molecules at a given temperature. The number of conformational 
microstates available tracks the flexibility of the protein molecule: a relatively rigid protein will 
have few thermally accessible microstate conformations, and most will be similar to the mean 
structure, whereas a relatively flexible or dynamic protein will be able to sample many different 
conformational microstates, with some of these having structures that are significantly displaced 
from the mean.  
Cooper and Dryden’s (1984) model of dynamic allostery showed how changes in 
conformational entropy could be the driving force behind an allosteric response in relatively 
flexible proteins. In this case, individual protein molecules would be able to sample a large number 
of conformational microstates in solution. Then, as these protein molecules bound the allosteric 
ligand, they would stiffen, losing dynamic flexibility, thereby becoming more rigid. This first 
binding event, like most ligand-binding processes, would be enthalpically favorable (∆H1 < 0), but 
there would be a significant unfavorable loss of conformational entropy (∆S1 << 0). The ∆G1 for 
the first binding event might then be either positive or negative, depending on the protein-ligand 
system. However, what matters for allosteric coupling is the difference between the free energy of 
this first binding event (∆G1) and that of the second binding event (∆G2). In the case of dynamic 
allostery described by the Cooper and Dryden model, the second ligand binds the protein to yield 
a similarly favorable ∆H2, but now the protein molecules are already relatively stiff, with access 
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to only a limited number of conformational microstates, all of which are relatively close to the 
mean structure. In a sense, then, the protein is trapped in conformational microstates with high 
binding affinity for the second ligand. Binding of the second ligand will therefore yield a much 
smaller decrease in conformational entropy (∆S2 << ∆S1) because the majority of the entropic cost 
of binding the ligand was already paid by the first ligand. Because the enthalpy of binding the first 
and second ligand was roughly equivalent (∆∆H ≈ 0) but the entropic cost of binding greatly 
decreased (∆∆S >> 0), the coupling free energy in this case is likely to be favorable (∆∆G < 0), 
indicating the two binding sites are positively coupled.  
As Cooper and Dryden’s model illustrates, the thermodynamic framework proved useful 
for those committed to the dynamic view of proteins who wanted to demonstrate the functional 
importance of protein dynamics. In the case of allostery, it provided a way to distinguish dynamic 
from structural allostery, and it revealed when and how dynamic allostery was likely to occur. 
Those scientists seeking to discover cases of dynamic allostery should look for flexible proteins in 
which ligand-binding induced large changes in entropy. Moreover, the thermodynamic analysis of 
allostery also showed why structural accounts of allostery, such as the MWC model, would 
necessarily fail to be able to account for dynamic allostery, since they only considered the enthalpic 
contribution to free energy.  
3.4.3 The Search for Anomalies 
Aided by this thermodynamic framework, the true believers embarked on their quest in the 
1980s to find dynamic “anomalies” to demonstrate the importance of protein dynamics and reveal 
the inadequacy of  the static view of proteins. These were anomalies in name only—at least to the 
true believers who went out searching for them—because these scientists were already 
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theoretically committed to the thermodynamic framework and the dynamic view of proteins. The 
true believers thus went out in search of empirical cases that could confirm Cooper and Dryden’s 
model of dynamic allostery and help convince others to endorse the dynamic view.  Because of 
the thermodynamic framework, they knew exactly what they were looking for and where to look 
in advance, namely, cases in which the entropic contribution swamped the enthalpic contribution. 
Already committed to dynamic accounts of allostery for theoretical reasons, they were particularly 
keen to find empirical evidence that would confirm it. 
The overarching goal of discovering dynamic anomalies greatly influenced the true 
believers’ methodological choices. Their desire to accumulate enough instances of dynamic 
allostery in order to argue for the replacement of the structural approach with the dynamic one 
affected their choice of both experimental techniques and experimental systems. These scientists 
typically avoided using x-ray crystallography, which was the dominant technique for structural 
characterization at that time, and instead opted for experimental techniques that would be better 
able to track changes in dynamics. By using microcalorimetry, fluorescence and Raman 
spectroscopy, activity assays and the like, these researchers were able to experimentally obtain 
data from which they could then derive the individual contributions of entropy (∆∆S) and enthalpy 
(∆∆H) to the free energy of allosteric coupling (∆∆G). When coupled with the thermodynamic 
framework, these techniques enabled them to identify cases of dynamic allostery. Moreover, 
because they wanted to amass as many anomalous cases as possible, the true believers would often 
use these techniques to study multiple experimental systems. Driven by their theoretical 
commitments to protein dynamics, the true believers spent the late 1980s and 1990s building the 
case for the dynamic approach, using all the resources at their disposal to accumulate empirical 
evidence that supported dynamic rather than structural accounts of allostery. 
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Let us consider Reinhart in greater detail, since his research program illustrates this 
approach to the dynamic view of proteins. The publications from his group in the 1980s and 1990s 
show that Reinhart and his collaborators were seeking anomalous cases of dynamic allostery that 
could bolster the case for the dynamic view of proteins. Focused on investigating the dynamic 
behavior of allosteric enzymes, his research used a variety of different experimental techniques 
and studied different enzyme-ligand systems. Most of his research utilized enzyme activity assays, 
including kinetic assays, which could be used to obtain constants from which ∆∆H and ∆∆S could 
be derived.48 However, during this time, his group also expanded their studies to include 
fluorescence polarization and quenching assays—experimental techniques that could yield more 
specific information about the structural fluctuations involved in protein dynamics.49 All these 
techniques were chosen because they would be the most likely to yield information about protein 
dynamics. As for their object of study, the preferred experimental system of the Reinhart lab was 
the metabolic enzyme PFK. Although the majority of their work involved this enzyme, they were 
able to study many different enzyme-ligand systems using it, since PFK is embedded in a complex 
regulatory network. Hence, even though they focused primarily on one regulatory enzyme, they 
were able to study its different allosteric responses to a variety of ligands, including MgADP, 
MgATP, fructose-6-phosphate, H+, and phosphenolpyruvate. In this way, they were able to obtain 
multiple different examples of allosteric coupling, in which the entropy component played an 
important role in determining the sign and magnitude of that coupling.50  
 
48 For examples, see Reinhart et al (1989), Johnson and Reinhart (1994a), Braxton et al. (1996), and Johnson and 
Reinhart (1997). 
49 See Reinhart and Hartleip (1987) and Johnson and Reinhart (1994a, 1994b, 1997). 
50 See Reinhart (1985), Reinhart and Hartleip (1987), Johnson and Reinhart (1994a, 1994b, 1997), and  Braxton et al. 
(1996). 
 85 
One of the main aims of their research program was to produce sufficient evidence for 
dynamic allostery to show that it was a common feature of allosteric systems. They wanted this 
evidence in order to convince those who thought changes in protein dynamics were functionally 
insignificant compared to structural changes—i.e., those on the opposite side of the relative 
significance debate. Their results with different PFK-ligand systems provided some evidence that 
dynamic allostery was not rare. To further bolster their view, Reinhart and his group expanded 
their program to study two additional regulatory enzymes: isocitrate dehydrogenase (Reinhart et 
al. 1989) and carbamoyl phosphate synthetase (Braxton et al. 1996). The primary motivation for 
including these additional enzymes in their studies was to show that dynamic allostery was not 
peculiar to PFK. For all three enzymes, Reinhart and his colleagues demonstrated that the entropy 
component was necessary to explain the magnitude of the observed allosteric effect. They offered 
this as suggestive evidence that dynamic allostery might be common, at least among regulatory 
enzymes.51 All these methodological choices—i.e., which enzymes to study and which techniques 
to employ—reveal Reinhart’s desire to search for cases of allostery that would support the dynamic 
account that emerged from thermodynamic analysis. 
Reinhart’s group also fully exploited the thermodynamic framework to help them discover 
cases of dynamic allostery. The majority of the group’s allostery publications from the mid-1980s 
onward discussed the importance of entropy to specific allosteric systems. They emphasized both 
the importance of entropy in giving rise to allosteric coupling and the need to include the entropy 
component in explanations of allostery. They wanted to show that entropic changes, such as 
 
51 Although they would like to make this generalizing induction from these two cases, the authors caution against 
doing so before more evidence confirms this finding: “It is of course inappropriate, without further investigation, to 
attribute all regulatory enzymes the characteristics reported herein for phosofructokinase and isocitrase 
dehydrogenase. In those enzymes to which these properties do pertain, however, an additional role for protein 
dynamics is suggested.” (Reinhart et al. 1989, 4035). 
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changes in conformational entropy, were important contributors to the free energy of allosteric 
coupling. In some cases, Reinhart and his colleagues were able to identify allosteric systems in 
which the change in entropy upon ligand binding was sufficiently large to overcome the enthalpy 
and determine the sign of the coupling free energy. The Gibbs free energy equation (∆∆G = ∆∆H 
– T∆∆S) shows that this will occur when the absolute value of the entropy component is greater 
than that of the enthalpy component: |T∆∆S| > |∆∆H|. Because the enthalpy and entropy 
components oppose each other, the sign of the coupling free energy in these cases will flip from 
positive to negative. These cases of dynamic allostery provide the most compelling evidence for 
the dynamic view, since structural accounts—if they were even possible to give—would predict 
negative cooperativity between the two sites when the system, in fact, exhibits positive 
cooperativity. Thus, the failure to consider the entropic component to allosteric coupling energy 
on systems such as this leads to complete explanatory failure. Reinhart and colleagues (1989) 
described these cases as ones in which “the coupling entropy plays an important role in establishing 
both the nature and the magnitude of the allosteric response” (4032). The change in entropy 
controls the “nature” of the allosteric response, on their view, since it determines whether a certain 
ligand acts as an allosteric activator or inhibitor. Throughout the 1990s, Reinhart and his 
colleagues continued to stress that the entropy component could reverse the expected coupling 
interaction in these paradigm cases of dynamic allostery and could thereby determine the “nature 
of the allosteric effect” (Braxton et al. 1996, 11922, see also Johnson and Reinhart 1997). 
Even in cases in which the entropy component is not greater than the enthalpy component, 
Reinhart and his colleagues were still quick to point out the effects of entropy in order to support 
the dynamic view of allostery. In these cases, the entropy component is not large enough to 
overcome the enthalpy component. It thus cannot determine the “nature” of the allosteric 
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interaction, but these researchers emphasized that the change in entropy would still affect the 
magnitude of allosteric coupling. They adopted this strategy in their discussion of the observed 
allosteric coupling in PFK:  
Net coupling energies responsible for PFK’s allosteric responses are always smaller in 
absolute value than the corresponding enthalpy, indicating that enthalpy-entropy 
compensation is occurring. (Johnson and Reinhart 1994a, 2636) 
 
Here, the researchers failed to find exactly what they were searching for—viz., another case in 
which the changes in protein dynamics were the driver of allosteric coupling. In this particular 
case, they discovered that the entropic contributions to coupling free energy were insufficient to 
overcome the enthalpic contribution. Nevertheless, they still spin their findings as evidence of the 
importance of protein dynamics and the need for accounts of allostery to consider entropic 
changes. They made what amounts to little more than a mathematical point: the experimentally 
determined ∆∆G for the allosteric system is less than it would be if it were wholly determined by 
∆∆H, which according to the Gibbs free energy equation means that ∆∆S is greater than zero. 
Thus, as the researchers claimed, their results showed that changes in entropy, even in this system, 
affected the magnitude of allosteric coupling.  
In other studies, Reinhart and his colleagues went even further in order to show that entropy 
was an important determinant of allosteric coupling and thereby ought to be included in any 
explanation of allosteric behavior. Guided by the thermodynamic framework, they exploited the 
fact that increases in temperature have a disproportionate effect on the entropic component; 
increasing the temperature increases the importance of the entropy component (T∆∆S) relative to 
the enthalpic component (∆∆H). In these experiments, Reinhart and his colleagues discovered that 
the allosteric systems they were studying exhibited the same behavior as the PFK case just 
described—the entropy and enthalpy components were opposing but the enthalpy term dominated. 
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However, by raising the temperature from 25°C to 37°C in one case (Braxton et al. 1996) and to 
40°C in another (Johnson and Reinhart 1997), they were able to increase the magnitude of the 
entropy component until it surpassed that of the enthalpy component. By raising the temperature, 
the researchers demonstrated that they could flip the sign of the coupling free energy, causing a 
given allosteric ligand to switch its function, from an activator to an inhibitor. This “temperature-
induced inversion” of the allosteric effect showed that in systems in which the entropy and 
enthalpy components are of opposite sign, changes in the relative magnitudes of these components 
could cause the “very nature of the allosteric response” to be reversed (Johnson and Reinhart 1997, 
12820).  
With these variable temperature experiments, Reinhart and his colleagues exploited the 
thermodynamic relationships to highlight the importance of entropy in determining the nature of 
allosteric coupling. However, the results of these experiments themselves were unsurprising. They 
simply showed how the experimental manipulation of temperature affects the entropy of the 
system, which was already known from the Gibbs free energy equation. Moreover, the researchers 
gave no reason to think that these elevated temperatures were physiologically relevant to the 
allosteric systems they were characterizing. In light of these facts, it seems the primary motivation 
for these variable temperature experiments was to transform less compelling evidence for the 
dynamic view into more compelling evidence. At room temperature, entropy only decreased the 
magnitude of allosteric activation of PFK by MgATP, which was still controlled by the enthalpy 
term. But, at higher temperatures, the compensatory effect of entropy was enhanced: entropy now 
controlled the nature of the allosteric coupling as well as the magnitude, thereby transforming 
MgATP from an activator to an inhibitor (Johnson and Reinhart 1997). With this latter result, the 
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researchers were better able to drive home their message that the entropic contribution to allosteric 
coupling could be quite significant and thus ought not be neglected. 
 Reinhart’s research program in the 1980s and 1990s clearly shows how scientists already 
convinced by theoretical arguments for the dynamic view of proteins set out to confirm it 
empirically. His research program was built upon the premise that protein dynamics were an 
important driver of protein function, and his work on allostery aimed to provide empirical proof 
of it. Rejecting structural models of allostery that considered only the enthalpic contribution, 
Reinhart showed that entropic changes could play a major role in allosteric coupling. Guided by 
the thermodynamic framework, he knew where to look and how to identify protein-ligand systems 
that exhibited allosteric coupling driven by changes in dynamics rather than structure. Indeed, this 
energetic analysis of allostery even showed him how to manipulate allosteric systems to increase 
the entropic contribution to coupling free energy. Throughout his publications during this time, he 
cited his findings as evidence that the static view of proteins and structural models of allostery 
needed to be replaced by the dynamic view and dynamic explanations of allostery that considered 
both enthalpic as well as entropic contributions to allosteric coupling.  
Cooper and Dryden were also members of the community of dynamicists whose research 
centered around the pursuit of empirical evidence for the dynamic view. When Dryden joined 
Cooper’s lab in October 1983, he and Cooper immediately started thinking about topics for a 
theoretical paper to demonstrate the functional importance of protein dynamics. In their 
discussions, Cooper’s previous suggestion of allostery without conformational change came to 
mind. In 1980, Cooper had considered the possibility of dynamic rather than structural changes 
transmitting a signal from one site to another site on a protein in a relatively obscure paper in 
Science Progress. At that time, he concluded that “it [was] difficult at this stage to predict whether 
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dynamic changes can contribute significantly to allosteric effects” (Cooper 1980, 495). In the fall 
of 1983, Cooper and Dryden decided to “put some numbers on this very basic idea” and develop 
a formal model of dynamic allostery.52 The goal was to produce a mathematical model that would 
enable them to estimate the potential magnitudes of the allosteric effects that arise from dynamics 
alone, which would in turn help determine the plausibility of allostery driven by dynamic changes 
in the absence of conformational change.  
Dryden thus began his graduate studies doing theoretical work, developing a formal model 
of dynamic allostery. His contribution to the model published in 1984 focused on allostery caused 
by changes in vibrational energy. His model showed that allosteric coupling could occur in the 
absence of any structural changes in the protein if the binding of the allosteric ligand induced 
changes in its vibrational spectrum. Dryden modeled two cases in which changes in low frequency 
normal modes could produce allosteric coupling. In the first case, ligand binding causes many 
“small frequency shifts resulting from an overall stiffening of the protein structure” (Cooper and 
Dryden 1984, 106). The shift in many individual vibrational modes from lower to higher frequency 
makes the protein less dynamic, since higher frequency modes are less thermally excitable. This 
in turn facilitates binding of the second ligand, since the system has already paid most of the 
entropic cost associated with ligand binding. In the second case, ligand binding suppresses 
“thermally excited collective modes” that are “strongly coupled to ligand binding sites” (Ibid.). If 
these global vibrational modes—the so-called “breathing modes”—were suppressed by ligand 
binding, it would lead to positive cooperativity between the binding sites. Here, binding of the 
ligand again shifts the frequency of the collective modes to higher, less thermally-excitable 
 
52 Cooper interview, 27 May 2019. 
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frequencies, but unlike the first case, the shift in frequency disrupts the collective mode that formed 
the energetic linkage between the two binding sites. 
Alongside this general theoretical treatment, Dryden also developed a more concrete model 
of dynamic allostery. In a recent interview, he confessed that initially he “didn’t want to do a 
general theory” of dynamic allostery but instead “wanted to get a specific physical model that 
would prove that binding of one ligand would change the vibrational spectrum of this physical 
object and enhance the binding of the second ligand.”53 Hence, he developed the “scissors model.” 
The model was meant to represent a highly idealized enzyme that could serve as a mechanistic 
example of how changes in low frequency vibrational modes could lead to allosteric coupling 
without any change in the average protein structure. In a recent interview, Dryden described the 
generation of the model:   
I came up with a little sketch…of the scissors model…. If you imagine a pair of scissors 
and that they can sort of vibrate…as one side opens, the other closes. And imagine if a 
ligand goes in [and] is jammed in the jaws of the scissors, then the scissors can no longer 
close…And so the second ligand would fit on the other side in between the handles.54 
 
Starting from this idea, he developed a simple theoretical model of the enzyme that he could use 
to evaluate the potential allosteric coupling between the two binding sites. He approached the 
problem like a physicist building a toy model: 
I'm going to make a theoretical pair of scissors. [In] the model, there's going to be two rods, 
and they'll be joined at a rubber pin. And they'll have a certain length, and the rods won't 
have any mass. All the mass of the protein was going to be in point masses at the ends of 
the four ends of the system… And then I thought, "Well, I'd be able to solve the equations 
of motion for that physical model, and that would give me the vibrational modes."55  
 
 




According to Dryden, Cooper ultimately decided not to include the scissors model in the 1984 
publication, likely because he “thought it was too detailed” and “wouldn’t be taken seriously,” 
since it was not supported by any known empirical systems.56 But Dryden continued to work on 
the model and his analysis of its vibrational spectrum, and he included this work in his dissertation 
(Dryden 1988). 
For Dryden, the scissors model provided a possible mechanism that showed how changes 
in vibrational normal modes, rather than a conformational change, could cause allosteric coupling 
between two sites:  
One can imagine the free enzyme vibrating at low frequency with a large amplitude due to 
the highly excited states, encountering the ligand which binds without changing the mean 
conformation, as measured by the angle θ, but which restricts the amplitude of the scissor 
motion severely. (Dryden 1988, 66) 
 
Unlike the general theoretical treatment of this topic included in the 1984 paper, the scissors model 
offered better guidance on where to look for empirical confirmation of dynamic allostery. This 
feature of the model was important to Dryden since the primary goal for “the rest of [his] PhD then 
was…trying to prove it…trying to prove the scissors model” by obtaining data “that could show 
changes in low frequency vibrational modes in proteins upon ligand binding.”57  
The arc of Dryden’s doctoral research in Cooper’s lab thus exemplifies the approach of the 
true believers in the 1980s and 1990s. He began with a strong theoretical commitment to the 
dynamic view of proteins, developing a theoretical model that demonstrated the functional 





confirmation for it. As Dryden summed it up recently, his research was “theory first, then 
experiments.”58  
However, when he turned from the theoretical model to empirical research he ran into 
problems. From empirical and simulation work published at that time, he learned that proteins 
were likely to have hundreds or even thousands of low frequency vibrational modes. Thus, the 
likelihood that he would be able to identify the shift in low frequency modes that he had calculated 
for the scissors model was slim, since the background vibrational spectra for the rest of the protein 
would likely swamp the changes of interest. In order to confirm the model, he realized he would 
need to try to identify a simpler allosteric system.  
While scouring the literature, Dryden came across two papers by Julius Rebek, a synthetic 
organic chemist at the University of Pittsburgh who had been developing synthetic allosteric 
compounds (Rebek 1984, Rebek et al. 1985). The crown ether Rebek’s group had synthesized was 
much smaller than any polypeptide molecules and therefore would have many fewer vibrational 
modes. Dryden thought he might have better luck confirming the change in vibrational spectra 
with this compound, so he and Cooper wrote to Rebek, who graciously sent them about 10mg of 
the compound. Rebek’s group had NMR and x-ray crystallographic data for the compound at 
different temperatures, but they had not done Raman spectroscopy to analyze changes in the 
vibrational spectra upon ligand binding. Dryden aimed to obtain this data to confirm the scissors 
model. After much troubleshooting, he was able to identify a shift in the low frequency region of 
the spectra. However, the initial spectra he obtained were quite broad, and the spectrometer broke 




never published, although Dryden did include them in his dissertation on “Functional 
Consequences of Protein Dynamics” (Dryden 1988).  
This account of Dryden’s theoretical and empirical research, coupled with the description 
of Reinhart’s research program and publications, provides a glimpse of what was happening within 
the small community of true believers in the 1980s and 1990s. They were early adopters and 
promoters of the dynamic view at a time when most mainstream structural and molecular biologists 
were still committed to the static view of proteins and were focused on developing structural 
explanations of protein functions. Committed to the dynamic view for theoretical reasons, the true 
believers set out to find empirical examples that could confirm their view while disconfirming the 
static view. My accounts of both Dryden and Reinhart show their tenacity and the lengths they 
would go in their quest to find evidence in support of their theoretical commitments. When 
studying proteins proved too challenging, Dryden searched for and found a synthetic compound 
in order to confirm his model, and Reinhart went so far as to manipulate his experimental setup, 
raising the temperature, in order to increase the importance of protein dynamics in allosteric 
coupling.   
Because they knew where to look and were determined to find evidence in support of the 
dynamic view, these researchers slowly but surely discovered empirical examples of protein 
functions driven by changes in dynamics throughout the late 1980s and 1990s.59 The discovery of 
“anomalous” cases of dynamic allostery was therefore driven by the theoretical commitments of 
these true believers as well as the workhorse dynamicists. It was their belief in the application of 
the principles of thermodynamics to proteins and the analysis of proteins as small thermodynamic 
 
59 For empirical examples of dynamic allostery in a variety of systems discovered during this time, see Cooper et al. 
(1989), Akke et al. (1993), Braxton et al. (1994), and Johnson and Reinhart (1994a, 1994b, 1997).   
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systems that led them to adopt techniques that could identify the dynamic features of proteins, in 
general, and also led them to use and develop analytical methods that could distinguish the 
structural and dynamic contributions to allosteric coupling, specifically. While the true believers 
would be more likely to frame their findings as anomalies that could not be explained by structural 
models, both sets of dynamicists were accumulating observations that were difficult, if not 
impossible, for the dominant structural accounts of proteins to explain. The accumulation of 
dynamic anomalies by the early 2000s proved sufficient to convince protein scientists, including 
crystallographers and others committed to the static view, to take protein dynamics seriously. By 
that time, the dynamic behavior of proteins could no longer be written off as inconsequential 
“noise,” but instead had to be acknowledged as an important driver of protein function. 
3.5 Conclusions: Widespread Acceptance of the Dynamic View 
By the mid-2000s, the mounting empirical evidence for protein dynamics, coupled with 
the clarion calls of the true believers to replace structural models with dynamic ones, finally caused 
the larger community of protein scientists and structural biologists to take note. Through the work 
of scientists, such as Cooper, Dryden, Reinhart, Akke, and others, many examples of protein 
dynamics had been discovered—too many, in fact, for them to be ignored or written off as rare. 
Building on this foundational work from the 1980s and 1990s, scientists such as Vincent Hilser at 
Johns Hopkins and Ruth Nussinov at the National Cancer Institute developed well-funded research 
programs around protein dynamics. Influential representatives of a new wave of true believers, 
they continued to promulgate dynamic accounts of protein function in the 2010s, helping the 
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dynamic view achieve widespread acceptance by the broader community of protein scientists and 
structural biologists.60  
This history of the dynamic view of proteins differs from the standard Kuhnian account of 
anomaly-driven theory change, an account which has been endorsed by some of the scientists 
involved.61 In this case, I have argued that it was the theoretical commitment to the dynamic view 
of proteins that drove the discovery of anomalies. Cooper and Dryden’s model, along with the 
thermodynamic framework more generally, provided guidance to the dynamicists, by shedding 
light on where to look for cases of dynamic protein functions. Although these researchers slowly 
accumulated anomalies that chipped away at the dominant static view, these anomalies did not 
emerge during the course of Kuhnian “normal science” (Kuhn 1962). Instead, the causal arrow is 
reversed. What my historical analysis has shown is that these empirical examples of dynamic 
protein function were only discovered and catalogued in the 1980s and 1990s because a certain 
subset of scientists applied the principles of thermodynamics to proteins. Thus, a deep theoretical 
commitment to protein dynamics lies at the heart of this history, providing the impetus for a larger 
theoretical and explanatory shift from the static to the dynamic view of proteins.  
 
60 In the span of four years, Hilser published high-impact reviews on dynamic allostery in Science (Hilser 2010), 
Nature (Motlagh et al. 2014), and the Annual Review of Biophysics (Hilser et al. 2012). During this time, Nussinov 
and her colleagues also published multiple reviews, perspectives, and opinion pieces advancing dynamic accounts of 
allostery (Tsai et al. 2009, Tsai and Nussinov 2014, Nussinov and Tsai 2015, Lui and Nussinov 2016).  
61 Hilser implicitly endorses a Kuhnian account of the development of the dynamic view of proteins when calls the 
switch from the static to dynamic view a “paradigm shift” and cites the discovery of anomalies as the driver behind 
this change (Hilser et al. 2012, Motlagh et al. 2014).     
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4.0 Protein Concepts, Representations, and Their Epistemic Relations 
4.1 Introduction 
Within the molecular life sciences, many disciplines, including molecular and structural 
biology, biochemistry, biophysics, enzymology, and molecular genetics, count proteins as among 
their objects of study. Representations of proteins figure in explanations, such as mechanistic 
explanations, either as part of the explanans (e.g., enzymes are cited in explanations of metabolism 
and antibodies are cited in explanations of immunity) or as the explanandum (e.g., studies of 
enzyme catalysis or protein-ligand binding seek to explain the behavior of proteins). Proteins also 
serve as sites of intervention in both laboratory techniques (e.g., PCR and CRISPR use proteins to 
replicate or edit DNA sequences) and medical treatments (e.g., HIV enzymes and other proteins 
function as drug targets for antiretrovirals). Over the past century, as the importance of proteins in 
a myriad of biological processes has become clearer, the concept of the protein has evolved 
significantly.  
This chapter focuses on the two most recent concepts of the protein that have emerged 
since the birth of molecular biology: the structural concept (proteinS) and the dynamic concept 
(proteinD).62 The former was the dominant protein concept of classical molecular biology in the 
1950s and 1960s, whereas the latter first emerged in the 1970s and 1980s. In previous chapters, I 
have considered the historical relationship between these two concepts, but in this chapter, I turn 
my attention to the epistemic relations between them. Specifically, I aim to characterize the 
 
62 This notation is my own.  
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epistemic relationships that obtain between these two concepts and their associated 
representations. A major innovation of my philosophical approach to this topic is the identification 
of two levels of analysis. I argue that we must distinguish the epistemic relationship that obtains 
between the two protein concepts from the epistemic relationships that obtain among their 
associated representations. Although no philosophers have undertaken a similarly systematic study 
of protein science,63 my analysis draws on two bodies of work by philosophers of biology. It is 
guided, on the one hand, by philosophers who have scrutinized the relationship between successive 
concepts of the gene in the twentieth century, and on the other hand, by the work of Sandra 
Mitchell, who has considered the epistemic relationships that obtain between different models and 
representations of proteins.  
 In this chapter, I argue that conceptual replacement, rather than reduction or integration, 
is occurring in protein science. The conceptual core of the structural concept includes beliefs about 
proteins that privilege structure over dynamics that are rejected by the dynamic concept. The 
inferential role of the dynamic concept replaces those beliefs with ones that recognize structure 
and dynamics as co-determinants of protein function. On my view, this revision in the inferential 
role of the concept is too drastic to count as reduction and instead constitutes conceptual 
replacement. At the level of representations, however, I argue that dynamic and structural 
representations of proteins are typically related via abstraction. Because protein dynamics and 
structure are largely partitionable features of proteins, the inclusion or exclusion of one of them in 
a representation has little effect on the other. Therefore, scientists can often transition between 
structural and dynamic representations of proteins via processes of abstraction or de-idealization.64   
 
63 Throughout the chapter, I will use the terms “protein science” and “structural and molecular biology” as shorthand 
to refer to those areas within the molecular life sciences that consider proteins to be one of their objects of study.  
64 I will clarify what I mean by these terms (e.g., abstraction and de-idealization) below, in Sec. 4.4. 
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  In what follows, I begin my analysis by characterizing the two concepts of the protein. 
Following Philip Kitcher’s (1977, 1982) and Ingo Brigandt’s (2010) accounts of conceptual 
change, I distinguish the structural and dynamic concepts of the protein by characterizing their 
references, inferential roles (or meanings), and their associated epistemic goals in Section 2. I show 
how the differing beliefs about proteins associated with each concept guide scientists toward 
different uses of the concept in inference, explanation, and scientific practice. In Section 3, I 
consider the applicability of certain philosophical accounts that aim to understand scientific 
change, and I conclude that neither reduction nor the Kuhnian account accurately characterizes the 
relationship between protein concepts. In Section 4, I develop my own account of the relationships 
between protein concepts and representations and attempt to draw certain philosophical morals 
from my analysis of concepts and representations in protein science.  
4.2 Protein Concepts and Representations 
In this section, I first present an account of concepts and conceptual change (Sec. 4.2.1). I 
then use this account to identify and distinguish the key semantic features of both the structural 
(Sec. 4.2.2) and dynamic protein concepts (Sec 4.2.3). I also discuss some of the methods and 
representations associated with both concepts. 
4.2.1 Concepts, Representations, and Conceptual Change  
I endorse an account of concepts and conceptual change in science, which is largely drawn 
from Kitcher (1978, 1982) and extended by Brigandt (2010). These philosophers of biology 
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developed their accounts to make sense of scientific change and demonstrated their usefulness by 
applying them to the history of the gene concept. Their accounts agree that concepts have at least 
two components of semantic content: reference and something akin to meaning. Both commit to 
an extensionalist account of reference. Thus, conceptual change can be understood as “shifts in 
referential relations between words and the world” (Kitcher 1982, 339). They use different 
vocabularies to cash out the meaning of a concept: Kitcher prefers “reference potentials” while 
Brigandt uses “inferential roles,” but these terms are quite similar. On both accounts, the meaning 
of a concept is more than its theoretical definition.  
Kitcher develops the notion of “reference potential” to help understand the use and changes 
in use of scientific concepts over time. He claims that the reference potential for a scientific term 
“is a compendium of the ways in which the referents of tokens of the term are fixed for members 
of the community” (1982, 340). On this view, the referent of a token is fixed by the explanation 
for the speaker’s production of that token. Similar to other causal theories of reference, 
explanations of this sort trace the reference through a chain of events back to an “initiating event,” 
in which someone was “either in causal contact with an entity or intend[ed] to refer to whatever 
satisfy[ed] a description” (Ibid., 345). According to Kitcher, the reference of a scientific term can 
be fixed by more than one initiating event. Whereas other semantic theories of reference require 
the reference to be fixed once and for all by the original baptism of the term, Kitcher’s account 
liberalizes the idea of reference-fixing to better accord with the usage of scientific terms. He argues 
that the connections between scientific concepts and the world “are frequently renewed and 
extended” (Ibid.). Therefore, the reference potential of a scientific term—i.e., the collection of 
initiating events for the production of a token of the term—is likely to include many distinct 
initiating events. Kitcher argues that scientific terms “frequently have heterogeneous reference 
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potentials” because scientists find it useful to initiate their tokens by different events (Ibid.). He 
cites the production of chemical substances via different methods as an example, arguing that 
scientists in different disciplines can employ different modes of production to fix reference.65 
Brigandt (2010) discusses the meaning of a concept in terms of its “inferential role” rather 
than reference potential.66 The inferential role of a concept, according to Brigandt, is “a subset of 
the beliefs that scientists have about a term’s referent” (Ibid., 22). Borrowing from inferential, or 
conceptual, role semantics, his account aims to highlight how the content of a concept “figures in 
inference, or more broadly how it figures in reasoning, perception, and action” (Ibid.). More 
precisely, he claims that the inferential role of a scientific concept consists of the “inferences and 
explanations in which the term occurs” that “account for the term’s successful use in scientific 
practice” (Ibid.).  
This focus on the use of a concept in scientific practice leads Brigandt to move beyond 
Kitcher’s original formulation. He posits a third component of semantic content for scientific 
concepts, which he calls “the epistemic goal pursued by a concept’s use” (Ibid., 23, emphasis in 
original). With this third component, Brigandt establishes a method to judge the rationality of 
conceptual change in science. For central terms in biology, such as the gene, he claims that we can 
often assign general epistemic goals that motivate their use by a community of scientists at a given 
time. We can then evaluate various concepts as to how well they enable their users to achieve these 
 
65 According to Kitcher, scientific concepts with heterogenous reference potentials are theory-laden, since the 
scientific community must have some theoretical description that enables them to link tokens with distinct modes of 
production to the same referent.  
66 Brigandt (2010) claims that his “inferential role” is similar to Kitcher’s “reference potential”: “Inferential role is 
my term for what has been called a term’s meaning (sense, intension), and is fairly similar to what Kitcher dubs 
reference potential” (22, emphasis in original). I am skeptical of this claim, since Kitcher does not seem to endorse a 
theory of meaning, but instead focuses on concept usage. For my purposes, I will rely primarily on Brigandt’s account 
and his discussion of a concept’s meaning, or inferential role. 
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epistemic goals. Importantly, he argues that his innovation enables us to judge the rationality of 
conceptual change in science, even when the reference and inferential role of a concept changes.67  
Both Kitcher and Brigandt develop their accounts to make sense of conceptual change in 
science, in part to respond to the challenge of incommensurability posed by Kuhn and Feyerabend, 
and also to clarify the debate about gene concepts. Conceptual change, on both their accounts, 
involves more than a change in definition. It also requires a change in the reference potential or 
inferential role of the concept. Conceptual change occurs as part of the development of science 
when new discoveries and hypotheses alter the set of initiating events in the reference potential 
(e.g., through the removal of inadequate modes of reference or the acquisition of new ones), or 
when a concept’s inferential role expands as the concept begins to figure in new inferences or 
explanations. Both accounts also acknowledge that the referent for the concept can change along 
with the meaning (as almost everyone agrees happened with the gene concept), but this change in 
reference need not lead to incommensurability (Kitcher 1978) nor make conceptual change in 
science irrational (Brigandt 2010).  
Furthermore, Brigandt (2010) argues that because we have access to a more fine-grained 
analysis of conceptual change, we can largely sidestep the issue of concept individuation. He 
claims that 
labeling two contexts in which a term is used as expressing the “same concept” or two 
“different concepts” is not of much philosophical relevance. Instead, what is important is 
to lay out how exactly two uses of a term differ regarding the various semantic properties. 
(Ibid., 25) 
 
I agree. I will follow the scientific actors when they talk of a “new” dynamic concept of proteins, 
but whenever I use the terms “dynamic concept” (“proteinD”) or “structural concept” (“proteinS”) 
 
67 He further argues that his account can show the rationality of conceptual change even in cases in which the epistemic 
goals change. However, I will not discuss this further since it is not be relevant to the change in protein concepts.  
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this should be taken as shorthand for referring to the concept—with its referent, inferential role, 
and epistemic goal—as it is or was used in a particular community of scientists at a particular time. 
Little hangs on whether we construe the dynamic concept as a new concept or just a modification 
of the earlier structural concept, since the differences in their reference, inferential roles, and 
epistemic goals will serve to distinguish them.     
For my analysis of protein concepts, I must append a brief note on the relationship between 
concepts and representations. Neither Kitcher nor Brigandt discusses the latter in their accounts of 
concepts, but other philosophers of biology have posited an explicit link between gene concepts 
and representations. Griffiths and Stotz (2013), for instance, begin and end their book-long 
exploration of gene concepts with the following claim: “The concept of the gene is therefore best 
conceived as a set of contextually activated representations” (8, see also 221). Their identification 
of concepts with sets of representations is compatible with the account of concepts and conceptual 
change I have endorsed, so long as we include linguistic and mathematical representations, as well 
as visual representations or models of proteins. A given concept will have associated visual 
representations, but will also include linguistic representations, expressing explanations, 
inferences, and hypotheses. We can think of the relationship between concepts and representations 
as mereological: a given concept will include a characteristic set of representations. Hence, the 
concept of DNA will support various representations, such as a linear sequence of ATGC base 
pairs in a DNA primer, Crick’s famous Central Dogma diagram, Franklin’s x-ray diffraction 
pattern, as well as the two-story model of DNA at the Virginia Science Museum. And two different 
scientific concepts will support different sets of representations. Conceptual change will also be 
reflected in the different representations used within the inferential role of a particular concept. 
The reason for highlighting this distinction will become clearer in Section 4, where I will argue 
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that the epistemic relation that obtains between protein concepts is quite different than the one that 
holds between different representations of proteins.       
4.2.2 The Structural Concept and Its Representations 
4.2.2.1 The Concept 
The structural protein concept (proteinS) emerged from classical molecular biology in the 
1950s and 1960s. According to the theoretical definition of proteinS, a protein was a rigid and static 
molecule that was composed of densely-packed, highly-charged amino acid chains (Fruton 1999, 
Tanford and Reynolds 2001).68 Moreover, every protein molecule was thought to fold into a unique 
stable 3D conformation such that “each molecule, of a given kind, is identical in shape to all 
others” (Cooper 1980, 474). The referent of the concept, which was established via different 
methods and initiating events, was an individual molecule of this sort. The inferential role, or 
meaning, of proteinS included what Sarkar has called the “structure-function rule,” which held that 
“the behavior of biological macromolecules can be explained from their structure as determined 
by techniques such as crystallography” (Sarkar 2008, 60-61). A review of protein structure from 
1956 applies this structure-function rule to proteins:  
The biological activities of proteins such as catalysis and antigenicity are dependent to a 
large degree on the complete structural integrity of the molecule and the organized 




68 The concept of protein includes many more features within its inferential role. Throughout this chapter, however, I 
will focus only on those aspects of the structural and dynamic concept’s inferential roles that distinguish them from 
each other. 
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Classical molecular biology focused on protein structure precisely because of this hypothesized 
connection to function. 
The commitment to explaining protein function by citing the 3D structure of the protein 
and the molecules with which it interacts was seen as a solution to the explanatory problem posed 
by biological specificity. Since the late nineteenth century, organic chemists, such as Emil Fischer 
had demonstrated that enzymes were designed to interact with only certain substrates. For instance, 
Fischer’s work demonstrated that a yeast enzyme would hydrolyze the D form of a sugar but not 
the L form, which differed only in the transposition of one hydrogen (H) and one hydroxyl group 
(OH) on a backbone carbon. To explain this specificity, Fischer introduced the lock-and-key 
model: “To use a metaphor, I would like to say that the enzyme and glucoside [substrate] have to 
fit together like lock and key in order to exert a chemical effect on each other.”69 From this and 
other work in biochemistry and immunology, classical molecular biology “inherited the proposed 
mechanism that the function or behavior of biological molecules is ‘determined’ by its structure” 
(Sarkar 2008, 60).  
When Fischer introduced his model linking enzyme structure to its catalytic activity in the 
1890s, the hypothesis that protein structure determines protein function had little direct empirical 
evidence. By the 1960s, however, things had changed. The elucidation of protein structures via 
crystallography by John Kendrew (myoglobin) and Max Perutz (hemoglobin) in the 1950s and 
1960s, coupled with structural modeling work by Linus Pauling and others, bolstered the structural 
concept and “seemed to confirm the hypothesis that structure explains behavior” (Sarkar 2008, 
60).70 
 
69 Fischer (1894, 2992) translated in Barnett and Lichtenthaler (2001, 377). 
70 See Green et al. (1954), Kendrew et al. (1958), Perutz et al. (1960), and Pauling et al. (1951). 
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4.2.2.2 Structural Methods and the Epistemic Goals of ProteinS 
The structural concept of the protein, coupled with the structure-function rule, formed “the 
theoretical core of molecular biology” (Sarkar 2008, 60). But the inferential role of the concept 
includes more than just the structure-function rule. The concept was also embedded within the new 
research tradition of classical molecular biology, with its methodology and experimental practices. 
It provided a research heuristic, directing scientists interested in protein function to study their 3D 
structures, since “what was important in a protein was its shape” (Morange 2006, 515). The 
concept also laid out the foundation for adequate molecular explanations of protein behavior. To 
explain binding, catalysis, allostery, or other protein functions, one needed to cite the structural 
features of the protein in order to show how the molecular surface of the protein complemented 
the surface of the substrate or ligand. The structural concept of the protein was thus closely tied to 
a particular set of research methods and explanatory strategies. 
The primary epistemic goal of proteinS for the community of molecular biologists was to 
explain protein behavior and function, both for the sake of basic scientific understanding as well 
as intervention. Because of the commitment to the structure-function rule, this goal was to be 
achieved by elucidating the 3D structure of biological macromolecules, such as proteins. For this 
reason, techniques such as x-ray crystallography, which could reveal “the rigidly defined structural 
relationships which characterize the native protein,” were highly valued (Anfinsen and Redfield 
1956, 80). Although structural features could be inferred from other methods (e.g., activity assays 
and various spectroscopic analysis), in the early days of molecular biology, the only technique able 
to determine the structure of entire proteins was x-ray crystallography. Nuclear magnetic 
resonance (NMR) was also developed for protein structural determination, with the first NMR 
protein structure published in 1985 by Kurt Wuthrich (Williamson et al. 1985). However, NMR 
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was only practical for relatively small proteins and polypeptides. X-ray crystallography, in 
contrast, had no in principle size limit. This difference alone was often considered to be “decisive 
in favor of x-ray diffraction” (Drenth 1994, vii). Thus, x-ray crystallography was typically taken 
to be the gold standard for protein structural determination, and the belief that the development of 
x-ray diffraction and structural refinement techniques would ultimately yield more and higher-
resolution structures was widespread beginning in the 1960s.  
This optimism and excitement surrounding advances in x-ray crystallography and the 
steady publication of new protein x-ray crystal structures stemmed from the belief that these 3D 
protein structures would serve as the basis for explanations of protein functions and cellular 
processes. Early textbooks, such as the Principles of Protein Structure, as well as the research 
articles they summarized, provide examples of scientists citing the structural features of the 
enzyme active site and the location of certain chemical groups on the substrate to explain “the 
structural basis of protein mechanism, action, and function” (Schulz and Schimmel 1979, 233). 
The structural concept was thus deeply wedded to a research tradition dominated by x-ray 
crystallography and focused on structural determination, as well as an explanatory strategy that 
cited structure as the mechanistic basis for protein behavior and function. The ability for scientists 
to infer mechanistic features of enzyme catalysis or ligand binding from 3D protein structures 
further reinforced their commitment to the structure-function rule and the research strategies that 
developed around the structural concept. 
4.2.2.3 Structural Representations 
The information obtained via x-ray crystallography and other techniques led researchers to 
develop a characteristic set of modeling practices to represent protein structure in accordance with 
the structural concept of the protein (de Chadarevian 2018). X-ray diffraction patterns are the direct 
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output of an x-ray crystallographic study. For proteins, these patterns were complex and nearly 
impossible to interpret until Perutz developed a method using heavy atoms that enabled researchers 
to “solve the complex X-ray pattern of a protein crystal and produce a model of the structure of 
the molecule” (Kendrew 1961, 104). Using Perutz’s method, researchers were able to convert the 
diffraction pattern into an electron density map, which then allowed them to overlay the 
polypeptide backbone structure of the protein in order to visualize the 3D shape of the molecule. 
If the resolution of the x-ray diffraction pattern was sufficiently high or additional information 
were available from other techniques (e.g., sequence information), crystallographers could add 
information about the position and orientation of amino acid side chains to these backbone 
structures.  
In the 1950s and 1960s, Kendrew and his colleagues working on myoglobin produced some 
of the earliest 3D representations of proteins developed from the results of x-ray crystallography.  
In 1957, they designed the first backbone model, deemed the “sausage model” (Fig. 6). This 
relatively low-resolution structural representation offered a “good general picture of the layout of 
the molecule” (Kendrew 1961, 106). Kendrew then developed an atomic model of myoglobin, 
which represented amino acid sidechains along the backbone structure. This “forest of rods” 
model, which was constructed from six-foot-tall steel rods, used the rods to fix the atoms of the 
protein molecule in space, and the connectivity of bonded atoms was depicted via wire 
connections. Architect and illustrator Irving Geis was commissioned in 1961 by Scientific 
American to create a 2D drawing of this model, without the rods and other mechanical parts, for 
publication in the magazine. His work as a molecular illustrator, which began in 1961, “deeply 




Figure 6 Model of Myoglobin (Kendrew et al. 1958). First model of myglobin to appear in print. Polypeptide 
backbone depicted in white, and the heme group depicted as a gray disk. Republished with permission from 
Kendrew et al. (1958); permission conveyed through Copyright Clearance Center, Inc. 
 
Within a few decades, many types of representation became standardized while new 
representations associated with the structural concept were also developed, and this set of 
representations formed an important part of the inferential role of the concept. Schultz and 
Schirmer (1979) surveyed the various types of representations of proteins in the Principles of 
Protein Structure. The authors highlight the variety of 3D and 2D models and identify the virtues 
of each. Two decades after Kendrew built the first “forest of rods” model, Schulz and Schirmer 
claimed that these wire models still offered “the most accurate three-dimensional representation 
of a protein” (135). Backbone wire models, in contrast, were easy to build and portable, but only 
provided a “chain fold representation of low accuracy” (Ibid.) (Fig. 7A). Plastic push-fit models, 
the bane of organic chemistry students to this day, could also be used to represent the structural 
features of proteins. Colored balls represent atoms with different properties, but the “balls and 
sticks are large with respect to scale,” compared to wire; thus, a push-fit model “lacks 
transparency” (Ibid., 137). Space filling models are even less transparent. According to the authors, 
these models were “very difficult to build” (in 1979) and did not depict the interior of the molecule. 
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However, they illustrated surface properties very well, and hence were used mainly “to depict 
substrate and effector sites” (Ibid., 139) (Fig. 7B).71 
 
 
Figure 7 Static Representations of Proteins. (A) Photograph of 3D backbone wire model of adenylate kinase. (B) 
Photograph of 3D space-filling model of ribonuclease S. (C) 2D carton model of adenylate kinase. (A-C) 
Republished with permission from Schulz and Shirmir (1979); permission conveyed through Copyright Clearance 
Center, Inc. (D) Cover of Science magazine showing 2D structural cartoon, or “ribbon diagram,” of catalytic core of 
eukaryotic kinases. Science, July 26, 1991, Vol. 253, Is. 5018. Reprinted with permission from AAAS.  
   
The structural properties of proteins gleaned from x-ray crystallography and other 
techniques could also be represented in 2D models. These could be drawings, such as Geis’ 
drawing of myoglobin, with its “introduction of small distortions and exaggerations to resolve 
 
71 The ability to reveal surface features would have been quite important, since in addition to the structure-function 
rule, classic molecular biology was also committed to the “molecular-shape rule” (i.e., “structures…could be 
characterized entirely by molecular size and, especially, external shape”) as well as the “lock-and-key fit rule” (i.e., 
“molecules interact only when there is a lock-and-key fit between two molecular surfaces”) (Sarkar 2008, 61). Space-




overlaps and create an understandable image” (de Chadarevian 2002, 148), or they could be “exact 
line drawings” done by hand or with a computer (Schulz and Schirmer 1979, 142). In addition, 
“structure cartoon” models could represent the “essential parts” of the protein structure, usually by 
representing alpha-helices as cylinders and beta-sheets as arrows (Ibid., 143; Fig. 7C). They depict 
the structure but “relieve the reader of unnecessary details” (Ibid.). Although more sophisticated 
computer-generated models have replaced the hand-drawn 2D models of the 1970s and 1980s, 
similar structural and cartoon models of protein structure have remained common (Fig. 7D).  
Despite their differences, all these representations of proteins are involved in the inferential 
role of the structural concept. Both Kendrew’s “forest of rods” model from the 1950s and the 
cartoon structural model from the 1990s represent the fact that a protein, according to the structural 
concept, had a single stable structure that enabled it to carry out its characteristic function. Modern 
computing has altered the production of protein representations, with cheap and computationally 
efficient visualization programs, such as PyMOL, Jmol, and VMD.72 But even these programs, 
which let a user display and modify structures deposited in the Protein Data Bank, represent the 
protein as having a fixed, stable structure.73 Reasoning with these characteristic representations, 
as well as the structure-function rule, the scientists committed to the structural concept of the 
protein developed a productive research program in the second half of the twentieth century that 
 
72 The Protein Data Bank offers a lengthy list of the available protein visualization software on its website: 
https://www.rcsb.org/pages/thirdparty/molecular_graphics. 
73 These programs let users manipulate the way the structure is represented, for instance, by switching between ball-
and-stick representation of atoms and bonds and a cartoon structure with rods and arrows, and they also let users rotate 
and flip the molecule. However, because they are generated from the PDB files deposited in the Protein Data Bank, 
each structure has fixed 3D coordinates for each of the atoms in the molecule. Thus, although the user can manipulate 
the structure, for example, by turning it to see the molecule from different angles, these computer-generated 3D models 
represent the structure itself as rigid and static. 
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centered on determining protein structures and using those structures in explanations of protein 
function.74  
4.2.3 The Dynamic Concept and Its Representations 
4.2.3.1 The Concept  
The dynamic concept of the protein (proteinD) emerged in the 1970s as a critique of the 
structural concept. The community of scientists who championed proteinD argued that the 
structural concept figured in faulty inferences and explanations. They aimed to drastically revise 
or replace the defective structural concept with a new concept, associated with new 
representations, hypotheses, and explanatory commitments. Writing in 1986, Martin Karplus and 
Andrew McCammon, two champions of proteinD, identified a fundamental problem with the 
structural concept of the protein: 
The study of how proteins serve the needs of a living organism is a curious case in which 
a method that yielded dramatic advances also led to a misconception. The method is X-ray 
crystallography…. The intrinsic beauty and the remarkable detail of the structures obtained 
from X-ray crystallography resulted in the view that proteins are rigid. This created the 
misconception, namely that the atoms in a protein are fixed in position. (Karplus and 
McCammon 1986, 42) 
 
The structural concept, they claimed, had also led scientists to endorse a problematic explanatory 
strategy: “most attempts to explain protein function…have been based on the static structure,” 
even though there are many “phenomena that cannot be explained by the static view” (Ibid.).   
 
74 The concept, with its associated representations, explanations, and methods, was successful enough to prompt 
Michel Morange, a molecular biologist-cum-historian, to claim that “for the molecular biologists of yesterday and 
today a protein is sufficiently understood only when its three-dimensional structure has been determined by x-ray 
diffraction” (Morange 1998 [1994], 215).   
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The dynamic concept of the protein arose from a commitment to treating proteins as small 
thermodynamic systems. Similar to the structural concept, one potential referent for the dynamic 
protein concept was an individual folded amino acid chain. (We will see below that the reference 
potential expanded with the dynamic concept so that it could also refer to a population of such 
molecules.) However, the theoretical definition of proteinD privileged a thermodynamic rather than 
structural description of these molecules in solution. The individual protein molecule is a small 
system, and the electrostatic interactions that maintain the 3D structure are relatively weak. The 
constant collisions between the protein and the solvent—i.e., "the continual Brownian-motion-like 
buffeting by solvent molecules”—would supply enough thermal energy to cause the protein to be 
in constant motion (Cooper 1980, 489). Hence, according to the dynamic concept, a protein was 
“a fluid and flexible system” (Cooper 1976, 2740), which was “constantly changing the details of 
its conformation” (Karplus and McCammon 1986, 42).  
On this view, an individual protein molecule would undergo constant structural 
fluctuations, rapidly interconverting among many quasi-degenerate microstates. This theoretical 
description of a protein molecule clearly distinguishes it from proteinS. The latter included the 
belief that all protein molecules of the same type would adopt the same 3D conformation. Indeed, 
it is this belief that enabled users of proteinS to talk about the structure of a particular type of 
protein molecule. The dynamic concept denies that a population of protein molecules in solution 
would adopt a single discrete structure. As Gregorio Weber memorably describes it, the protein of 
the structural concept does not exist: 
The protein molecule model resulting from the X-ray crystallographic observations is a 
"platonic" protein, well removed in its perfection from the kicking and screaming 
"stochastic" molecule that we infer must exist in solution. (Weber 1975, 65)  
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In other words, individual protein molecules conduct a biased walk through conformation space, 
“wandering in a haphazard and non-periodic fashion amongst a multitude of possible 
conformational states” (Cooper and Dryden 1984, 107). Thus, the inferential role of the dynamic 
concept includes the belief that a population of protein molecules in solution exists in a multiplicity 
of different structures, or conformational microstates.  
This set of theoretical commitments leads to a new potential referent for proteinD. Although 
the individual molecule will not have a stable structure in solution, according to the dynamic 
concept, the population, or ensemble, of molecules at equilibrium will be stably distributed across 
a range of microstate conformations. A probability distribution determines the likelihood of 
finding an individual protein molecule in any one of these microstates. The unit of function, in this 
case, is the ensemble of molecules, rather than any one molecule, and explanations of protein 
behaviors (e.g., catalysis or allostery) cite changes in the ensemble distribution, rather than changes 
in structure. If we are to preserve the notion that a protein has a function, then it makes sense to 
say that the ensemble of molecules is the protein.75 We can interpret this as an expansion of the 
reference potential for proteinD (when compared to proteinS): depending upon the context, the 
reference for the token “protein” could be an ensemble of polypeptide molecules or a single 
dynamic molecule.  
Adoption of the dynamic concept also leads to other changes in the inferential role of the 
concept, in particular the role it plays in explanations. The structure-function rule of classical 
 
75 This claim may seem more provocative than it actually is. Although no scientists (of whom I am aware) have 
advocated this change in the reference of the concept of protein, it falls out naturally if we take ensemble explanations 
seriously (see Chapter 5 for a detailed discussion of these explanations). If one wants to describe the unit that carries 
out a function, such as allostery, it is an ensemble of protein molecules rather than a single molecule. For example, 
the functional unit of hemoglobin responsible for transporting oxygen in red blood cells is not a given molecule in one 
or two structural states, but rather it is an entire population of hemoglobin molecules in an ensemble of microstate 
conformations. The change in reference here simply forces us to attend to the fact that a single molecule with a given 
structure cannot perform a function, since it can only adopt one structure at a time. 
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molecular biology has been jettisoned, and in its place, the dynamic concept includes the 
hypothesis that explaining function requires attending to dynamic properties of proteins as well as 
their structure. Many cases have been discovered that simply cannot be explained by the structure-
function rule.76 One particular striking case is the class of intrinsically disordered proteins that 
have allosteric, catalytic, or other functions. These proteins do not have a stable 3D structure, so 
their functions cannot arise from structural complementarity; thus, explanations that treat protein 
molecules as molecular machines have proven inadequate. The explanatory strategies associated 
with the dynamic concept require researchers to attend to both structural and dynamic 
contributions to function. 
To avoid a potential confusion about the relationship between proteinS and proteinD, a 
terminological clarification is in order. Although advocates of the dynamic concept have 
christened it “dynamic” so as to contrast with the earlier “structural” concept, this rhetorical choice 
does not mean that all structural features of protein molecules have been purged from the 
inferential role of the dynamic concept. Rather, the dynamic concept, and its associated inferences, 
explanations, and hypotheses, posits that protein molecules have important structural and dynamic 
features. This is evidenced by the fact that proponents of the dynamic concept often refer to the 
dynamic properties of the protein as “structural fluctuations,” as well as their discussion of 
structural or conformational microstates of protein molecules in an ensemble. In an important way, 
proteinD expands the meaning of the protein and its inferential role to include dynamic features, 
but it is more than just an expansion, since this concept also loses the theoretical core of proteinS—
viz., the belief that proteins had stable 3D structures that could explain their functions. In other 
words, the dynamic concept displaces the privileged role of protein structure. With the dynamic 
 
76 See Motlagh et al. (2014) for some examples. 
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concept, researchers have had to develop new methods to investigate proteins, as well as new 
explanatory strategies to explain protein behavior and function.   
4.2.3.2 Dynamic Methods and Epistemic Goals of ProteinD 
Unlike the scientists who endorsed the structural concept, the community of scientists who 
adopted the dynamic concept did not use a single, dominant method. Instead, these scientists 
developed a diverse set of methods and experimental strategies to study protein dynamics, as well 
as the relationship between dynamics and structure. However, the advocates of proteinD had the 
same epistemic goal as those who used proteinS: they aimed to use the concept to explain protein 
behavior and function. On their view, proteinS, with its associated hypotheses and explanatory 
strategies, was inadequate for this goal, since they believed that protein dynamics were important 
drivers of protein function.   
Scientists adopting the dynamic concept of proteins have two general strategies with which 
to characterize these dynamic fluctuations. The first strategy characterizes the thermodynamic 
parameters of proteins to shed light on their dynamic properties. The standard thermodynamic 
approach uses the Gibbs equation, which describes the free energy (∆G) of a given conformational 
state of the protein: ∆G = ∆H – T∆S. Changes in free energy are used to explain protein behaviors, 
such as binding. While the enthalpic contribution (∆H) to free energy is thought to arise from 
changes in structural features of the protein, the entropic contribution (∆S) is identified with 
changes in the internal dynamics of the protein. Although the focus of this analysis is on the 
dynamics of the system, the thermodynamic framework reinforces the fact that the behavior of 
proteins is governed by both structure and dynamics by identify them as the two components of 
free energy—∆H and ∆S.   
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Early theoretical and experimental work sought to show that changes in dynamics alone 
could be the driver of protein functions, by causing changes in conformational entropy (Cooper 
and Dryden 1984). The conformational entropy of a protein is a measure of the number discrete 
conformational states that are accessible to it at a certain temperature. The number and relative 
accessibility of conformational states tracks the dynamic flexibility of the protein: a relatively rigid 
protein will have few thermally accessible conformations, whereas a relatively flexible or dynamic 
protein will be able to sample many different conformational states. Protein interactions that 
decrease the flexibility of the protein decrease the conformational entropy, making the interaction 
entropically unfavorable. Although thermodynamic approaches alone do not provide information 
about the set of thermodynamically accessible structures, they can provide information about the 
magnitude and relative importance of dynamics in protein interactions. For example, researchers 
can measure the heat capacity for a protein-ligand interaction via microcalorimetry, and from this 
value, they can distinguish the enthalpic and entropic contributions to free energy (Sturtevant 
1977). The signs and relative magnitudes of these contributions reveal the extent to which protein 
dynamics, rather than structure, is responsible for particular protein behaviors.77 
The thermodynamic approach cannot reveal much “about the structural character of the 
fluctuations nor about their timescale,” but the second general strategy of investigating protein 
dynamics can (Brooks et al. 1988, p. 226). It uses diverse methods to characterize the range and 
diversity of structures available to the protein and to learn about the kinetics of these motions and 
the timescales in which they occur. The earliest experimental methods used to investigate the 
dynamic protein measured changes in spectroscopic properties or chemical reactivities of certain 
 
77 For example, see the discussion of the thermodynamic framework of the dynamic view, as well as the case of 
agonism-antagonism switching described in Chapter 3. This was one of the cases of anomalous dynamic behavior that 
could not be explained within the static view. 
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groups (Cooper 1980). Methods such as fluorescence quenching, or hydrogen-deuterium 
exchange, can identify regions of a protein that are more flexible than others, and both techniques 
can provide information about the timescale of protein dynamics.  Some early x-ray 
crystallographic studies also provided evidence of protein dynamics. For instance, Frauenfelder 
used temperature-dependent x-ray diffraction to trap less probable, higher-energy conformational 
substates of myoglobin (Frauenfelder et al. 1979). By determining the 3D structure of these states, 
Frauenfelder and his colleagues revealed a subset of the ensemble of structures accessible to the 
protein in solution.  Molecular dynamic (MD) simulations, which were pioneered in the 1970s, 
provide information about the timescale of various protein motions. They begin from known x-ray 
crystal structures of proteins and use Newtonian equations of motion to simulate the motions of 
the atoms over time (Brooks et al. 1988). Methods such as these were further able to characterize 
the heterogeneity of structures that a protein molecule could adopt.  
Since the early days of the dynamic concept, technological advancements have afforded 
researchers new means to study protein motions. New empirical techniques that can provide direct, 
atomic-level evidence of protein dynamics have been developed. The most important among these 
techniques is protein NMR. Since the first protein structures were solved via NMR in the 1980s, 
the technique has been perfected to study larger proteins and polypeptides. Because NMR 
determines the structure of the protein in solution, it can provide information about the range of 
structures a protein can adopt in solution. Other techniques, such as small angle x-ray 
crystallography (SAXS), can be used to obtain similar information. In addition to these empirical 
methods, improvements in MD simulations, including vastly increased computing power, have 
enabled researchers to run longer simulations, which have offered dynamic information about 
slower protein motions. Other computational approaches have been developed to generate the 
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predicted ensemble of possible structures in solution, based upon the protein structure and 
thermodynamic and empirical data about the flexible regions of a protein (Liu et al. 2006). Both 
the empirical and computational advances provide evidence for internal protein motions and 
support the contention that a population of protein molecules inevitably exists as a multiplicity of 
structures, thereby reinforcing this posit, which plays an important part in the inferential role of 
the dynamic concept. 
4.2.3.3 Dynamic Representations 
Developing representations and models that comport with the dynamic concept of the 
protein has proven more challenging than developing structural representations, since most 
scientific representations occur in static media, such as journal articles, reviews, and textbooks. 
Nevertheless, the community of researchers who endorse proteinD have developed conventions for 
representing the dynamic information gleaned from empirical studies and computational 
approaches. There are two general representational strategies, with significant overlap. The first 
attempts to represent the dynamic properties of a protein within a structural model of a single 
protein molecule, while the second strategy presents an ensemble of thermodynamically accessible 
protein structures in order to represent the structural fluctuations of the protein as well as the 
heterogeneity of a population of molecules in solution.78  
The first strategy represents the protein as a superposition of structures, highlighting the 
motion within a single molecule. Models of this sort often begin from the average structure of the 
protein, as determined by x-ray crystallography, and then add information to represent the 
 
78 This distinction is only one of degree, since most representations can be construed either as a superposition of 
structures for a single molecule or as an ensemble of structures in a population. Both these features, however, form 
the core of the inferential role of the dynamic protein concept.   
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structural fluctuations caused by protein dynamics. These fluctuations are most often measured as 
deviations from the average structure in the root mean squared position (RMS) of atoms. The 
superposition strategy takes the average static structure and overlays its dynamic properties. 
Frauenfelder and colleagues (1979) offer an early example of this strategy for myoglobin (Fig. 
8A). In this study, the researchers crystallized the protein in different conformational substates. 
They calculated the difference in RMS position of the backbone atoms from the average structure 
for all the crystalized substates. They then added a shaded region to the average structure to 
represent the atomic displacements that occur as the protein undergoes structural fluctuations in 
solution.  
Karplus and McCammon (1986) produce a similar model of the dynamic properties of a 
molecule of myoglobin from a different method.79 In this model, they have superimposed structural 
representations of the protein as it appeared over five-picosecond intervals during an MD 
simulation. The mismatch between the structures aims to represent the rapid motion of the protein 
backbone.  A special issue of Science magazine on protein dynamics offers a more recent example 
of the superposition approach to modeling the dynamic concept of the protein (Fig. 8C). Here, the 
dynamics of calmodulin are represented as a superposition of computer-generated structures 
interpolated between two empirically solved structures of the protein. This model aims to represent 




79 Model not shown. See Karplus and McCammon (1986), “Motions of a Protein,” p.43. 
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Figure 8 Dynamic Representation of Proteins: Superposition of Structures. (A) Flexibility of myoglobin. Solid 
lines represent the static structure, circles represent the backbone carbons, and the shaded region represents the 
extent of deviation from the static structure obtained by different substate conformations of the protein, with 99% 
probability. A 2Å scale bar is also shown. Republished with permission from Frauenfelder et al. (1979); permission 
conveyed through Copyright Clearance Center, Inc. (B) Dynamic structural fluctuations in calmodulin. Computer-
generated structures interpolated between calcium-bound structure (blue) and structure bound to both calcium and 
one of the protein’s regulatory targets (red). Science, April 10, 2009, Vol. 324, Is. 5924. Reprinted with permission 
from AAAS. 
 
Shifting the focus from a single molecule to the population of protein molecules, the second 
strategy represents protein dynamics as an ensemble of distinct structures. The structures in the 
ensemble can be generated empirically or computationally. Figure 9 depicts an example of each 
type. Figure 9A shows a set 23 distinct structures, each obtained empirically via NMR. The 
superposition of these structures reveals significant heterogeneity in the population due to the 
flexibility of the N-terminus of the protein. Figure 9B depicts an ensemble of protein structures 
generated using the COREX algorithm, which takes into account the thermodynamic and structural 
data of the protein. Each microstate shows certain structural deviations from the average structure. 
The user of these ensemble representations can read off the dynamic properties of an individual 
molecule, for instance, identifying more flexible regions from less flexible ones. However, 
compared to the first strategy, these models better represent a key posit of the dynamic concept, 
namely, that a protein is not a unitary entity with a single structure but rather a structurally 





Figure 9 Dynamic Representation of Proteins: Ensemble Representation. (A) Acetyl coenzyme A carboxylase 
conformations. Colored lines show carbon backbone structure for 23 different NMR runs on the protein. Arrow 
highlights the structural diversity at the N-terminus of the protein. Republished with permission from Gunasekaran 
et al. (2004); permission conveyed through Copyright Clearance Center, Inc. (B) Ensemble representation of generic 
protein. Forty most probable ensemble structures generated via COREX are shown, with folded regions (red) and 
unfolded regions (yellow) shown for each state. Republished with permission from Lui et al (2006); permission 
conveyed through Copyright Clearance Center, Inc.  
 
All these representations of proteins are associated with the dynamic concept: they 
incorporate beliefs and hypotheses that are involved in the inferential role of proteinD but not 
proteinS. For instance, they represent the dynamic structural fluctuations in a single molecule, or 
they represent the key tenet that proteins in solution will exist as an ensemble of microstate 
conformations. Moreover, these representations figure in explanations of protein behavior that 
violate the structure-function rule and instead reveal the importance of dynamic properties. 
Compared to users of proteinS, the community of scientists using proteinD and reasoning with this 
set of representations reached very different conclusions about the relationship between protein 
structure, dynamics, and function.    
4.3 Inadequate Characterizations of the Relationship Between Protein Concepts 
The emergence and development of two distinct concepts of the proteins since the birth of 
classical molecular biology raises the question: what epistemic relationship holds between the 
 A. B. 
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two? Although philosophers of biology have not addressed this particular question, they have 
spilled much ink discussing conceptual change in genetics. Beginning in the 1960s, philosophers 
of biology interested in molecular biology have attempted to characterize the relationship between 
successive genetic theories and their different concepts of the gene. Within this context, 
philosophers focused their attention on reduction, with the earliest arguments centered around 
Nagelian intertheoretic reduction and more recent debates turning to consider explanatory 
reduction in genetics. In my analysis of protein concepts, I will follow the path established by these 
earlier philosophical debates about concepts of the gene. I will consider whether either Nagelian 
or explanatory reduction can adequately characterize the relationship between the structural and 
dynamic concepts of the protein, and I will also consider the Kuhnian account of scientific change, 
since many scientists who endorse the dynamic concept have suggested that molecular and 
structural biology are undergoing a paradigm shift. Ultimately, I conclude that these accounts shed 
little light on the relationship between the structural and dynamic protein concept.80  
4.3.1 Reduction 
4.3.1.1 Nagelian Intertheoretic Reduction 
Nagel (1961) presented reduction as a way to characterize the relationship between 
scientific theories. Intertheoretic reduction is of philosophical and scientific interest because it is 
a special type of explanation: it is “the explanation of a theory or set of experimental laws 
 
80 Because these concepts emerged at particular moments during the history of molecular and structural biology, there 
is an inevitable historical dimension to the question motivating this section. The Nagelian account of reduction and 
especially Kuhn’s account of scientific revolutions both include a historical component, since they aim, in part, to 
characterize the development of science. Nevertheless, my analysis here will focus, for the most part, on the epistemic 
rather than historical relationships these accounts posit between successive theories, explanations, or paradigms.  
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established in one area of inquiry, by a theory usually though not invariably formulated for some 
other domain” (Nagel 1961, 338). By demonstrating that one theory, developed for one domain, 
reduces to another more fundamental theory, which applies to a larger domain, one explains the 
former theory by subsuming it under a more general theory. Following the deductive-nomological, 
or covering law, model of explanation, Nagelian reduction explains the reduced theory (Tf) by 
showing that it is logically derivable from the reducing theory (Tr) and thus any consequences of 
it were to be expected. Tr reduces Tf if all the laws of Tf can be logically derived from Tr. Nagel 
supplements this “condition of derivability” with a “condition of connectability” in order to 
account for reduction between two theories with differing theoretical terms. If the theory being 
reduced includes terms that do not appear in the reducing theory, reduction is still possible if one 
can establish “bridge laws” that connect the terms in Tf to something that appears in Tr. Most of 
the early debate sparked by Nagel’s account of reduction—including debates about the possibility 
of reduction in genetics—focused on these formal conditions.81 
Nagel distinguishes two types of intertheoretic reduction. Homogeneous reduction, which 
occurs when the two theories share all the relevant concepts, is typically domain-preserving. 
Nagel’s favorite example of this sort was the reduction of Galilean mechanics by Newtonian 
mechanics.82 It is domain-preserving, since the reducing theory expanded the domain covered by 
the reduced theory to include both celestial and terrestrial dynamics. Cases of homogeneous 
 
81 For a history of the reception of Nagelian intertheoretic reduction by philosophers of biology, specifically, see 
Sarkar (1998). For a more recent history of the reception by philosophers of science more generally, see Sarkar (2015). 
82 Nagel (1961): “The range of application of a macroscopic theory may be extended from one domain to another 
homogeneous with it in the features under study, so that substantially the same concepts are employed in formulating 
the laws in both domains. For example, Galileo’s Two New Sciences was a contribution to the physics of free-falling 
terrestrial bodies, a discipline which in his day was considered to be distinct from the science of celestial motions. 
Galileo’s laws were eventually absorbed into Newtonian mechanics and gravitational theory, which was formulated 
to cover both terrestrial and celestial motions. Although the two classes of motions are clearly distinct, no concepts 
are required for de scribing motions in one area that are not also employed in the other.” (Nagel 1961, 339) 
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reduction, such as this, are “normal steps in the progressive expansion of scientific theory,” as the 
theory and laws of one domain are shown to apply more broadly (Nagel 1961, 338). In contrast, 
inhomogeneous reduction occurs when the reduced theory uses theoretical terms that do not appear 
in the reducing theory. Reduction of this sort often involves an older theory that “deals with 
macroscopic phenomena” and a newer, reducing theory that “postulates a microscopic constitution 
for those macroscopic processes” (Ibid., 340). While homogenous reductions are relatively 
straightforward, according to Nagel, inhomogeneous reductions are more philosophically 
puzzling, since the reduced theory contains concepts not included within the reducing theory. His 
account was developed primarily to explain how intertheoretic reduction could occur in these cases 
in which “the subject matter of the primary science seems qualitatively discontinuous with the 
materials studied by the secondary science” (Ibid., 342).  
The most famous example of a successful inhomogeneous reduction, developed by Nagel, 
is the reduction of thermodynamics to statistical mechanics. Nagel focused specifically on the 
relationship between the ideal gas law, or the Boyle-Charles’ law, and the kinetic theory of gases. 
The thermodynamic law can be derived from the kinetic theory of matter, but only with the 
addition of certain “bridge laws” to connect terms from thermodynamic theory (e.g., temperature) 
to traits represented by theoretical terms in statistical mechanics (e.g., kinetic energy of gas 
molecules). Nagel (1961) endorsed pluralism with respect to the bridge laws that connect terms in 
the old and new theories: they could be logical connections, conventions, or empirical claims.83 
For example, the bridge law that identified “temperature” from the Boyle-Charles’ law with the 
“mean kinetic energy of gas molecules” in the kinetic theory of gases was not a logical connection, 
 
83 Later modifications to Nagel’s account, such as Schaffner (1967), drop this pluralism and instead require the 
relationship between terms to be a biconditional, expressing an identity relation. 
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according to Nagel, but instead was best construed as either a convention or an empirical fact, 
depending on the context. 
Early discussions of Nagel’s account within philosophy of biology aimed to assess its 
applicability to changes in genetics in the twentieth century, specifically focusing on the 
relationship between Mendelian genetics and classical molecular genetics.84 According to Sarkar, 
“most of these disputes have been about formal issues, the ‘logical’ form of reduction” (1998, 17, 
emphasis in original). Those who claim that the formal conditions for Nagelian reduction have 
failed to obtain in this case have typically focused on one of two issues. They have argued either 
(1) that biology, or a particular biological discipline, does not have theories and laws, so the 
Nagelian account does not apply, or (2) that there is no sufficiently simple bridge law that can 
connect the concept of the Mendelian gene with the newer molecular gene concept.85 Similar 
formal problems with applying Nagel’s account to biology reappear in the protein case. On my 
view, theories are not the right unit of analysis, and any bridge law we develop to connect the 
structural and dynamic concepts of the protein will be unilluminating, since it will likely amount 
to little more than replacement of the one concept for the other. After briefly presenting my 
arguments, I then turn to a more substantive issue. I argue that Nagelian intertheoretic reduction is 
not occurring in this case since the potential reducing theory associated with the dynamic concept 
(i.e., statistical thermodynamics) is not more fundamental than the theories of molecular biology 
and chemistry associated with the structural concept.   
The focus on theories as the unit of analysis suggests that Nagelian intertheoretic reduction 
cannot accurately capture the relationship between the structural and dynamic protein concepts. 
 
84 See, for example, Schaffner (1967), Hull (1972), and Kitcher (1984). 
85 Kitcher (1984), Hull (1972), and Dupre (1993) are among many examples of philosophers arguing for these two 
positions. 
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As we have seen, the inferential roles of the two protein concepts involve theoretical definitions 
and descriptions, but they also involve various methods, research and explanatory heuristics, and 
representational and modeling conventions. Nagel’s formal account, which is couched in terms of 
the syntactic account of theories, assumes scientific theories are axiomatized sets of propositional 
statements. But this is not the way most philosophers or scientists think about the inferences, 
explanations, heuristics, and hypotheses associated with the two protein concepts.  Even if we 
could axiomatize the research programs in which each concept is embedded, which is doubtful, it 
is highly unlikely that this would result in a cohesive, unitary theory.86 However, without 
axiomatization, it is impossible to determine whether the logical derivation requirement holds. For 
reasons such as this, even Waters (1990), a defender of reduction in the genetics case, suggests 
that biological theories will typically fail to satisfy the formal conditions of Nagel’s account.  
There is a further problem for applying intertheoretic reduction to the protein case. Even if 
we were able to reconstruct unitary theories associated with each protein concept, before we could 
begin the derivation required for reduction, we would have to settle upon bridge laws to connect 
the two distinct protein concepts. This step was the focus of many who argued against reduction 
in genetics. Philosophers argued that there was no systematic mapping between the Mendelian 
gene and the molecular gene that would allow the establishment of a bridge law. And since there 
were no bridge laws forthcoming to connect these most central concepts, they concluded that 
reduction—at least according to the Nagelian account—had not happened and was unlikely to 
happen.87 In the genetics case, one major difficulty occurred because of the change in reference 
 
86 This is similar to Kitcher’s (1984) argument that classical molecular genetics lacks a unitary theory. Waters (1990) 
also considers whether the reduction of Mendelian genetics will require multiple theories from different biological 
domains, what he calls the “splintering argument” against reduction.  
87 See Kitcher (1984) and Dupre (1993) for examples of this argument focused on bridge laws. 
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for the gene concept. The Mendelian gene was an abstract gene, but later gene concepts, such as 
the gene of classical molecular biology and more recent concepts, seemed to refer to different bits 
of DNA, such that different DNA sequences would be part of the reference potential for different 
concepts (Griffith and Stotz 2013). The reference for protein concepts is less fraught, since both 
proteinS and proteinD include a single, folded polypeptide chain. Therefore, there is less chance 
that the token “protein” will refer to different entities when used by scientists endorsing different 
protein concepts. However, even in this case, the relationship fails to be one-to-one, since the 
reference potential of the dynamic protein also includes an ensemble of polypeptide molecules.  
Another more problematic difficulty arises when trying to establish an appropriate bridge 
law connecting the protein concepts themselves: their inferential roles involve many incompatible, 
or even contradictory, posits. Cooper (1976) sums up this problem, presenting the two “conflicting 
views” of proteins: 
One, a compact structure in which the polypeptide chain is precisely folded to give a tightly 
interlocking, rigid molecule; the other, a “kicking and screaming stochastic molecule” 
(Weber 1975) in which fluctuations are frequent and dramatic. These fluctuations produce 
a seemingly fluid and flexible system. (Cooper 1976, 2741) 
 
To connect these concepts via a bridge law, then, would require radical revisions in the meaning, 
or inferential role, of the structural concept. Both the privileged status of the 3D structure of the 
molecule and the belief that structure alone determines function would need to be jettisoned from 
the inferential role of the structural concept in order to connect it to the dynamic concept. Since 
these theoretical posits form the core of proteinS, justifying its use in most inferential and 
explanatory contexts, it seems that this revision in the concept would be tantamount to replacement 
of proteinS with proteinD. Similar to the previous philosophical debates about genetics, it seems 
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that the formal conditions of Nagelian intertheoretic reduction make it unable to illuminate the 
relationship between protein concepts.88 
There is a more substantive issue unique to the protein case that reinforces these formal 
arguments against the applicability of Nagelian intertheoretic reduction. At first blush, one might 
assume there is a relevant similarity between this case and the canonical example of successful 
Nagelian reduction—viz., the reduction of thermodynamics by statistical mechanics—because of 
the role of thermodynamic theory in the dynamic view of proteins. Despite this similarity, it is 
mistaken to think that thermodynamics plays a similar role in both accounts. Indeed, I argue that 
it plays precisely the opposite role in the protein case.     
According to Nagel (1961), inhomogeneous reduction typically occurs as part of the 
normal progression of science when a higher-level, macroscopic theory is reduced to a lower-level, 
microscopic theory. But in the case of protein concepts, the older, structural concept involves 
theory from molecular biology and chemistry that provide lower-level molecular detail about the 
3D structure of the protein (microscopic), whereas the newer dynamic concept involves higher-
level thermodynamic theory (macroscopic). In this case the candidate reducing theory describes 
the macro-level (e.g., thermodynamic systems), whereas the candidate reduced theory focuses on 
the micro-level (e.g., individual molecules). The historical progression is therefore the reverse of 
the one described by Nagel. Moreover, we might reasonably think that the candidate reducing 
theory, in this case, is not more fundamental than the reduced theory. For this reason, even if the 
dynamic concept and its associated theoretical framework can provide a unified view, framework, 
 
88 This result was to be expected, since as the name suggests, Nagelian intertheoretic reduction was meant to 
characterize an epistemic relation that could obtain between theories. My reason for including this discussion of Nagel 
is because of the importance it played in earlier debates about genetic theory and gene concepts. However, although I 
have not argued for the position here, I also suspect that intertheoretic reduction would not obtain if we were to analyze 
the theories associated with the structural and dynamic concepts.    
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or description for explaining protein behavior, as some scientific advocates claim (see, e.g., 
Motlagh et al. 2014), it does not seem to achieve this unity via reduction of the older structural 
framework, in accordance with Nagel (1961).89 
Consideration of these formal and substantive issues have shown that Nagelian 
intertheoretic reduction is either inapplicable or unilluminating for understanding the change in 
protein concepts in the late twentieth century. Nevertheless, there is a sense in which the evolution 
in protein concepts embodies some of the spirit of Nagel’s account. One goal of his account was 
to make sense of the progress of science. By making evident the ways old theories relate to newer 
ones, Nagelian intertheoretic reduction offers an explanation of scientific progress, while at the 
same time demonstrating that this progress is rational.90 The dynamic concept, with its theoretical 
framework, hypotheses, and methods, does have the resources to explain why explanations that 
used the structural concept succeeded as well as they did. However, as I will argue in Section 4, 
there are better ways to explain this fact that do not construe the epistemic relationship between 
the concepts as one of reduction.  
4.3.1.2 Explanatory Reduction 
Within philosophy of biology, recent discussions of reduction have shifted away from 
intertheoretic reduction, and the debate about the relationship between Mendelian and molecular 
 
89 According to Sarkar, “part of the appeal of Nagel’s analysis is that it seems to capture what the mechanical 
philosophy of the seventeenth century was about; what Maxwell, Clausius, and Boltzmann attempted to do with 
thermodynamics in the nineteenth century; and what Pauling and Crick promoted through the molecularization of 
biology in the twentieth century” (2015, 44). The shift in protein science from descriptions of proteins as molecular 
machines using the structural concept to the analysis of proteins as small thermodynamic systems using the dynamic 
concept seems to be the reverse of the process Nagel (1961) aimed to capture.  
90 Nagel’s account is also part of the mid-twentieth century logical positivism project that tried to demonstrate the 
unity of science. By showing how old and new theories and theories in different domains are logically connected, 
Nagel’s account offered support for the unity of science thesis. If most scientific theories are connected via reduction, 
then the possibility of developing one unified account of science (or rather one unified account of scientific theories 
and laws) was much more likely. 
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genetics, in part, prompted this shift. The failure of this case to fit the formal Nagelian account of 
reduction led to the emergence of an anti-reductionist consensus among philosophers of biology 
by the end of the twentieth century (Sterelny and Griffiths 1999). But many philosophers of 
biology, including those in agreement with this consensus, saw molecular genetics as “an obvious 
triumph for reductionistic research” (Griffiths and Stotz 2013, 57). For this reason, some 
philosophers came to reject Nagel’s account of reduction, since it failed to apply “to many 
important cases that [were] (pre-systematically) accepted as reductions” (Sarkar 2015, 44). 
Instead, they developed an alternative—viz., explanatory reduction—that could account for the 
apparent reductive successes of molecular biology. If this shift from intertheoretic to explanatory 
reduction could clarify the relationship between older and newer approaches to genetics, then we 
might wonder if such a philosophical move could also make sense of the relationship between 
protein concepts and their associated explanatory strategies. In this case, however, I argue that the 
history of gene concepts and protein concepts diverge: the shift from proteinS to proteinD is not 
accurately characterized by explanatory reduction.  
Although philosophers of biology have developed different accounts of explanatory 
reduction, there is general agreement about the key features. For instance, most would agree with 
the spirit of Sarkar’s brief characterization:  
Reduction will be construed as the explanation of wholes by parts, that is, reductionist 
explanations are those in which the weight of a putative explanation is borne by properties 
of the parts alone. (Sarkar 2008, 68) 
 
From this gloss, we can identify two features that are necessary for an explanation to be a reductive 
explanation. First, the system to be explained must be represented as having an “explicit 
hierarchical organization” (Sarkar 1998, 43). This abstract hierarchy need not be spatial. However, 
“strong reduction” occurs when it is instantiated in space (Ibid., 45). In this case, we will be able 
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to distinguish entities at different levels because lower-level entities will be “spatial parts of 
entities at higher levels of the hierarchy” (Ibid., 44). Brigandt and Love (2017) agree that reductive 
explanation in biology is part-whole explanation.91 The levels in the hierarchy are typically 
discovered via decomposition and localization of a biological system into lower-level parts 
(Bechtel and Richardson 2010). This leads to the second condition: the explanation must cite only 
features of the system that occur below the level of the system itself (Kaiser 2015). In other words, 
the “explanatory factors” cited to account for the behavior of the biological system must “refer 
only to properties of entities at lower levels of the hierarchy” (Sarkar 1998, 47).  This second 
condition ensures that reductive explanations maintain “an epistemically important unidirectional 
‘flow’ of explanation from the lower to the higher level” (Brigandt and Love 2017, 26).92 
At first blush, we have some reasons to think this type of reduction might illuminate the 
relationship between the structural and dynamic concepts of the protein. First, the molecularization 
of biology and related sciences are seen as great scientific achievements because molecular biology 
has the ability to describe and explain the molecular basis for macroscopic biological phenomena. 
Scientific progress has occurred by drilling down deeper to uncover molecular mechanisms and 
by developing mechanistic explanations of biological phenomena. Indeed, this is precisely what 
Griffiths and Stotz (2013) claim happened with molecular genetics. Because of this historical 
trajectory, one might suspect that the newer, dynamic concept of the protein marks an 
improvement over the earlier structural concept because it offers a lower-level description of 
 
91 Kaiser (2015) agrees with the abstract hierarchy criterion but does not think that reductive explanations in biology 
require spatial containment. Thus, she disagrees with Brigandt and Love (2017), arguing that not all reductive 
explanations are part-whole explanations. She contends that a reductive explanation can include entities that are not 
parts, so long as they occur at the lower-level, as required by the second condition. (See footnote 13 for further 
discussion of Kaiser’s account of levels.) 
92 Sarkar (1998) agrees. He claims that reductive explanations “proceed in a definite direction, that is, intuitively from 
lower through higher levels toward a sink” (55). 
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proteins. Second, the single 3D structure of the protein, posited by the structural concept, is 
replaced by an ensemble of structures in the dynamic concept.93 This proliferation of structures 
within the dynamic concept requires more lower-level molecular and structural detail, which might 
seem to fit the reductive trend in molecular biology. 
Despite this initial plausibility, it would be a mistake to think that explanations of protein 
behavior that use the dynamic protein concept provide explanatory reductions of protein behavior 
previously explained using the structural concept. I develop two arguments for this claim. Both 
focus on explanations that use ensemble representations of the dynamic concept, since these are 
the ones most likely to be misconstrued as reductive explanations. First, I argue that the 
relationship between the structural microstates and the ensemble does not exhibit the part-whole 
character required for reductive explanation. And second, I contend that dynamic properties should 
not be construed as lower-level properties of proteins. There is no abstract hierarchy that shows 
that the structural properties of proteins are at a higher level than their dynamic properties.  
First, consider a representation of the “same” protein using either the structural or dynamic 
concept. In the former, there is a single structure whereas in the latter there is an ensemble of 
microstate structures, representing the various conformations that the protein can assume in 
solution. In this transition from the structural to the dynamic concept, the unique structural 
representation (i.e., what was previously considered to be the protein) becomes only one of many 
structures in the ensemble. Thus, the older structural representation exists as an individual within 
 
93 According to the structural concept, a population of protein molecules would behave like a set of identical molecular 
machines, each carrying out the same task. Since all the molecules were identical in this way, it made sense to look 
for an explanation at the level of the individual protein. In contrast, according to the dynamic concept, the single 
molecular structure of proteinS has given way to a multiplicity of microstate structures all carrying out the same task 
but in slightly different ways. Hence, the adoption of proteinD requires attending to features of the population, as well 
as the structural differences between individual molecules, in order to explain protein behavior. 
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the new group of structures in the ensemble representation. It is therefore possible to construe the 
relationship between that single structural representation and the dynamic representation as a part-
whole relationship, since the structure is a microstate within the ensemble. This part-whole 
relationship, however, is very different from the part-whole relationship that exists in mechanistic 
or reductive explanations. In reductive explanations, the part-whole relation arises via 
decomposition of the system of interest into its components (Bechtel and Richardson 2010, Craver 
2007), and this decomposition is spatial, yielding distinct parts that are spatially contained within 
the whole. Moreover, because of the constitutive relation between the parts and the whole, the 
parts are necessarily smaller than the whole of which they are a part.  
The part-whole relationship between a single microstate structure and the ensemble differs 
in both respects. For one, the 3D structural representation of the protein is not decomposed into 
different parts (e.g., it is not decomposed into different structural domains). Instead, the 
proliferation of structures required by the dynamic concept of the protein represents all the possible 
structures that the protein could assume in solution. It can be thought of as providing either 
snapshots of the temporal structural fluctuations of any given protein molecule, or a representation 
of the instantaneous equilibrium distribution of molecules across all microstates.94 The shift from 
the structural to dynamic representation is therefore not accurately characterized as a 
decomposition of the structural protein into component parts. In addition, the putative parts in the 
dynamic representation are not spatially smaller than the protein represented according to the 
structural concept. In mechanistic explanation, the parts are spatially contained within the whole, 
but in the ensemble representation, the old structural representation reappears as a microstate 
 
94 Because of the ergodic hypothesis, the ensemble representation can be interpreted as either (1) the temporal 
evolution of a single molecule or (2) the instantaneous representation of the population of molecules (Hilser et al. 
2006).  
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structure. It is therefore of equivalent size to any of the other microstate structures in the ensemble 
representations. In no sense is one of the microstate structures in the ensemble representation 
smaller than the single structural representation of the protein under proteinS. Therefore, we can 
conclude that the only part-whole relationship that exists between the structural and dynamic 
representations of the protein—viz., the microstate and ensemble—does not have the appropriate 
character to enable explanatory reduction.  
Second, in addition to their part-whole character, reductionist explanations must only cite 
explanatory factors at the lower-level in order to explain the behavior of phenomena at higher 
levels.95 However, the dynamic properties of proteins associated with proteinD, and the structural 
properties, which are at the conceptual core of proteinS, are not related hierarchically. There is no 
“independent criterion” (Sarkar 1998, 53), for establishing an abstract hierarchy, with structure as 
a higher-level property and dynamics as a lower-level one.96 Thus, even though the shift from the 
structural concept to the dynamic concept can involve the addition of dynamic properties to 
structural representations of proteins, this dynamic information does not introduce a new, lower 
level of analysis, either spatially or abstractly. The addition of dynamic properties, for example, 
does not require the use of quantum-level theories to explain the atomic-level structural properties. 
Talk of “levels” in this case hardly makes sense. The thermodynamic framework invoked by those 
who endorse the dynamic concept also fails to establish the necessary hierarchy. The energetic 
 
95 One major problem for this understanding of reductionist explanation in this way is ambiguity in the concept of 
“levels”. When construed as part-whole explanations, the levels are established locally via the part-whole relationship: 
the whole is at a higher level than the parts from which it is composed (Craver 2007). Kaiser (2015) develops an 
account that attempts to provide a more global account of “levels,” since her account of reductive explanation permits 
non-parts in the explanans so long as they are also at a lower level. However, I am skeptical that it can offer an 
unambiguous account of levels in biology. See Woodward (2020) for further discussion of levels.  
96 Sakar (1998) requires that there must be some independent criterion that establishes the hierarchy. It is 
“independent” in that it “should not have been posited only for the sake of the explanation at hand” (53). However, 
the hierarchy could be established by a general research program or explanations of another phenomenon.    
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components related to structure (∆H) and dynamics (∆S) are additive components that jointly 
determine the free energy (∆G) of proteins, which governs protein behavior: the structural and 
dynamic properties of proteins are co-dependent and not at different levels. There is thus no 
plausible construal of the structural properties of proteins as being at a higher level than their 
dynamic properties.  
Molecular biologists adopted the structural concept first, representing the protein as a 
single, static structure, and only later discovered the functional importance of structural 
fluctuations, which led them to adopt a dynamic concept that explicitly represented the dynamic 
properties of the protein. Despite this historical narrative, which expresses contingent facts about 
progress in molecular biology, the shift from the structural to the dynamic concept does not 
indicate that structural properties in representations associated with the former occur at a higher 
level than the dynamic properties included in representations associated with the latter.  
In sum, explanatory reduction fails to capture the relationship between protein structure 
and dynamics. The history of protein concepts, in this case, diverges from that of gene concepts. 
Although philosophers of biology largely rejected Nagel’s account of intertheoretic reduction in 
the context of genetics, many suggested that the new science, molecular genetics, provided 
reductive explanations of phenomena that the older Mendelian science only described 
cytologically (Griffiths and Stotz 2013, Waters 1990). In contrast, I have argued that neither 
Nagelian reduction nor explanatory reduction can accurately characterize the relationship between 
the structural and dynamic concepts and their associated representations.  
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4.3.2 Kuhnian Paradigm Shifts 
Kuhn developed an influential, non-reductive account of the development of science. His 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), which introduced the concepts of “scientific paradigms” 
and “paradigm shifts,” was the most-cited book in the history and philosophy of science in the 
twentieth century and was read by generations of scientists (Kaiser 2012). His account focuses on 
revolutions in science that drastically reshaped theory and practice in different scientific fields. It 
is therefore unsurprising that scientists endorsing the dynamic concept of the protein have gestured 
toward Kuhn’s account of scientific revolutions and claimed that understanding of proteins and 
protein behavior is undergoing a paradigm shift. Vincent Hilser, a structural biologist at Johns 
Hopkins and one of the most vocal champions of the dynamic protein concept, has argued that it 
is the foundation for a “new paradigm” that has replaced the “historically dominant paradigm” 
(Motlagh et al. 2014, 331). Nobel prize-winner Martin Karplus has also presented this change as 
a “paradigm shift” from an old view focused on structure to a “new view” that “emphasized the 
intrinsic dynamic nature of proteins” (Cui and Karplus 2008, 1304). In a “Perspectives” article in 
Cell Structure, two structural biologists even cited Kuhn before claiming that a “paradigm shift is 
underway” (Forman-Kay and Mittag 2013). These scientists typically support their assertions by 
showing how the dynamic concept, with its associated theoretical posits, hypotheses, and 
explanatory strategies, has overturned the structure-function rule and provided a new framework 
to characterize and explain protein function. For the scientists, the reference to paradigm shifts is 
likely a rhetorical flourish used to signal the novelty and importance of their view. Nevertheless, 
it is worth considering whether Kuhn’s account can make sense of the relationship between the 
structural and dynamic protein concepts.   
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Kuhn’s (1962) account of scientific revolutions aims to offer a historical account of 
theoretical and conceptual change in the sciences. According to Kuhn, as a scientific field 
develops, it establishes a paradigm, which is a set of core concepts, theories, methods, and other 
aspects of scientific practice accepted by the relevant community of scientists. The paradigm 
defines the relevant scientific problems and outlines the shape of the solutions according to a set 
of exemplars. During “normal science,” the work of most scientists will be solving problems 
following these exemplars and further articulating the paradigm to show how it applies in different 
situations. Theoretical and conceptual change occurs when anomalous phenomena that cannot be 
explained by or incorporated into the paradigm accumulate. After the accumulation of sufficient 
anomalies, the paradigm breaks down, leading to a scientific revolution, in which the scientific 
community has not yet settled on a new set of guiding concepts, theories, methods, and practices. 
Eventually, a new paradigm arises that can make sense of most of the anomalies, and it is adopted 
by the scientific community.  According to Kuhn, the shift from one paradigm to another is like a 
Gestalt shift: within the new paradigm, the scientist sees the world differently than she did before.  
Whereas Nagel’s account takes theories to be the primary unit relevant to the analysis of 
scientific change, Kuhn’s account posits the scientific paradigm. The bigger difference between 
these two accounts—and the one that sparked more debate within philosophy of science—lies in 
the epistemic relation that connects the old and new theories or paradigms. For Nagel, the two 
theories are connected via the reduction relation, which is grounded in logical derivability. In 
contrast, Kuhn argues that the Gestalt-like paradigm shift is not wholly rational. According to 
Kuhn, the terms and theoretical concepts in the new theory, even identical terms, will be 
incommensurable, since they will refer to different things and have new meanings in the context 
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of the new paradigm.97 Therefore, a theory or concept that gets replaced during a paradigm shift 
will have no necessary epistemic relationship to any new theories or concepts that emerge to 
describe and explain phenomena within the new paradigm.98  
Despite the claims of some scientists, the Kuhnian model of scientific change does not 
accurately describe the relationship between the structural and dynamic concept of the protein. For 
one, if the introduction and adoption of the dynamic concept were part of a paradigm shift in 
molecular and structural biology, then the new dynamic concept and the old structural concept 
would be incommensurable. Scientists working within the new paradigm would not be able to 
make sense of those working in the old paradigm, since they would “practice their trades in 
different worlds” (Kuhn 2012 [1962], 149). While it is true that the structural concept and the 
dynamic concept are incompatible, since their inferential roles involve inferences and explanations 
that are at odds (e.g., one cannot simultaneously accept the claim that protein function can be 
explained by structure alone as well as the claim that structure and dynamics jointly determine 
function), it is false to say that these concepts are incommensurable.  
Scientists who endorse one or the other concept can make sense of claims made using the 
other concept, despite the change in reference and inferential roles. For example, in a recent review 
of protein function, Hilser and colleagues (2012) describe how one function—allostery—is 
 
97 It is precisely this claim that motivates Kitcher (1978, 1982) to develop his alternative account of conceptual change 
that shows how concepts can acquire and lose modes of reference across theory change yet still be compared. 
Brigandt’s (2010) account of conceptual change also seeks to show how changes in the meaning of concepts, as well 
as their referents, can be rational, when we consider the epistemic goals of the concept’s use.  
98 As Ian Hacking points out, however, Kuhn did not deny the “very rationality of science,” as it is sometimes claimed 
(Hacking 2012, xxxi). On Kuhn’s account, under any paradigm, “theories should be accurate in their predictions, 
consistent, broad in scope, present phenomena in an orderly and coherent way, and be fruitful in suggesting new 
phenomena or relationships between phenomena” (Ibid.). But these epistemic values track the relationship between 
theories and the world and not successive theories. Thus, it is not inconsistent with Kuhn’s view to claim, as I have, 
that his account provides for no necessary epistemic connection between theories, which is the focus of the current 
chapter.   
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explained using the structural concept and the structure-function rule and then again using the 
dynamic concept and the ensemble representation. He presents these as alternatives and ultimately 
advocates the latter explanation of allostery, but he argues for this preference by claiming that the 
latter strategy offers a more accurate and unified explanation of allostery that can account for more 
cases.99 That is, Hilser argues for the superiority of the dynamic concept—he does not simply hope 
for his interlocutors to undergo a “conversion” to his view. The expectation, then, is that scientists 
in this discipline will be able to recognize, comprehend, and reason with both concepts.  
There is another reason to think that Kuhn’s account cannot illuminate the change in 
protein concepts. Because it casts the two paradigms as radically distinct, leading to different 
worldviews, it does not have the philosophical resources to explain why some aspects associated 
with the old concept—e.g., research problems, methodological strategies, and experimental 
techniques—have carried over into research and theorizing associated with the new dynamic 
concept of the protein.100 On the Kuhnian account, the newer dynamic paradigm should replace 
the older structural one, and the characteristic research problems, methods, and explanatory 
strategies of the old paradigm should also be replaced. Within structural biology, however, this 
has not happened. The Kuhnian account is too blunt an instrument to adequately account for the 
change that is occurring in structural biology. Although I will develop an account of conceptual 
change and advocate for replacement of the structural concept in Section 4, my account will show 
why we should not expect conceptual replacement in this case to lead to a transition from one set 
 
99 According to Hilser, the dynamic concept is more accurate, since it represents dynamic structural fluctuations that 
are excluded from the inferential role of the structural concept. He also seems to adopt the position that more unified 
explanations are superior to less unified ones (see, e.g., Motlagh et al. 2014). Since the thermodynamic framework 
associated with the dynamic concept of the protein offers a unified account of more protein behaviors than structural-
mechanistic framework does, he claims that the former is superior. 
100 Kuhn moderates this view somewhat in The Essential Tension (1977).  
 141 
of methods, models and representations to another set, but will instead lead to an expansion of 
scientific practices that aim to characterize and explain protein function.   
4.4 How to Make Sense of Changes in Protein Science  
4.4.1 Two Levels of Analysis: Protein Concepts vs. Representations 
In order to adequately characterize the conceptual change in molecular and structural 
biology, we must distinguish two levels of analysis—viz., concepts and representations. Scientific 
concepts are theoretical terms that have an inferential role (or meaning), reference, and epistemic 
goal as components of their semantic content (Brigandt 2010). As we have seen in Section 2, a 
concept will be compatible with many different representations. But any particular concept will be 
compatible with only a certain set of representations.101 Change at the conceptual level will likely 
lead to changes at the representational level, since changes in the inferential role (or reference 
potential) of the concept will likely involve the development of new representations and exclude 
the use of certain old ones. There is no principled reason, however, to think that the epistemic 
relationship that holds between two different concepts is the same as the relationship that holds 
between the representations associated with each concept. Therefore, any adequate account of the 
changes in molecular and structural biology vis-à-vis proteins will need to explain the epistemic 
 
101 The focus of my analysis is on visual representations of proteins, such as the models of proteins discussed in Section 
2 of this chapter, although it could be extended to include other representations, such as mathematical or linguistic 
representations. The main claim I will defend is that the dynamic concept will be able to accommodate more types of 
representations than the structural concept, since its inferential role includes beliefs about protein dynamics that are 
excluded from the inferential role of the structural concept.  
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relationship between the structural and dynamic views at both the level of concepts and the level 
of representations. 
4.4.2 Protein Concepts and Conceptual Replacement 
The epistemic relationship between the structural and dynamic protein concepts, I argue, 
is best understood as an example of conceptual replacement. On my view, the difference in the 
inferential roles of the concepts is too significant to count as a meaningful reduction. To support 
this claim, it will be worthwhile to review the types of semantic content that are involved in the 
inferential role of a concept before comparing the inferential roles of the structural and dynamic 
concepts.  
According to Brigandt (2010), the inferential role of a concept extends beyond the 
theoretical definition, including other features necessary to explain how the concept is successfully 
used in “scientific inference, explanation, and discovery” (Ibid., 22). Brigandt’s specification of 
the inferential role of the classical molecular gene is illuminating. He claims it  
includes the genotype–phenotype distinction, the idea that genetic loci are arranged in 
linkage groups, beliefs about the basic principles specifying the transmission of genes 
(linkage, recombination, segregation), and ideas about the relation between genotype and 
phenotype (such as dominance and recessiveness). (Ibid., 26) 
  
This example shows the breadth of the inferential role of a concept and just how far it extends 
beyond the theoretical definition a scientific user of the term might give when asked. The 
inferential role of the concept, in this case, explains how it was used in scientific practice and 
theorizing. 
As we have seen, the protein concept underwent a significant change in the late twentieth 
century. It was sufficiently drastic for certain scientists to begin to distinguish the old structural 
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concept of the protein from the new dynamic concept. At the heart of the old structural concept 
were two commitments: (1) the belief that every protein had a rigid and static 3D structure and (2) 
the belief that the protein structure alone determined protein function. Taken together, these two 
core beliefs established a heuristic for research and laid out a strategy to explain protein behavior 
and function. They also promoted the use of certain instruments and experimental techniques, such 
as x-ray crystallography, to elucidate protein structure. This conceptual core gave rise to a host of 
other more specific features that were involved in the use of the concept, such as the “lock-and-
key model” of catalysis and the “molecular shape rule,” that directed scientists to attend to the 
general properties of the surface of molecules (Sarkar 2008, 61).  
The new dynamic concept of the protein rejects both of these commitments at the core of 
the structural concept. Instead, the inferential role of this new concept includes the belief that 
proteins are flexible and dynamic and are constantly undergoing structural fluctuations. Moreover, 
users of the dynamic concept are committed to the belief that dynamics, as well as structure, are 
an important determinant of protein behavior and function. Unlike the structural concept, which 
was largely wedded to one technology, the users of the dynamic concept promoted a diversity of 
experimental, theoretical, and computational strategies to probe the dynamic properties of 
proteins.102 The explanatory strategies involved in the inferential role of the concept were similarly 
diverse, with some using thermodynamic analyses to distinguish structural and dynamic 
contributions to function, and others adopting computational approaches. Despite the diversity of 
methodological and explanatory strategies, the common theoretical core of the dynamic concept 
maintained that dynamics and structure were both causally relevant to protein function and denied 
the privileged status accorded to protein structure by the structural concept.  
 
102 Cooper (1980) provides and early review of these dynamic approaches.  
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This characterization of the inferential role of the dynamic concept serves as a reminder 
that the name of this new concept can be easily misconstrued. Although it emphasizes the major 
novelty (viz., dynamics), the name is potentially misleading. Since it is often contrasted with the 
old structural concept, one might assume that the explanations, inferences, and hypotheses 
involved in the inferential role of this new concept direct scientists to focus on protein dynamics 
rather than protein structure. However, this is not the case. The dynamic concept guides scientists 
to attend to both structure and dynamics, if they are interested in explaining protein function. Table 
1 summarizes the key differences in the inferential roles of the protein concepts. 
Table 1 Three Semantic Components of Protein Concepts 
 Structural Concept Dynamic Concept 
Reference − single folded polypeptide chain − single folded polypeptide chain 
− ensemble of such polypeptide 
chains 
Inferential Potential  − rigid and static 3D structure 
− structure alone determines 
function (structure-function 
rule) 
− mechanistic explanations 
consider proteins to be 
molecular machines 
− flexible and dynamic 3D 
structure 
− structure and dynamics determine 
function  
− thermodynamic analysis treats 
proteins as thermodynamic 
systems 
Epistemic Goal − explain and predict protein 
behaviors, in part, to enable 
interventions 
− explain and predict protein 
behaviors, in part, to enable 
interventions 
 
This side-by-side comparison of the two concepts supports my contention that the 
relationship between the old structural concept and the new dynamic one is best interpreted as a 
case of conceptual replacement rather than reduction. The core theoretical posits of the two 
concepts, which guide their use in inferences, explanations, and research, are either incompatible 
or contradictory. For instance, the structure-function rule of the old concept, which holds that 
structure alone determines function, is contradicted by the new concept’s explanatory rule, which 
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holds that structure and dynamics co-determine protein function. The inferential role, or meaning, 
of the concept has changed significantly, which is sufficient to identify the conceptual change and 
distinguish the usage of two concepts (Brigandt 2010). Unlike in the case of gene concepts, 
however, there is no difficulty in establishing the appropriate connection between one concept and 
the other, since their referents have remained largely unchanged. 103 Nevertheless, this is not a case 
of reduction in the spirit of Nagel, since the change in the inferential roles of the concept do not 
allow one to connect the concepts while preserving their meaning in each respective theoretical 
context. In other words, if one were to attempt to correct the inferential role of proteinS so that it 
could be appropriately linked to proteinD, it would require replacing the inferential role of the old 
concept with that of the new.104 And this, I suggest, would not be reduction in any meaningful 
sense. Instead, we ought to think of it as the replacement of the old structural concept of the protein 
with the new dynamic one.  
However, we can say something further about the epistemic relationship between the two 
protein concepts. It is not at all the case that the new dynamic concept is incommensurable with 
the old structural concept. If we compare the theoretical posits that form the core of their inferential 
roles, we see that the posits and rules that guide the use of the dynamic concept are more permissive 
than those of the structural concept. Where the structural concept focused only one cause of protein 
function (structure), the dynamic concept focuses on two (structure and dynamics). Similarly, the 
structural concept was embedded in research contexts that focused primarily on elucidating the 3D 
structure of proteins, while the dynamic concept guides researchers to many methods that 
 
103 As Table 1 shows, the referent of the dynamic concept has expanded to also include an ensemble of polypeptide 
molecules.  
104 Schaffner (1967) modified Nagel’s original formulation, arguing that what is actually derivable from the reducing 
theory is not the reduced theory, but rather a strongly analogous corrected version of the reduced theory.  
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illuminate dynamic as well as structural features of proteins. Thus, in a sense, the replacement of 
proteinS with proteinD amounts to a quasi-unification. Advocates of the dynamic concept do not 
argue that structure is irrelevant to protein function. Quite the contrary. They recognize that the 
dynamic features of proteins previously excluded from the explanatory framework of the structural 
concept are instantiated within structures. Consider two examples from advocates of the dynamic 
concept:  
It is clear that complete understanding of the nature and function of protein molecules will 
require knowledge not only of their mean properties, but also of their dynamic 
characteristics, and that static descriptions of molecular structure are incomplete and may 
be misleading. (Cooper 1976, 2741, emphasis added) 
 
For a complete description of proteins, it is important, therefore, to know, in addition to the 
average structure, the form of the fluctuations that occur, to determine how they take place, 
and to evaluate their magnitudes and timescales. (Brooks et al. 1988, 2, emphasis added) 
 
These endorsers of the dynamic concept interpret the dynamic concept as providing a conceptual 
unification, bringing together both structural and dynamic features of proteins. The new concept, 
which replaced the old, is thus more permissive and more inclusive, guiding scientists to expand 
the set of factors they consider causally relevant to protein function.  
This fact, then, explains the puzzling feature of this particular conceptual change that the 
Kuhnian account could not—viz., why so much reasoning and research in structural and molecular 
biology remains the same after the replacement of the structural concept with the dynamic one. 
This occurs because the inferential role of the new dynamic concept is significantly expanded to 
include beliefs about protein dynamics and only jettisons those beliefs that afforded privileged 
status to protein structure. Even after conceptual replacement, use of the dynamic concept guides 
scientists to continue to investigate and draw conclusions from protein structure but also 
encourages them to recognize and pursue new investigations into protein dynamics will also be 
necessary to adequately explain protein function. 
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Philosopher Sandra Mitchell has also developed an account of the relationships between 
concepts and representations in protein science (Mitchell and Gronenborn 2017, Mitchell 2019). 
Therefore, it will be useful to distinguish my account of protein concepts and conceptual 
replacement from her account of scientific perspectives and integration. According to Mitchell’s 
account of perspectival pluralism, scientific practice produces a variety of different models and 
representations that often must be integrated in order for them to be applied to particular problems 
and specific cases.105 Pluralism arises because science relies on a variety of epistemic sources, and 
integration is then required because the representational outputs of these different sources are often 
not unifiable or reducible.  
Mitchell (2019) presents the problem of protein structural determination as an example of 
scientific practice involving perspectival integration. Molecular and structural biologists want to 
be able to determine and/or predict the 3D structure of proteins. To do this, they rely on a variety 
of methods and approaches: physics, chemistry, and biology. According to Mitchell, each one of 
these approaches constitutes a perspective.106 The physics perspective focuses on the 
thermodynamic properties of proteins and the Gibbs free energy of different conformations. It 
studies the protein in silico, attempting to model the thermodynamics of folding that ultimately 
lead the protein to adopt a given 3D structure. The chemistry perspective occurs in vitro and uses 
experimental techniques, such as x-ray crystallography or NMR, in order to determine the 3D 
structure of the isolated protein. Finally, the biology perspective looks at the protein in vivo, using 
techniques such as fluorescence that let scientists visualize the protein inside the cell. Each 
 
105 Although Mitchell has only recently framed her analysis in terms of “scientific perspectives,” her early arguments 
for integrative pluralism contain similar arguments about the partiality of representation and the need for integration 
rather than unification. See, for example, Mitchell (2002), (2003), and (2012).  
106 Mitchell (2019) claims that, in this case, by using these three different scientific approaches, “one can crudely 
distinguish” the three different perspectives (185).  
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approach focuses on different features of proteins that are relevant to determining or predicting the 
3D structure, and no single approach includes all the relevant features. Whereas the 
representational outputs of a given perspective may be able to address certain research questions 
about protein structure, according to Mitchell, other questions will require integrating information 
from multiple perspectives, since each perspective offers only a “partial grasp of the phenomenon” 
(Ibid., 188).       
Mitchell characterizes a “scientific perspective” in much the same way that I, following 
the philosophical debates in genetics, have used the term “concept”:  
Different scientific perspectives are characterized by different assumptions, methods, 
instruments of observation, experimental arrangements, concepts, categories, and 
representations, all of which are associated with specific pragmatic concerns and 
explanatory or predictive projects. (Mitchell 2019, 181) 
 
Nevertheless, from her example from protein science, it is clear that Mitchell’s perspectives are 
not the same as the concepts of the protein that are the focus of my analysis. The three perspectives 
cut across both concepts of the protein. In other words, scientists who endorse either concept can 
study proteins from any of the three perspectives. Take, for example, the group of scientists who 
have adopted the dynamic concept of the protein. Within this community, even as early as the 
1980s, we find certain scientists using computational and theoretical thermodynamic approaches 
(physics perspective), others using in vitro approaches, such as x-ray and NMR analysis (chemistry 
perspective), and others still using techniques, such as fluorescence (biology perspective), to study 
protein behavior and function.107 Despite investigating proteins from different perspectives, this 
community of scientists saw themselves as having a shared commitment to the dynamic concept, 
 
107 See, for example, Cooper and Dryden (1984) and McCammon et al. (1977) for physics approaches; Kendrew et al. 
(1958) and Perutz et al. (1960) for chemistry approaches; and Weber (1975) and Demchenko (1986) for more 
biological approaches. 
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as evidenced by their attendance at conferences, such as the 1982 Cibia Foundation symposium 
on “Mobility and Function in Proteins and Nucleic Acids” (Porter et al. 1983). Furthermore, 
scientists working within a particular perspective can disagree over the relevant concept of the 
protein. For example, although much early work in x-ray crystallography was carried out by 
scientists who endorsed the structural concept, Frauenfelder used this method in clever ways in 
the 1970s and 1980s to investigate the dynamic features of proteins, and he was an early champion 
of the dynamic concept (see, e.g., Frauenfelder et al. 1979). 
Mitchell’s scientific perspectives are clearly not at the same level of analysis as the 
concepts of the protein in my account. Our different units of analysis, in part, explain our different 
conclusions about protein science. Mitchell argues that perspectives cannot be globally unified or 
reduced but instead typically require integration.108 In contrast, I have argued that a process of 
conceptual replacement, which yields quasi-unification, is occurring. Although Mitchell’s analysis 
of perspectives is different from my analysis of concepts and conceptual change, I will argue in 
the next section that her analysis of scientific representations and the relationships between them 
is compatible with and complementary to my analysis of structural and dynamic representations 
of proteins.  
4.4.3 Relating Representations of Proteins: Abstraction and De-idealization  
The mere fact that conceptual change is leading to the replacement of the structural concept 
with the dynamic concept does not tell us much about the epistemic relationship that holds between 
the representations associated with each concept. The elimination of the structural concept does 
 
108 On Mitchell’s view, successful reductions and unification happen in science, but only locally.  
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not entail the elimination of all the old structural representations of proteins. Instead, because the 
protein concepts are put to many uses, they can support many representations, (as evidenced by 
the many examples discussed in Section 2). Since the new dynamic concept has a more expansive 
inferential role, it supports more types of representations of proteins that are useful for explaining 
and intervening upon protein behavior.109 In other words, it generates more successful inferences 
in the relevant scientific domains. I argue that most structural representations of proteins, 
associated with the old concept, are still included in the set of representations of the dynamic 
concept because these representations are related via abstraction. Any scientific representation of 
proteins will necessarily be partial, so the fact that these representations omit dynamic features of 
proteins does not make them incompatible with the dynamic concept. In what follows, I will 
develop the argument that structural and dynamic representations of proteins are often related via 
abstraction and idealization. My account, I argue, explains why the conceptual change in protein 
science has not eliminated old structural representations of proteins as inadequate and also why 
these structural representations will still be useful to scientists in certain contexts.  
To begin, we must first briefly consider the partiality of scientific representations. 
Mitchell’s work on this topic offers an excellent starting point for my analysis of protein 
representations.110 She argues that all scientific representations and models are partial, representing 
certain aspects of the phenomenon of interest while omitting others. This partiality arises from a 
selection process, in which a researcher chooses which features of the phenomenon to include in 
 
109 It is not merely that the inferential role of the dynamic concept is more expansive than that of the structural concept 
that makes it a more useful scientific concept. Rather, my argument turns on the fact that the inferential role is larger 
in the relevant domain—i.e., in cases that are actually instantiated. The inferential role of the structural concept is, in 
a sense, oversimplified—it is too limited and includes false beliefs (e.g., structure alone determines function)—and 
for this reason it cannot support the dynamic representations that are needed to explain certain protein behaviors.    
110 My presentation of Mitchell’s work here primarily draws upon Mitchell and Gronenborn (2017) and Mitchell 
(2019).  
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the representation and which to omit. In addition, some of this selection will be unintentional. For 
instance, a lack of knowledge or a constraint of a given representational medium might prevent 
the inclusion of a particular feature. However, according to Mitchell, this partiality is not a 
shortcoming. Scientific representations must be incomplete in this way if they are to be useful 
tools for reasoning and explanation. If they were complete rather than partial, they would represent 
all the features of the phenomenon in a one-to-one mapping relation between the model and the 
world.111 Hence, they would no longer be practical scientific models but instead would be exact 
replicas of the phenomenon. Mitchell concludes that perspectival pluralism in science is an 
inevitable consequence of the nature of representation: scientific models and representations are 
partial, and scientists will require multiple models in order to represent different aspects of the 
same phenomenon. 
As Mitchell (2019) shows, this argument is directly applicable to the case of protein 
representations: they are also inevitably partial. Consider, for example, early structural 
representations of proteins, such as Kendrew’s models of myoglobin (see Fig. 6). His models 
represent only structural features of the protein, with the earliest models showing the position of 
the polypeptide backbone and later models including more detail regarding the location of the 
amino acid side chains. However, all dynamic properties of the protein are omitted from the 
representation, arguably for two different reasons. First, x-ray crystallography does not reveal 
information about protein dynamics, since it requires protein molecules to be removed from 
 
111 Mitchell (2019) also argues that this ideal of a “complete representation” of a phenomenon, such as a protein, is 
unattainable because our empirical and theoretical access might engage with different aspects of the phenomenon. For 
instance, the two most common techniques of protein structural determination, x-ray crystallography and NMR, 
interact with different aspects of the protein—i.e., the electron cloud and nucleus, respectively. The representations of 
protein structure from both these methods will often disagree in certain respects, so a unified model of protein structure 
that simply and straightforwardly combines both representations is impossible. Instead, Mitchell claims, more 
complex process of integration must occur.     
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solution and packed into a crystal. Thus, Kendrew inevitably excluded the dynamic properties of 
myoglobin because his experimental method did not give him access to the molecule’s dynamics. 
But even if he had access to the dynamic properties of myoglobin, he likely would have excluded 
them from the representation, since molecular biologists at that time were committed to the 
structural concept. This concept of the protein involved the commitment to the structure-function 
rule, which maintained that structure alone determined protein function. The user of this concept 
would likely have deemed most dynamic properties of proteins to be irrelevant to protein function 
and therefore excluded them from the representation of the protein.112  
Even though they were developed when the structural concept of the protein was dominant, 
structural representations of proteins like Kendrew’s models of myoglobin are nevertheless 
compatible with the dynamic concept. All the dynamic features have been abstracted away from 
the protein. But no matter the reason for the omission, structural representations are not false 
because they lack dynamic properties. Instead, they are merely partial. The change in inferential 
role of the concept that occurred with the shift from proteinS to proteinD jettisoned the structure-
function rule and the idea that proteins have stable, static 3D structures, but it did not deny that 
proteins have structure or claim that structure is irrelevant to protein function. Instead, the 
inferential role of the new concept involves the belief that dynamics as well as structure are 
relevant to protein function. Because all representations are invariably partial, those 
representations associated with the structural concept do not need to be interpreted as representing 
structure as the sole cause of protein function. Hence, they do not represent the central feature of 
 
112 I do not mean to attribute this view to Kendrew or any particular historical actor. However, it seems plausible that 
many structural and molecular biologists in the mid-twentieth century considered the fast timescale motions at the 
heart of the dynamic protein concept to be largely irrelevant to protein function (see, e.g., Monod (1968) for suggestive 
evidence of this point).   
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the structural concept that has been rejected by advocates of the dynamic concept.113 They are 
therefore compatible with the dynamic concept, since they can be interpreted as partial 
representations of proteins with their dynamic features abstracted away. This fact explains why 
structural representations of proteins persist, despite the conceptual change from proteinS to 
proteinD.  
The argument from the partiality of representations shows why the dynamic concept is 
compatible with both structural and dynamic representations. Analysis of those representations 
demonstrates that they are typically related via abstraction. That is, one can transition from a 
structural to a dynamic representation or vice-versa through the process of de-idealization or 
abstraction, respectively. Many of the representations of the dynamic protein arise rather 
straightforwardly from the addition of dynamic information to structural representations. Recall 
the superposition model of hemoglobin that Frauenfelder and colleagues developed to represent 
the dynamic structural fluctuations the protein undergoes in solution (see Fig. 8A). This 
representation overlays dynamic properties of the molecule onto the average structure, thereby 
unifying the structural and dynamic features in one more representationally complete model of 
hemoglobin. This process is typical of the superposition family of dynamic representations. 
Similarly, Hilser and colleagues’ (2006) energy landscape ensemble representation of protein 
molecules in solution overlays thermodynamic information over the 3D structures of the 
microstate conformations (Fig. 10). 
 
113 An advocate of the dynamic concept could nevertheless argue that these structural representations are misleading, 
but it would be a mistake to say that they are incompatible with the contemporary understanding of proteins captured 
in the dynamic concept. 
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Figure 10 Energy Landscape Ensemble Representation (Hilser et al. 2006). Hypothetical energy funnel with 
local minima labeled with structures (only native structure shown). Republished with permission from Hilser et al. 
(2006); permission conveyed through Copyright Clearance Center, Inc. 
 
The single 3D structure, associated with the structural concept, remains in the new dynamic 
representation, but other accessible structures are represented along with the energy landscape that 
conveys information about the accessibility and stability of these various structures. These 
examples show that many of the dynamic representations associated with proteinD are more 
complete than previous structural representations, since no structural features that were previously 
represented are now omitted.114  
Unification is possible in this case because representing dynamic features of proteins does 
not preclude representing structural features. Mitchell (2019) acknowledges that features 
represented in different models can be combined to “form a single, more complete model,” if the 
features are “causally independent, partitionable into distinct subfeatures, or neatly mereologically 
nested” (180). In this case, I argue, the structural and dynamic features of proteins are largely 
 
114 Note that the representational “completeness” I invoke here is only relative: a representation of protein P associated 
with the dynamic concept that includes structural features A and B as well as dynamic features C and D will be more 
complete than a representation of P associated with the structural concept that includes only A and B, or only A, or 
only B. 
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partitionable. The relationship between these new more complete representations, which include 
structural and dynamic features, and the older structural representations is one of abstraction. To 
move from the dynamic representation back to a structural one, one need only abstract away the 
dynamic features from the representation to leave a static structure. 
The relationship between the dynamic and structural representations is actually slightly 
more complicated. Although the abstraction relation captures the epistemic relationship between 
dynamic and structural representations, something is lost in the transition—viz., there is no way 
via abstraction to identify a unique 3D structure of the protein. That is, there is no epistemically 
principled way to privilege one particular 3D structure over any of the other structures included in 
the ensemble representation or in the superposition of structures representation.115 In many cases 
of abstraction, certain features can be abstracted away because they are irrelevant to the feature 
one wants to represent in abstract or idealized form. Lockean abstraction of particulars works in 
this way (Rosen 2020). I can abstract away the material in which I find a triangle—for instance, 
whether it is drawn on a board or in the sand or made from three pieces of wood—to produce an 
abstract or idealized “triangle” precisely because the material from which it is made is irrelevant 
to its “triangle-ness.” We perform similar abstractions when we judge certain features to be 
causally or explanatorily irrelevant (Sober 1984). For instance, in explaining why some balls fit 
through a certain hole but others do not, we can abstract away and ignore the color of the ball in 
our explanation, since we judge the color to be causally irrelevant. Indeed, everything but the 
diameter of the ball can be abstracted away in this way.116  
 
115 Because an x-ray crystal structure averages over all the structures in the crystal, it is rather like Quetelet’s average 
man, so “it is highly improbable that at any instant in time one individual protein molecule has the average structure” 
(Karplus and McCammon 1986, 42). 
116 This example is from Sober (1984, p. 99). 
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But the structure and dynamics of a protein are not properties such that one can be 
abstracted away from the other in this way. The two properties are codependent. There is no sense 
in which dynamics could be said to be irrelevant to structure: the dynamic properties of a protein 
determine the range of structures it can adopt, and the structural features determine its range of 
dynamic flexibility. Although we can easily represent proteins in such a way that we reveal their 
structural features and hide their dynamic ones (indeed, this is the most common and simplest way 
to represent proteins), we cannot represent a singular structure of the protein as it would be without 
dynamics. There is no representation that would capture the abstract or idealized “pure structure” 
of the protein in a way analogous to the Lockean triangle, since no protein has a singular structure 
because of the inevitable dynamic properties.117 Thus, although one can abstract away the 
dynamics to convert a representation of the structural fluctuations of a protein into a static, 
structure without any fluctuations, the process of abstraction alone cannot be used to identify any 
one structure as the structural representation of the protein.  
My account of the relationship between structural and dynamic representations of proteins 
explains the persistence of structural representations despite conceptual replacement and also helps 
explain their usefulness in certain contexts. I agree with Mitchell that different scientific 
representations, which are inevitably partial, will be useful in different contexts. Because structural 
representations are related to dynamic representations via abstraction, it is not difficult to imagine 
contexts in which these simplified representations will be useful.118 For example, structural 
 
117 Here, I am not simply arguing that structure is context dependent. Even when we fix the relevant functional 
context—e.g., in a particular solution, in a particular cell type, etc.—the structure is still dynamic and therefore better 
represented as a multiplicity (or ensemble) of structures rather than a single 3D structure. The structural variation 
within the ensemble will of course vary depending on the protein and the context.  
118 It is reasonable to think of structural representations as simpler than the dynamic representation from which it is 
derived, since the former represents primarily one relevant feature (structure) while the latter represents two (structure 
and dynamics).  
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representations are still productively used in pedagogical settings. Structural representations figure 
in explanations of protein behavior that show up in textbook accounts of allostery (e.g., Garrett 
and Grisholm 2011). Unlike accounts of allostery that use ensemble representations of the dynamic 
concept, which require thermodynamic and equilibrium thinking (e.g., Hilser et al. 2012), these 
structural accounts involve mechanistic reasoning, which is more in line with folk physics and 
therefore easier for students to grasp. One of the early proponents of the dynamic concept of the 
protein, recognized this difference and cited it as a reason why explanations that used the dynamic 
representations associated with the dynamic concept were slow to be adopted: 
The concept that “conformational changes” are involved is widely accepted and is a 
comforting view since we might then picture the mechanism as similar to the relative 
motions of springs and levers and pulleys familiar from macroscopic machines. (Cooper 
1980, 474) 
 
Morange (2012) reiterates this point, specifically in the context of teaching. He claims that 
“everyone who has taught” biochemistry and structural biology knows that mechanistic 
explanations of protein behavior, which invoke the structural representations of the protein, are 
“understood much more rapidly” than thermodynamic explanations that use dynamic 
representations (Ibid., 14). Structural representations of the protein abstract away their dynamic 
features, but they can still help students and laypeople gain an understanding of protein behavior. 
Furthermore, these representations can be used to develop successful scientific explanations of 
protein behavior insofar as the proteins being studied approximate the static structures posited in 
the representations.   
In sum, I have argued that abstraction and de-idealization can often make sense of the 
relationship between structural and dynamic representations of proteins. My position is largely 
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compatible with Mitchell’s (2019) account.119 I have shown that the strategies of abstraction and 
de-idealization are essential to understanding the epistemic relationship between the 
representations associated with the two protein concepts. Generalizing from this case, I suspect 
that local unifications of representational outputs are common: the models and representations of 
the dynamic protein, which overlay dynamic features on structural representations, are a case in 
point. 
4.4.4 Philosophical Insights and Morals 
My analysis of concepts and representations of proteins has certain philosophical payoffs. 
For one, it provides a justification for the intuition that the dynamic concept of the protein provides 
a better way of explaining, predicting, and intervening on protein behavior than the previous 
structural concept. Relatedly, it also suggests that scientists should prefer more permissive and 
inclusive scientific concepts—i.e., ones that support more representations rather than fewer. And 
finally, the history of protein science highlights certain problems that can arise with the standard 
scientific strategy of beginning from a simpler representation—i.e., one that is more abstract or 
idealized—and later attempting to de-idealize to develop a more complete representation. In what 
follows, I will explore each of these three insights in turn.  
We might intuitively think that the new dynamic concept of the protein marks an 
improvement over the old structural concept, in part because we now know the two beliefs that 
 
119 Our accounts are compatible because we focus on different scientific procedures for combining features from 
different representations: Mitchell (2019) focuses on understanding strategies of integration whereas I focus on 
abstraction. Similarly, she focuses her analysis on features that are not partitionable into subfeatures, whereas I have 
argued that structural and dynamic features largely fit this description and hence can be combined into a unified 
representation. 
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form the core of the structural concept’s inferential role are false or misleading. It seems better to 
begin reasoning with a concept of the protein that from the start encourages scientists to attend to 
two causally relevant features of protein behavior (structure and dynamics) rather than just one 
(structure), especially when we have good empirical evidence for the prevalence and importance 
of that second causal feature (dynamics).120  
Brigandt’s (2010) account of conceptual change in science helps to confirm this intuition. 
Using his account, we can demonstrate that the change that occurs with the replacement of proteinS 
for proteinD is rational. Recall that, according to Brigandt, concepts have three components of 
semantic content: reference, inferential role, and epistemic goal. My analysis has already taken 
into account the first two components. However, it is this final component—“the epistemic goal 
pursued with the concept’s use” (Ibid., 19)—that enables us to judge the rationality of changes in 
the concept’s inferential role, or meaning. The primary epistemic goals that govern the use of the 
protein concept by molecular and structural biologists has remained the same since the heyday of 
the structural concept in the 1950s and 1960s. These scientists use the protein concept primarily 
because they aim to explain, predict, and potentially intervene upon protein function and behavior 
(see Table 1).121 These same general epistemic goals hold for those who endorsed the structural 
concept as well as those who advocate using the dynamic concept. According to Brigandt’s 
account, we can use the stability of the epistemic goals across conceptual change to judge the 
rationality of that change. If the new concept lets scientists better achieve the epistemic aims that 
 
120 The discovery of the ubiquity of functionally important intrinsically disordered (ID) proteins (i.e., proteins without 
stable 3D structure) as well as proteins with ID regions has highlighted the importance of dynamic properties of 
proteins (Oldfield and Dunker 2014). 
121 Brigandt (2010) argues that “epistemic goals can be assigned to those central concepts (at least in biology) that 
underwent conceptual change, such that this semantic change can be explained in these terms” (23). 
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motivated their use of the concept in the first place, then the change is warranted, thus making the 
conceptual change rational. 
The shift from proteinS to proteinD, I argue, fits this pattern: the new concept promotes the 
achievement of the epistemic goals that motivated its use. First, the dynamic concept, with its 
associated representations, enables scientists to explain more cases of protein function. As we saw 
in the previous section, the dynamic concept supports more diverse representations than the 
structural concept. Included among the set of representations associated with the dynamic concept 
(but not the structural one) are ensemble representations. Scientists have identified examples of 
protein behaviors, such as allostery and catalysis, that cannot be explained using structural 
representations of proteins but instead require explanations that use these ensemble representations 
(Hilser et al. 2012, Motlagh et al. 2014). The new concept thus improves the epistemic goal of 
explanation of protein behavior since it supports both the mechanistic explanations that invoke 
structural representations of proteins as well as these explanations that require dynamic 
representations of proteins.  
Second, the dynamic concept also enables better predictions of protein behavior. In 
particular, the use of the thermodynamic framework, which identifies structural changes with 
enthalpy (∆H) and dynamic changes with entropy (∆S), enables scientists to predict when protein 
behaviors that have previously been explained using only structural representations will fail 
(Reinhart et al. 1989). These explanations abstract away dynamics and thus fail to consider the 
role of entropy. They are therefore likely to incorrectly predict protein behavior in cases in which 
there are large changes in entropy, or in cases in which the relative contribution of entropy 
increases, for instance when the temperature increases. By accounting for entropy, the dynamic 
concept marks an improvement over the structural concept in predicting protein behavior.  
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Finally, these improvements in the ability to explain and predict protein behavior, which 
occur when scientists use proteinD rather than proteinS, further enhance scientists’ ability to 
intervene. For example, antiretroviral drugs that bind to HIV proteins are more effective if they 
complement the structure of the viral protein but also take into account changes in the dynamic 
properties of the protein that occur upon binding the drug (Neal 2019). Thus, the dynamic concept 
provides these biomedical researchers a better starting point for considering the relevant causal 
factors. Having considered all three of the primary epistemic goals of the protein concept, we can 
conclude that this change in inferential role that accompanies the shift from the structural to the 
dynamic concept is rational, “since the revised inferential role [of the dynamic concept]…meets 
the epistemic goal to a higher degree than the previous inferential role [of the structural concept]” 
(Brigandt 2010, 24). My analysis confirms our intuitions and gives us good reasons to side with 
the scientific advocates of the dynamic concept of the protein. 
We can also draw two tentative philosophical morals about scientific concepts and 
representations from this case study of rational change in protein science. Let us first consider what 
the protein case can tell us about what makes one concept better than another. All the features of 
the dynamic concept that make it a better tool for scientists who aim to explain, predict, or 
intervene on protein behavior are related to the fact that the inferential role of this protein concept 
is more inclusive than that of the structural concept. It guides the scientist to consider structure and 
dynamics as co-determinants of protein function whereas the inferential role of the structural 
concept led to exclusive focus on structure. From this, we might generalize that a concept that 
guides scientists’ attention to more rather than fewer relevant causal factors and consequently 
supports the development of more diverse representations will prove a better starting point for 
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explanation, prediction, and intervention.122 Although representations are necessarily partial, 
concepts are not. There are no in principle limits on what the inferential role of a concept can 
contain. Even though scientific users of more inclusive concepts will still have to engage in a 
selection process when they set out to represent the phenomena, these scientists will be more aware 
of the partiality of their representations and the features of the phenomena omitted.  
This case can also tell us something about scientific representations. I argued in the 
previous section that a scientist could typically switch between a structural and dynamic 
representation via abstraction or de-idealization. The process of abstracting dynamics from 
dynamic representations that include both dynamic and structural features of proteins—e.g., 
Frauenfelder’s superposition representation of myoglobin—is relatively straightforward. The 
reverse process of de-idealization is often not so simple. For example, developing a dynamic 
representation from a structural one may require the development of completely novel 
representations. Hilser’s energy landscape ensemble representation is a case in point (see Fig. 10). 
Unlike abstracting the dynamic features from Frauenfelder’s representation, the development of 
this dynamic representation from a structural one is a scientific achievement. At the 
representational level, abstraction is typically an easier process than de-idealization. Beginning 
from a more inclusive concept that guides scientists to consider more causally relevant features 
from the outset might prove an easier strategy than attempting to de-idealize from a partial 
representation.  
Reasoning from the structural concept poses another risk: the scientist who develops an 
explanation of protein behavior using structural representations of the protein may think that if an 
 
122 Of course, this can be no more than a general heuristic. Much will likely depend on the particular context in which 
we want to explain or intervene 
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explanation of this sort can be given, then the dynamic features of the protein do not matter.123 
Advocates of the dynamic concept have long argued that this is not so (Cooper 1980, Reinhart et 
al. 1989). The dynamic concept tells us that there is no principled reason to privilege structural 
features in this way, thus even if a structural explanation can be given, it may still turn out that 
dynamics are the driver of a particular protein behavior. The general moral here, then, is that the 
strategy of beginning with the simplest representation and then de-idealizing as needed can pose 
an epistemic risk, but reasoning from a more expansive concept can help ameliorate this risk.  
4.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have conducted a systematic analysis of protein concepts and 
representations in order to understand the conceptual change in protein science as well as the 
relationship among the diversity of representations of proteins. I have distinguished two concepts 
of the protein—proteinS and proteinD—and have argued that former is being replaced by the latter. 
At the level of representations, I have argued that the relationship between structural and dynamic 
representations is best understood as one of abstraction and de-idealization. Because these two 
features of proteins are largely partitionable, it is possible to either combine them into more 
complete representations of proteins or to abstract one away leaving a more partial representation. 
By distinguishing the conceptual and the representation levels, my account explains why the 
dynamic concept, which is a more expansive concept supporting more representations of proteins, 
 
123 There are interesting parallels between this example and debates about neutral selection in evolutionary biology. 
Advocates of neutral selection have argued that we should not begin with adaptationist accounts and then only consider 
the possibility of neutral selection when those fail (Koonin 2016). Instead, we should consider the possibility of either 
neutral selection or adaptations from the beginning.  
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is a better conceptual tool. It further explains why replacement at the conceptual level does not 
lead to similar replacement of structural representations at the representational level. 
Using Brigandt’s (2010) account of conceptual change, I have shown that the shift from 
proteinS to proteinD is part of the rational development of protein science, since the use of this new 
concept enables scientists to better achieve their epistemic goals. I have also drawn two 
philosophical morals. This analysis, I suggest, demonstrates the benefits of reasoning with more 
inclusive scientific concepts, and it has also revealed certain epistemic risks associated with the 
reductive approach of beginning with the simplest representation and de-idealizing as needed. 
Although these philosophical morals are tentative since they have been drawn from this one case 
in protein science, they would be worth investigating in other areas of molecular and structural 
biology.       
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5.0 Ensemble Explanation of Protein Function: A Philosophical Account of a Novel Type of 
Explanation in the Biological Sciences 
5.1 Introduction 
Philosophers of science and biology have argued that mechanistic explanation is the 
dominant type of explanation in the biological sciences, especially in the molecular life sciences 
(Machamer et al. 2000, Craver 2007, Bechtel and Richardson 2010). On this view, scientists 
explain by decomposing biological systems into molecular components and then describing how 
these lower-level components interact to produce the higher-level behavior of the system. Indeed, 
uncovering the molecular mechanisms responsible for heredity, metabolism, and diseases, such as 
cancer, has been one of the central explanatory goals of the biological sciences since the middle 
of the twentieth century. This trend of molecularization in the life sciences has led to a presumption 
that advances in biological knowledge will come from mechanistic explanations that drill deeper, 
contain more details, and invoke more highly refined molecular structures.124 Within molecular 
and structural biology, this trend has been particularly pronounced. Since the discovery of the 
DNA double helix, champions of molecular biology have claimed that advances in structural 
techniques would render the 3D structures of DNA, RNA, and proteins visible, and from these 
high-resolution structures we would then be able to determine the functions of these molecules 
and explain their role in various biological processes (Monod 1965).  
 
124 See Kaplan and Craver 2011, but see also Kaplan and Craver 2020, in which they moderate their commitment to 
‘the more details the better’ account of mechanistic explanation.  
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Recently, however, molecular life scientists have begun to develop an alternative type of 
explanation—ensemble explanation—to understand and explain protein behavior. Unlike earlier 
mechanistic explanations, ensemble explanations do not cite structural changes in individual 
protein molecules as the cause of protein behaviors, such as catalysis, binding, and allostery. 
Proponents of these explanations reject the structural view that maintains that a protein has a 
largely stable and rigid 3D structure, and instead adopt a dynamic view that holds that proteins in 
solution are undergoing constant structural fluctuations. Whereas mechanistic explanations focus 
on changes in the average structure of a protein molecule, ensemble explanations consider changes 
in the thermodynamic properties of a population of protein molecules in solution. They use a novel 
ensemble representation of proteins to capture both their structural and dynamic properties.  
In this chapter, I develop an account of ensemble explanation of protein behavior. These 
explanations deserve philosophical attention, since they are becoming increasingly common in 
structural and molecular biology as scientists recognize the importance of dynamic properties of 
proteins (Motlagh et al. 2014; Morange 2017, 2020). My account shows that scientists have not 
simply modified mechanistic explanations to include protein dynamics. Instead, they have 
developed ensemble explanations as a novel type of explanation to deal with the added complexity 
of protein dynamics.   
In what follows, I first present my account of ensemble explanation of protein behavior 
(Sec. 5.2). To capture protein dynamics, these explanations represent a population of protein 
molecules as an ensemble of structurally distinct microstates. They cite changes in the equilibrium 
distribution of protein molecules across microstates, caused by perturbations, to explain protein 
functions. After developing my account, I then compare ensemble explanations to two different 
philosophical accounts of explanation: equilibrium explanation and causal explanation in 
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thermodynamics. I argue that these explanations in protein science do not fit the model of 
equilibrium explanations discussed in the philosophical literature (Sec. 5.3). The equilibria in 
ensemble explanations—i.e., the equilibrium distributions of microstates—do not play the right 
explanatory role. Instead, I argue that ensemble explanations are a species of causal explanation 
(Sec. 5.4), similar to but distinct from causal explanations in thermodynamics. Their major 
innovation, however, is their difference from mechanistic explanations and their focus on protein 
dynamics as well as structure to explain protein function.   
5.2 Account of Ensemble Explanation 
Ensemble explanations of protein behavior are a new type of explanation in structural and 
molecular biology. In a field dominated by mechanistic explanations, these explanations are 
strikingly different. Whereas mechanistic explanations of protein behavior focus primarily on the 
relationship between structure and function, ensemble explanations capture the role of dynamics 
as well as structure in bringing about protein function. To represent protein dynamics, ensemble 
explanations shift the primary unit of analysis from an individual molecule to a population or 
ensemble of molecules. Moreover, these new explanations include thermodynamic reasoning 
typically missing from mechanistic accounts.    
To characterize this new type of explanation, I will focus on allostery, which is one of the 
simplest and most general protein behaviors with important regulatory functions (Cui and Karplus 
2008). Allostery, as traditionally defined, is the process whereby binding of a ligand at one site on 
a protein affects binding of another molecule at a distal site. Beginning in the 1960s, scientists 
developed mechanistic explanations to account for this seeming action at a distance. These 
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mechanistic explanations of allostery cited a structural, or conformational, change in a protein 
molecule upon binding the first ligand that alters the second binding site, which in turn affects its 
affinity for the second ligand  (Monod et al. 1963, 1965; Koshland et al. 1966). These explanations 
of allostery fit within the dominant static view of proteins, since an allosteric protein was assumed 
to have only two discrete structures or conformations.   
Scientists have recently developed alternative ensemble explanations of the same 
phenomenon (Hilser et al. 2012, Motlagh et al. 2014). These scientists reject the static view of 
proteins and instead endorse the new, dynamic view, which stresses the fact that a protein molecule 
does not have a stable 3D structure in solution but instead undergoes constant motion (Cooper 
1976, 1980). A population of protein molecules thus will not all adopt one or two discrete 
structures, as the mechanistic models assumed. Instead, individual molecules will be wandering 
through conformational space, and the population at any instant in time will include a multiplicity 
of heterogeneous structures. While mechanistic explanations used an idealized representation of 
the protein as a static molecule with stable structure, ensemble explanations were intentionally 
designed in order to capture the dynamic properties of protein molecules. In these explanations, a 
population of protein molecules is represented as an ensemble of structural microstates. The 
distribution of microstates is energetically-weighted, with more thermodynamically stable 
microstates more populated at any moment in time than less stable microstates. Allostery, 
according to this account, is not a property of an individual protein molecule but rather a property 
of the ensemble. An ensemble explanation of allostery therefore does not cite structural changes 
in a protein molecule but instead cites changes in the distribution of microstates that occur upon 
perturbation by the allosteric ligand. 
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Let us look more closely at the two major features of these explanations, beginning with 
the microstates. Each microstate within the ensemble has only three explanatorily relevant 
properties. First, each microstate has a thermodynamic stability, given by the Gibbs free energy, 
∆G. For any microstate j, ∆Gj is an individual property of the microstate, not dependent on the 
other microstates.125 At a given temperature and pressure, the ∆G for the microstate is fixed. It will 
depend upon structural features of the protein, such as the interaction among amino acid sidechains 
in the hydrophobic core of the protein as well as the interaction between amino acid sidechains 
and the solvent (e.g., water). For example, a microstate structure with a hydrophobic region 
exposed to the solution will be less stable than another conformation with only hydrophilic 
residues exposed, all things being equal.  
Second, each microstate will have binding affinities for various ligands. These will be 
described by the dissociation constants, KD, which measure the rate at which the protein-ligand 
(PL) complex dissociates at equilibrium: 𝑃𝐿 ⇌ 𝑃 + 𝐿. KD is given by the following equation 




in which the protein-ligand complex [PL], free protein [P], and ligand [L] are concentrations in 
moles. The smaller the KD for a particular ligand, the more strongly it binds the protein.  To exhibit 
allostery, a protein must be capable of binding at least two ligands. In the most idealized case, the 
binding affinity for the two ligands is considered to be qualitative (Fig. 11). 126 Each domain in the 
 
125 The distinction I am drawing here does not map on to previous philosophical accounts of properties, such as Locke’s 
primary and secondary properties or Aristotle’s essential and accidental properties. Nor does it map on to the scientific 
description of intensive and extensive properties. Instead, it maps onto the distinction between individual and 
relational properties that Sarkar (2008) introduces in his analysis of frequency-dependent selection. In this case, what 
makes a property an individual property is the fact that it does not require reference to any other microstates or other 
properties of the ensemble.   
126 This figure depicts an example of heterotropic allostery, in which the allosteric ligand and the binding ligand are 
different. However, this account could also be used to explain homotropic allostery, in which the allosteric and binding 
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R (relaxed) state will, by definition, have a high affinity binding site for its ligand (KD ≈ 0), whereas 
in the T (tensed) state, the domain is assumed to have no affinity (KD ≈ ∞).127 Like ∆G, the binding 
affinity of a microstate for a given ligand is an individual property, independent from the properties 
of the other microstates. It is fixed for a given protein-ligand complex, since it depends only on 
the electrostatic and steric features of the ligand and the binding domain.  
 
Figure 11 Two Domain Allosteric Protein. In the RR state (left, blue), domain I binds Ligand A (red circle) with 
high affinity and domain II binds Ligand B (yellow rectangle) with high affinity. In the TT state (left, black), each 
domain has no binding affinity for either ligand.  
 
The third relevant explanatory property of each microstate is its probability, Pj. The 
probability of a microstate describes its frequency in the given ensemble. It depends on the relative 
thermodynamic stability of the microstate compared to the other microstates in the ensemble. For 
instance, a microstate with a lower free energy will be more stable than one with a higher free 
energy and thus will be populated by more protein molecules at any given time. Therefore, the 
probability of a given microstate Pj is not an individual property but rather a relational property. 
The probability for any microstate is only fixed within a given ensemble distribution. In other 
words, it depends on the state of the ensemble distribution. This dependence is evident from the 
mathematical representation: 
 
ligands are the same (e.g., O2 in hemoglobin binding). Using the heterotropic case as the exemplar makes it easier to 
distinguish the two ligands and their respective roles. 
127 These assumptions about KD are examples of Galilean idealization (McMullin 1985). They are easily de-idealized 
using the mathematical formalism developed alongside this qualitative description of ensemble explanations.  
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The value of the probability Pj for a given microstate is determined by the statistical-weighted free 
energy of that microstate (Sj) and the partition function (Q). While the former depends only on the 
thermodynamic free energy of that microstate (∆Gj), the latter is the sum of all the weighted 
microstates in the ensemble: 
𝑄 =  ∑ 𝑆𝑖 
𝑖
. 
It thus depends on the thermodynamic properties of all the other microstates in the ensemble and 
describes the ensemble distribution. Changes in the free energies of other microstates in the 
ensemble will perturb the ensemble distribution, which will in turn affect the Pj for each 
microstate.  
The ensemble itself is the other major feature of ensemble explanations. Imported from 
statistical mechanics, this representation provides a novel approach to explaining protein behavior. 
By representing the structural heterogeneity of protein molecules in solution, it enables these 
explanations to take into account the causal role of dynamics in bringing about protein functions. 
Using this representation requires two idealizing assumptions about the dynamics of protein 
molecules in solution. Most importantly, the interpretation of the ensemble as representing protein 
dynamics arises from the ergodic hypothesis of statistical thermodynamics (Frigg 2008). Applied 
to this particular case, the ergodic hypothesis tells us that the instantaneous ensemble distribution 
that shows the weighted distributions of molecules across microstates at any given moment mirrors 
the  temporal evolution of an individual protein molecule wandering through conformation space 
over time. The assumption of ergodicity shows why we can interpret the ensemble as encoding the 
dynamic properties of a single protein molecule. Thus, any explanation that cites changes in the 
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ensemble to explain observed protein behavior will necessarily also include information about the 
dynamic properties of that particular type of protein. The second assumption is that a given 
population of protein molecules in solution, unless perturbed, will be at thermodynamic 
equilibrium. Although individual molecules will be constantly interconverting between microstate 
structures, the population of molecules as a whole will preserve the equilibrium distribution of 
microstates. 128   
Given these assumptions, an ensemble explanation can explain almost any protein behavior 
by citing a change in the equilibrium distribution of microstates that occurs upon perturbation of 
the system and then comparing the associated changes in the probabilities of microstates with 
various properties. To give an ensemble explanation of the allosteric response to a ligand, for 
example, one must identify the relevant microstates and determine their three explanatorily 
relevant properties—e.g., thermodynamic stabilities, ligand affinities, and probabilities. This 
information alone is sufficient to describe the preexisting ensemble equilibrium distribution (Fig. 
12, left). The addition of the allosteric ligand then perturbs the preexisting equilibrium, by 
preferentially binding and stabilizing certain microstates. As depicted in the dotted arrows in 
Figure 12, binding of the allosteric ligand effects a change in the thermodynamic stability of each 
microstate, increasing the stability (lowering the ∆G) for all microstates it binds. 
 
 
128 Both of these assumptions—ergodicity and equilibrium—are background assumptions necessary for ensemble 
explanations. In other words, one has to accept that the biological systems of interest in this case are typically ergodic 
and that populations of protein molecules are in approximate equilibrium unless perturbed. An ensemble explanation 
itself does not explain why these assumptions are legitimate. It does not, for example, provide an explanation for why 
we can use the ergodic hypothesis or explain any other features of the foundations of statistical mechanics. Instead, it 
imports these background assumptions from physics, along with the ensemble representation, and uses them in the 
explanation of protein behavior. 
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Figure 12 Example of Ensemble Allostery. Following Figure 11, domain I is represented by a circle and domain II 
by a square. Blue domains are in the R state, capable of binding ligand A or B, for domains I and II, respectively. 
Black domains are in the T state, incapable of binding either ligand. Left panel shows the preexisting equilibrium of 
the three functionally-defined microstates. The probability of the microstates that are capable of binding ligand A 
(i.e., domain I in the R state: RR and RT) is 0.28. Right panel shows the redistribution of the ensemble caused by the 
addition of ligand B, which binds and stabilizes microstates RR and TR. Ligand B is a positive allosteric effector, 
since the probability of microstates that can bind A (i.e., RR and RT) increases: PI,R = ~0.78. Adapted from Hilser et 
al. 2012, Fig. 3, p. 592. 
 
The thermodynamic stabilization of those microstates, leads to changes in their probabilities, 
which in turn leads to a redistribution of all the microstates in the ensemble (Fig. 12, right).129 To 
explain the observed allosteric effect, the new equilibrium is compared to the preexisting 
equilibrium. When the addition of the allosteric ligand leads to an ensemble distribution in which 
the probabilities of the subset of microstates capable of binding the second ligand is higher than 
before, this change explains why the ligand is a positive allosteric effector (i.e., why the allosteric 
ligand increased the protein’s affinity for the second ligand). In an ensemble explanation of 
allostery, it is the change that occurs upon perturbation to the equilibrium distribution of 
microstates that is cited to explain the observed allosteric effect.  
 
129 The return to a new equilibrium after perturbation occurs because of the law of mass action, in accordance with Le 
Chatelier’s principle (Chang 2003). That is, the binding of the allosteric ligand to a particular microstate creates a new 
species, removing it from the previous equilibrium. Consequently, the previous equilibrium shifts in the direction of 
the microstate structure that that can bind the allosteric ligand. The process that governs the change in equilibrium 
will be further discussed in Sec. 4.2 in the context of the interventionist framework of causal explanation. 
   
 174 
A further clarification is in order. Ensemble explanations of allostery can be thought to 
involve answers to two distinct why-questions. The first is the one just discussed: why does a 
particular protein system exhibit changes in affinity for a second ligand after the introduction of 
an allosteric ligand? The answer given by the ensemble explanation in this case is that the allosteric 
ligand drove the ensemble equilibrium distribution to a new equilibrium that favored microstates 
with higher affinity for the second ligand.130 But one might also ask a second question of this 
system, namely, why does the allosteric ligand perturb the equilibrium distribution of microstates? 
The answer to this question invokes laws of chemistry that show that ligand binding leads to the 
stabilization of the protein. In this case, the binding of the allosteric ligand to a particular microstate 
stabilizes that microstate—reducing its ∆G—and thereby altering one of its three explanatorily 
relevant properties. When we apply this chemical fact to the ensemble representation, we see that 
this change in the free energy of those microstates that bind the allosteric ligand leads to a change 
in their probability (Pj) in the ensemble. Since the Pj for a given microstate is a relational property, 
this intervention on a certain subset of microstates to alter their Pj leads to a change in this property 
for all the microstates, which in turn constitutes a new equilibrium distribution of microstates. 
5.3 Equilibrium Explanations 
One of the major innovations of ensemble explanations is the use of the ensemble to 
represent protein dynamics. Within the ensemble, the distribution of protein molecules across 
 
130 A similar explanation can be given to account for changes in protein behavior caused by other factors: e.g., a change 
in temperature or pH causes a change in the behavior of a protein system because it perturbs the equilibrium 
distribution of microstates.  
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microstates is assumed to be at thermodynamic equilibrium, and perturbations to the system lead 
to a redistribution of molecules across microstates and the establishment of a new ensemble 
equilibrium distribution. Because of the central role of the ensemble equilibrium, it is worth 
considering whether ensemble explanations are a species of equilibrium explanation. Sober (1983) 
first characterized equilibrium explanation as a type of explanation in evolutionary biology, but it 
has gained attention more recently as philosophers of science have debated whether it is a type of 
causal or noncausal explanation.131 In what follows, I first present the canonical account of 
equilibrium explanation, focusing primarily on those features that distinguish it from paradigmatic 
cases of causal explanation (Sec. 5.3.1). I then argue that despite their invocation of equilibria, 
ensemble explanations fail to fit this pattern of explanation (Sec. 5.3.2). 
5.3.1 Canonical Account of Equilibrium Explanation 
In “Equilibrium Explanation,” Sober (1983) characterizes what he considers to be a novel 
type of noncausal explanation. He generalizes from R.A. Fisher’s (1931) explanation for why 
many species reproduce with a one-to-one sex ratio at birth. According to Fisher, a population will 
reach and maintain a one-to-one sex ratio because it is a stable equilibrium: if at any time the 
population diverges from this ratio, parental pairs who over-produce the minority sex will be 
favored by natural selection. The action of natural selection will maintain a one-to-one sex ratio 
and will return any population that happens to deviate from this ratio back to one-to-one. The 
explanation only holds for populations that satisfy certain empirical assumptions—i.e., the parents 
 
131 Sober (1983) claims equilibrium explanation is an example of noncausal explanation but more recently, certain 
philosophers have argued it is a variety of causal explanation, see, e.g., Woodward (2003) and Strevens (2008).  
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must mate randomly and invest equally in daughters and sons, reproductive strategies must be 
variable and heritable, and the sex ratio must never drift to fixation. But for those populations that 
satisfy (or approximately satisfy) these assumptions, the one-to-one sex ratio at birth can be 
explained by appeal to Fisher’s equilibrium explanation. What is curious about this type of 
explanation, according to Sober, is that it explains without appeal to actual causes.132 Fisher’s 
account explains the one-to-one sex ratio of a population without specifying the actual causal 
trajectory that led the population to this sex ratio.  
Strevens (2008) offers another example of an equilibrium explanation, using a mechanical 
example. He aims to explain why a ball placed on the inside lip of a basin rolls back and forth and 
ultimately comes to rest at the lowest point at the bottom of the basin.133 He agrees with Sober’s 
analysis that the best explanation of this phenomenon will not cite the initial position of the ball 
and trace its actual trajectory through the basin, but instead will cite the dissipation of motion 
through friction as the ball traverses the basin, the net force of gravity that pulls it down to the 
bottom, and the absence of any net force acting on the ball when it reaches the lowest point in the 
basin. Although Strevens and Sober disagree as to whether equilibrium explanations such as these 
are causal, there is a broad consensus that these explanations have certain features that make them 
different from paradigmatic cases of causal explanation.134  
 
132 In a bit more detail, Sober claims that this equilibrium explanation does not cite the actual cause but rather a 
disjunction of three possible causes: (1 and 2) if, at an earlier time, the population overproduced males (or females), 
then selection favoring females (or males) brought the sex ratio back to one-to-one, or (3) if the population was already 
at one-to-one at an earlier time, then selection against parental pairs that overproduced either males or females were 
selected against to maintain this ratio. Fisher’s explanation, according to Sober, cites this disjunction of possible causes 
to explain the sex ratio in a particular population at a given time.  
133 Strevens (2008), p. 267-8. 
134 In this section, I will sidestep the issue of whether paradigm equilibrium explanations are causal or noncausal. All 
that is required for my analysis is the acknowledgement that equilibrium explanations have certain features that 
distinguish them from paradigmatic cases of causal explanation that cite lower-level causal trajectories. When I refer 
to “paradigmatic causal explanation” or use similar terminology, I mean to draw a contrast between an equilibrium 
explanation like Fisher’s that does not cite the lower-level causal trajectory of a population through time and an 
explanation of the same phenomenon that does map out the causes and forces acting on the population through time 
 177 
From these two examples, we can identify the key features of equilibrium explanations that 
distinguish them from paradigmatic causal explanation. First, equilibrium explanations are “deep” 
explanations. According to Strevens, they “strip away vast quantities of apparently relevant, large-
scale causal detail” in order to “account for the phenomena in terms of a small number of abstract 
properties of the generating systems’ causal dynamics” (Strevens 2008, 137).135 Second, 
equilibrium explanations do not cite the actual causal trajectory that brought about the 
explanandum phenomenon; that is, they do not trace the causal evolution of the system. Instead, 
they present a “disjunction of possible causal scenarios” (Sober 1983, 204). Although the actual 
causal scenario is included as one of the disjuncts, the explanation does not specify which. For 
example, any ball placed on the lip of Strevens’ basin will have a particular trajectory as it travels 
around and down the basin, but the equilibrium explanation for the ball’s coming to rest at the 
bottom will not specify that path. It will instead cite the fact that the ball was placed somewhere 
on the lip of the basin along with certain properties of the basin and the relevant physics.  
Third, paradigmatic cases of equilibrium explanation, such as the two described above, 
have a single, global equilibrium. For instance, according to Fisher’s explanation no matter where 
a population starts—i.e., whether it produces more daughters or sons—it will eventually end in the 
same place, namely, at a one-to-one sex ratio. Less paradigmatic cases may lack a global 
equilibrium, but they will still have a wide basin of attraction. Equilibrium explanations require 
either global equilibria or equilibria with wide basins of attraction, since it is this structural feature 
 
to show the production of the sex ratio at a later time. It seems, even most philosophers who claim equilibrium 
explanations are causal would accept this rather minimal distinction (see, e.g., Kuorikoski 2007, Sperry-Taylor 2019, 
Woodward 2003, 2018).  
135 The depth that is relevant to equilibrium explanations is Strevens’ second axis of depth. (The first requires drilling 
down to fundamental physics.) According to Strevens (2008), explanations with depth along this second axis share 
“an unusual degree of generality” (137).  
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of the system that enables the explanation to omit information about the precise initial conditions 
and particular causal mechanism. The more local the equilibrium becomes the more causal detail 
must be included, making these explanations less distinct from standard causal explanations (Sober 
1983).  
Fourth, according to most philosophical accounts, equilibrium explanations work by first 
describing the structure and dynamics of a system that includes an attractor and then providing 
sufficient information about the initial conditions to show that they are likely to fall within the 
domain of attraction. Taken together, these features explain why a particular system is at or tends 
toward equilibrium. It is precisely these structural and dynamic features of the system that enable 
equilibrium explanations to omit so much causal detail and explain abstractly (Woodward 2018). 
For instance, Fisher’s explanation of sex ratios at birth explains this phenomenon because it 
describes the structure of the population and the dynamics which demonstrate the one-to-one sex 
ratio to be a stable equilibrium. Any perturbation that disturbs the equilibrium ratio will be 
unstable, and the action of natural selection will work to return the population to a one-to-one sex 
ratio. It is this story about the structure of the system and the dynamics that render the actual causal 
trajectory of any given population, in this case, irrelevant to the explanation (Woodward 2018, 
Strevens 2008).  
Fifth and finally, although they may be used to explain token events (e.g., why a particular 
population has a one-to-one sex ratio at a given time or why a ball placed at a particular location 
on the lip comes to rest at the bottom of the basin), equilibrium explanations, some have argued, 
are distinguished from paradigmatic causal explanations by their ability to explain patterns of 
behavior shared by different systems (Kuorikoski 2007). Fisher’s explanation, for instance, 
explains why any population at any time will either be at or tending toward the equilibrium sex 
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ratio. The explanation picks out the abstract structure and dynamics of the system, thereby 
identifying the minimum relevant features necessary for the system to evolve to its equilibrium 
state. Hence, an equilibrium explanation will show why many seemingly different systems all 
evolve to the same state. 
5.3.2 Ensemble Explanations are Not Equilibrium Explanations 
Each of the five key features of equilibrium explanation just discussed can be thought of 
as distinguishing equilibrium explanation from paradigmatic cases of causal explanation. 
Equilibrium explanations are (1) deep explanations (2) that do not trace low level causal 
relationships. Moreover, they involve systems that (3) exhibit global rather than local equilibria, 
which (4) makes the precise initial conditions of the system irrelevant, and (5) they consequently 
better explain patterns rather than token events. Sober (1983) argues that paradigmatic cases of 
equilibrium and causal explanation are on opposite ends of a continuum, with equilibrium 
explanations losing their distinctive characteristics as the equilibrium becomes more and more 
local. As the dominant type of causal explanation in molecular biology, mechanistic explanations 
are on one side of this continuum. I compare these explanations to ensemble explanations of 
allostery to determine whether we ought to consider the latter to be on the opposite side of the 
continuum, as a species of equilibrium explanation. Although ensemble explanations are deeper 
than mechanistic explanations, they nevertheless resemble paradigmatic cases of causal 
explanation along most of the other dimensions. They are therefore sufficiently distinct from 
equilibrium explanations to merit their own account of explanation.  
Let us first consider the depth of ensemble explanations. Strevens’ description of 
explanatory depth includes two features that it is useful to distinguish. He claims explanations are 
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deep because they exhibit “an unusual degree of generality” and also because they are “so abstract” 
(2008, 137). However, as Darden (1996) has argued, in biological explanations, abstraction and 
generality need not overlap. With respect to mechanistic explanation, abstraction refers to the 
amount of detail included in the description of the mechanism, whereas generality describes the 
scope, or the domain over which the mechanism holds (Machamer et al. 2000). A mechanistic 
explanation could be quite abstract, blackboxing many causal details, but also be quite limited in 
scope or generality, applying to only a small domain. This distinction between abstraction and 
generality can illuminate the relationship between mechanistic and ensemble explanations vis-à-
vis explanatory depth. On my view, both types of explanations can be pitched at similar degrees 
of abstraction, while ensemble explanations are more general explanations that apply to a larger 
domain of target phenomena.  
If we consider explanatory depth in terms of abstraction, then ensemble explanations are 
not necessarily any deeper than mechanistic explanations of allostery. In other words, these 
explanations do not strip away more causal or structural details about allosteric proteins and their 
ligands than mechanistic explanations. Both explanations can either include or abstract away these 
details. Early mechanistic explanations of allostery cited a structural or conformational change in 
an individual protein molecule to explain the observed effect: binding of the allosteric ligand at 
one site caused a conformational change that affected binding of another ligand at a second site on 
the protein. In the 1960s, when this mechanism was first proposed, there was little knowledge 
about the 3D structure of proteins, so the relevant features of allosteric proteins were described 
abstractly, i.e., functionally (Monod et al. 1965, Koshland et al. 1966). These proteins were 
represented as capable of adopting two different structures, but the structures were not described 
structurally (and certainly not in atomic-level detail); rather, they were characterized functionally 
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by their affinity for particular ligands. The  R (relaxed) state could bind the allosteric ligand with 
high affinity, while the T (tensed) state was unable to bind the ligand. Even today, this abstract 
explanation—what we might call the mechanism schema (Machamer et al. 2000)—is still taken to 
explain allostery in certain protein-ligand systems.136  
Ensemble explanations of allostery can be similarly abstract. They represent a population 
of protein molecules as an ensemble of microstate structures, each with different functional 
properties (e.g., with different thermodynamic stabilities and binding affinities for various 
ligands). The addition of the allosteric ligand perturbs the system and leads to a new equilibrium 
distribution of microstates. The microstate structures in ensemble explanations can be 
characterized at a similar degree of abstraction as the R and T state structures in mechanistic 
explanations of allostery. Thus, it is not the case that ensemble explanations are deeper 
explanations, if we measure depth in terms of degrees of abstraction.137 In fact, if anything, 
ensemble explanations include more causal detail, since they require both structural and dynamic 
information about protein microstates.138  
However, when we consider explanatory depth in terms of generality, we see that ensemble 
explanations of allostery are more general because they have a wider scope than mechanistic 
explanations. The MWC model, which was the first mechanistic explanation of allostery, was 
 
136 Of course, the functional properties that make a binding site high affinity for a ligand in one conformation and low 
affinity for that same ligand in the other conformation are instantiated in particular structures. But one need not cite 
these structures in order to give an explanation of allostery according to the MWC or KNF models.   
137 Explanatory depth as a measure of abstraction does not seem to capture what was special about equilibrium 
explanations, since the paradigmatic type of causal explanation in structural biology, viz., mechanistic explanations, 
can have depth of this sort by blackboxing certain features by describing them functionally. Moreover, Strevens’ 
notion of explanatory depth that tracks abstraction is not included in other accounts of explanatory depth, which focus 
instead on the generality of the explanation (e.g., Hitchcock and Woodward 2003).   
138 The representations of proteins and microstates that figure in mechanistic and ensemble explanations can include 
more or less information about protein structure, but any additional structural features beyond those already included 
in the explanation would be relevant only to a particular case and would not be part of a generic mechanistic or 
ensemble explanation of allostery. 
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proposed as a general mechanism schema that could explain the behavior of all allosteric proteins 
(Monod et al. 1965). However, it soon became apparent that this model could not account for the 
behavior of certain allosteric systems. For example, although it could account for cases of positive 
cooperativity, in which binding of the allosteric ligand increases the binding affinity for the second 
ligand, it could not explain negative cooperativity, in which the allosteric ligand decreases the 
affinity of the protein for the second ligand. Koshland and colleagues (1966) noted this 
shortcoming and developed a new mechanistic model to account for both positive and negative 
cooperativity. Much later, a whole new class of allosteric proteins were discovered that could not 
be explained with mechanistic models that cite a conformational change between two structures. 
These proteins were intrinsically disordered (or included intrinsically disordered regions) and 
consequently had no stable 3D structure, yet they still exhibited allosteric behavior (Wright and 
Dyson 1999, Hilser and Thompson 2007, Tompa 2011). Thus, we now know that mechanistic 
explanations of allostery that focus on structural changes have a limited scope.  
Ensemble explanations, in contrast, are more general in scope. An ensemble explanation 
can be given for allosteric proteins that have primarily two structures (and therefore approximate 
the earlier mechanistic models of allostery) as well as those proteins that lack well-defined 
structure (and hence cannot be explained mechanistically). Proponents of ensemble explanations 
argue that these explanations, unlike mechanistic explanations, provide a “unifying framework 
that can be applied to all allosteric systems” (Hilser et al. 2012, 588). These explanations encode 
structural properties of proteins in the microstate representations, but they identify changes in the 
thermodynamic properties of the ensemble rather than any particular structural changes in the 
microstates to explain allostery. These thermodynamic properties, unlike any specific features of 
protein structure, apply to all protein ensembles. Thus, compared to the abstract mechanism 
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schemata of the MWC and KNF models, ensemble explanations have a more general scope. 
Whereas the MWC and KNF models are only applicable to a subset of cases of allostery, an 
ensemble explanation can be given for any case of allostery. Thus, in this sense, ensemble 
explanations are in fact deeper than mechanistic explanations of allostery. 
The second unique feature of equilibrium explanations, according to Sober (1983), is the 
fact that they explain by citing a set of possible causes without specifying the actual cause. In fact, 
this is why he claims equilibrium explanations are not causal, namely, because “causation abhors 
an ineliminable disjunction” (206). An equilibrium explanation, such as Fisher’s account of the 
one-to-one sex ratio, provides information about causes, but it does not specify which low-level 
causal trajectory obtained.139 Neither mechanistic nor ensemble explanations of allostery match 
this description. Although they pick out different causes, both mechanistic and ensemble 
explanations of allostery purport to cite the actual causes of the phenomenon rather than a 
disjunction of possible causes. 140 Mechanistic explanations cite changes in protein structure as the 
cause of allostery whereas ensemble explanations cite changes in the equilibrium distribution of 
microstates. Providing an ensemble explanation in place of a mechanistic explanation of an 
allosteric system cannot be interpreted as explaining via higher-level causal structure rather than 
lower-level causes. The transition from mechanistic to ensemble explanations does not lead to the 
omission of causal detail nor does it replace an actual causal trajectory with a larger set of possible 
trajectories. It is therefore quite different from the relationship between an explanation that cites a 
 
139 In contemporary discussion, philosophers have largely dropped this positivist framing of equilibrium explanations 
in terms of possible versus actual causes and have instead focused more on how little information (e.g., about initial 
conditions) is required to explain the evolution of a system towards its equilibrium. I will discuss this contemporary 
framing below. 
140 Sec. 4 offers a more robust defense of the claim introduced here, namely, that ensemble explanations of protein 
function are causal. 
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specific lower-level causal trajectory, for example, to explain the sex ratio of a given population, 
and an equilibrium explanation of the same phenomenon. Ensemble explanations do not achieve 
their generality by omitting causes contained in mechanistic explanations. Instead, they simply 
pick out different causes as explanatorily relevant.  
Equilibrium and ensemble explanation differ in a third respect: the relevant equilibria in 
equilibrium explanations are global whereas they are local in ensemble explanations. Moreover, 
the equilibria in ensemble explanations are not the target of explanation. That is, the explanation 
does not purport to explain why a set of protein microstates is at equilibrium unless perturbed. To 
elucidate the different roles of equilibria in these two types of explanations, let us consider again 
Fisher’s one-to-one sex ratio. This ratio is a global equilibrium for the population. You can perturb 
the system however you like, for instance, by increasing the ratio of daughters to sons or vice 
versa, yet it will eventually return to the original one-to-one ratio.141 Because this sex ratio is a 
stable global equilibrium, the explanation for any token case can leave out almost all the causal 
details of the specific population. We do not need to know anything about the initial conditions of 
the population or the perturbation itself (so long as the ratio never leads to fixation and various 
other conditions are met) in order to explain why a population has a one-to-one sex ratio. The 
equilibrium in Strevens’ basin example is similar. So long as certain features of the system are 
fixed (e.g., gravity, friction, and the basin itself), we can put the ball at any place on the inside lip 
of the basin and rest assured that it will land in the bottom of the basin. The explanation in both 
cases functions by demonstrating that the structural and dynamic features of the system are such 
that it has a global equilibrium that will be stable so long as certain features of the system remain 
 
141 Of course, this is not quite true. You cannot perturb certain features of the system that are responsible for 
establishing the global equilibrium. For example, you cannot change parental investment nor can you eliminate natural 
selection. 
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fixed. Once this has been established, we can then cite the existence of the equilibrium to explain 
why a given system, with initial conditions within a certain range, is either at or tending toward 
equilibrium. 
Ensemble explanations, in contrast, invoke only local equilibria, and the fact that the 
microstates adopt an equilibrium distribution is simply assumed. The equilibrium distribution is 
an idealization, derived from the laws of chemistry and physics, which is taken to be approximately 
true of all proteins in solution. Unlike equilibrium explanations, ensemble explanations do not aim 
to show how or why this equilibrium emerges from the structure and dynamics of the system—it 
is simply taken as given. There is a further difference related to the dynamics of the allosteric 
system. In the case of an equilibrium explanation like Fisher’s, the internal dynamics of the system 
permit it to temporarily depart from equilibrium (e.g., because of drift, random mutation, 
migration, etc.) but also include a countervailing force (e.g., natural selection) that will bring the 
population back to equilibrium. This dynamic setup explains why any population will return to the 
equilibrium state. In ensemble explanations, however, the perturbation to the system causes the 
system to move to an entirely new equilibrium distribution. It is precisely this change in the 
equilibrium distribution upon perturbation that is cited to explain allostery. Since the dynamics 
that cause a population of molecules in solution to adopt an equilibrium distribution of microstates 
tell us nothing about the evolution of system when it is perturbed, these local equilibria are unable 
to explain the observed allosteric effect. Thus, compared to the equilibria in equilibrium 
explanations, those in ensemble explanations have a different and less central explanatory role.  
The role of initial conditions is a fourth feature that distinguishes equilibrium explanations 
from ensemble explanations. Most philosophical accounts of equilibrium explanation conclude 
that part of what makes these explanations unique is the relative unimportance of the initial 
 186 
conditions of the system. For instance, Sober (1983) claims that an equilibrium explanation can be 
given even when we have “considerable ignorance of the actual forces and initial conditions that 
in fact caused the system to be in its equilibrium state” (209). Although he thinks most equilibrium 
explanations can be captured as causal by his interventionist framework, Woodward (2003) largely 
agrees. Equilibrium explanations answer a broad range of what-if-things-had-been-different, or w-
questions (Woodward 2003). However, rather than specifying which changes to factors in the 
explanans would have resulted in changes in the explanandum phenomenon, equilibrium 
explanations focus “on the fact that if various factors had been different in various ways, the 
explanandum would not have been different” (Woodward 2018, 131). Ensemble explanations of 
allostery do not have this feature. To give an ensemble explanation, one must have information 
about the preexisting equilibrium distribution of microstates. The initial equilibrium of microstates 
in a population of protein molecules determines the allosteric behavior of the system: “The 
observed [allosteric] response is dependent on where the equilibrium is poised before activation” 
(Motlagh et al. 2014, 333). In other words, if a certain subset of microstates is thermodynamically 
stable and therefore dominant in an ensemble, the addition of an allosteric ligand might lead to one 
outcome (e.g., positive allostery), whereas if a different subset of microstates is stable in the 
preexisting equilibrium, then the same allosteric ligand might lead to another outcome (e.g., 
negative allostery or no allosteric coupling at all). Because the preexisting equilibrium, or how the 
ensemble is “poised,” can make such a big difference, we cannot be ignorant of initial conditions 
if we wish to give an ensemble explanation of allostery. 
Fifth and finally, unlike equilibrium explanations, ensemble explanations are not chiefly 
focused on explaining patterns of behavior. One of the unique features of equilibrium explanations 
is that they show how many of the differences between systems are irrelevant to their behavior. 
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They afford “deep” explanations that rely only on structural features of the system. For this reason, 
some philosophers have argued that what is special about equilibrium explanations is not their 
ability to explain token events but rather their ability to explain why seemingly disparate systems 
exhibit the same behavior (Kuorikoski 2007, Rice 2015). For example, Kuorikoski (2007) wonders 
“if the intended target of Fisher’s argument is really a 1:1 sex ratio of a single population at a given 
time?” He concludes it is not. Instead, he claims, “the perplexing explanandum is undoubtedly the 
pervasiveness of the 1:1 sex ratio across different populations, species, and environments” 
(Kuorikoski 2007, 152). This “perplexing explanandum” is an example of what Batterman (2002) 
calls a type ii question: it asks why a pattern of behavior manifests over a range of different systems 
in different circumstances. Since they highlight structural features that show why certain 
differences between systems do not matter, equilibrium explanations are well-suited to answer 
type ii questions.  
In contrast, ensemble explanations of allostery provide equally good answers to both type 
i and type ii questions. On the one hand, they can identify general features of allosteric systems 
and the energetic connections between different binding sites on a protein. Consider the case of 
agonism-antagonism switching, in which the addition of an allosteric ligand sometimes leads to 
positive cooperativity and other times leads to negative cooperativity. Using the mathematical 
description of the ensemble for a three domain protein, researchers have identified the necessary 
features an allosteric protein must have in order to exhibit this type of conditional cooperativity or 
switching behavior. They have shown how the binding domains on a protein must be energetically 
linked in order to yield this observed behavior:  
The importance of the result is that it demonstrates how a single thermodynamic 
architecture, within the framework of the most simple three-domain model, can poise the 




From their analysis, the scientists were able to identify the “thermodynamic ‘ground rules’ for 
conferring the ability to switch responses,” thereby explaining why all proteins capable of such 
functional behavior share a single thermodynamic architecture (Ibid., 4137). Ensemble 
explanations can thus reveal general features of allosteric systems, showing how the energetic 
connections between binding sites will yield similar allosteric behavior in different protein-ligand 
systems.  
On the other hand, ensemble explanations are often used to answer type i questions about 
why a system-level behavior manifests in a particular system under certain conditions at a given 
time (Batterman 2002).  They show why allostery occurs in certain proteins with certain allosteric 
ligands, and the details of the case matters. To explain the allosteric behavior in a given case, such 
as between hemoglobin and oxygen, we must include details about the preexisting equilibrium of 
protein microstates, which microstates are dominant, and the nature of the allosteric ligand. 
Ensemble explanations of protein function aim to explain particular cases, many of which are 
biomedically relevant. For example, an entire classes of HIV antiretroviral drugs are allosteric 
inhibitors of HIV enzymes (Mehellou and De Clerq 2010). Researchers interested in explaining 
the behavior of these drugs and designing new allosteric inhibitors of viral proteins are not 
primarily interested in type ii questions. Instead, they want to understand the behavior of these 
ligands in specific contexts and the way in which they inhibit the action of viral enzymes. Although 
scientists develop ensemble explanations to answer type ii questions, these explanations are also 
used in biomedical contexts in which scientists want to explain what happens in a particular 
protein-ligand system.142  
 
142 Since some philosophers have claimed that equilibrium explanations answer type i questions while others have 
claimed they can answer type ii questions, it is worth further elaborating on the distinction I see between equilibrium 
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From this analysis of the five dimensions that distinguish equilibrium explanation from 
paradigmatic causal explanation, we see that ensemble explanations are significantly different 
from equilibrium explanations. Ensemble explanations are deeper than mechanistic explanations 
of allostery. But along the other dimensions, ensemble explanations have more in common with 
these paradigmatic causal explanations than they do with equilibrium explanations. We can 
therefore conclude that ensemble explanations are not a species of equilibrium explanation, as 
characterized in the philosophical literature. In the next section, I turn to consider recent 
philosophical work that attempts to show how the interventionist framework can apply to 
explanations in thermodynamics. This analysis, I argue, can help shed light on how ensemble 
explanations work.  
5.4 Interventionist Causation and Explanation in Equilibrium Thermodynamics 
One branch of thermodynamics is exclusively concerned with thermodynamic systems at 
equilibrium. Equilibrium thermodynamics characterizes such systems and analyzes the processes 
that lead them to transition between equilibrium states. Because ensemble explanations of allostery 
involve thermodynamic descriptions of protein ensembles and focus on the transition between 
 
explanations, like Fisher’s explanation of the one-to-one sex ratio, and ensemble explanations of allostery. Although 
Sober (1983) presented Fisher’s equilibrium explanation as explaining the sex ratio of a given population at a given 
time, philosophers have more recently suggested that this is the wrong explanandum. For instance, Kuorikoski (2007) 
argues that equilibrium explanations account for patterns that occur across systems. He suggests that the existence of 
the same patterns of behavior across wildly different systems is what is curious and in need of explanation. 
Furthermore, it is the explanation of patterns—by showing why certain details do not matter—that justifies 
philosophers’ focus on equilibrium explanations. In contrast, I suggest that it is not the case that the type ii questions 
that ensemble explanations can answer are necessarily more interesting or more in need of explanation. Using 
ensemble explanations to answer type i questions in biomedical contexts is an important feature and the primary 
justification for the development of this type of explanation in the first place (Hilser et al. 2012, Motlagh et al. 2014). 
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equilibrium states, the philosophical literature on thermodynamics offers a useful framework for 
the analysis and interpretation of ensemble explanations. Although philosophers of science 
interested in equilibrium explanations often discuss the ideal gas law as an example, Zwier’s 
(2017) recent account of causation in thermodynamics provides the most systematic treatment of 
equilibrium thermodynamics. She argues that the interventionist account of causation can be used 
to describe thermodynamic theorizing. In what follows, I first present Zwier’s account of causation 
in thermodynamics (Sec. 5.4.1). I then show how it can be applied to cover ensemble explanations 
of allostery (Sec. 5.4.2). From this analysis, I argue that ensemble explanations are causal (Sec. 
5.4.3). Finally, I argue that ensemble explanations are novel explanations, distinct from both the 
common explanations in thermodynamics as well as the mechanistic explanations that dominate 
structural and molecular biology (Sec. 5.4.4).  
5.4.1 Intervention on Equilibrium States  
Thermodynamic analysis focuses on the equilibrium states of a system and the processes 
that move the system from one equilibrium state to another. Zwier (2017) argues that 
thermodynamic theorizing of this sort can be understood within the interventionist framework of 
causation. To make sense of her argument, we must first clarify two thermodynamic concepts: 
equilibrium and system. A system is in thermodynamic equilibrium when “all natural processes of 
change have come to an end and the observable state of the system is constant in time” (Frigg 
2008, 99). It describes the state of the system in which there is no change in macroscopic variables. 
As Zwier (2017) points out, however, equilibrium states do not occur spontaneously, since “natural 
thermodynamic systems are in constant flux” (1304). Any candidate system is likely to be 
undergoing internal processes of change as well as exchanging energy with its environment. In 
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fact, thermodynamic systems themselves are largely theoretical constructs that we impose upon 
the world in order to do thermodynamic analysis and bookkeeping. For a system to be in 
thermodynamic equilibrium, it must be given sufficient time without any external perturbations 
from the environment or other systems. The only way for this condition to be met, according to 
Zwier, is by carefully setting and maintaining the boundary conditions that isolate the system from 
its surroundings.  
Consider a plant cell as a candidate natural thermodynamic system, using the cell wall as 
the boundary of the system. For a healthy plant in a greenhouse, for example, the pressure and 
volume of the cell will be relatively fixed because the cell wall is rigid, and a well-watered plant 
will be able to maintain a relatively constant turgor pressure. In addition, even though most plants 
are exothermic, if the greenhouse is temperature-controlled, the temperature of the cell will also 
remain relatively constant. Finally, if we only consider the plant during the day, when 
photosynthesis is occurring, we might assume that the chemical reactions of photosynthesis and 
metabolism are occurring at a relatively steady state. Given these assumptions, we might 
reasonably think of the plant cell as thermodynamic system at a quasi-equilibrium state. It is clear 
from this description that the quasi-equilibrium state requires active maintenance of the boundary 
conditions. Stricter equilibrium states will require even more isolation of the system and control 
of the boundaries, and true equilibrium states “exist only in theory,” since they “require idealized 
boundaries,” such as perfect insulators and perfectly rigid containers (Zwier 2017, 1305). To even 
conceive of a system at thermodynamic equilibrium, we must first consider the constraints on the 
system imposed by the boundary conditions.  
Zwier draws upon Woodward’s (2003) interventionist account of causation to analyze the 
relationship between a system’s boundary conditions and its equilibrium states. According to 
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Woodward, causal claims must correctly capture the counterfactual dependence relations between 
cause variables and effect variables. These patterns of counterfactual dependence between the 
variables are understood in terms of interventions. An intervention sets a cause variable to a certain 
value. According to Woodward, C is a cause of E if there exists a possible intervention on C that 
would lead to a change in the value of E. The intervention must be ideal, in that the change in E 
must be brought about only through the change in C and not by changes to other causes elsewhere. 
Woodward uses this account of causation as the cornerstone of his account of causal explanation. 
On his view, causal explanations identify patterns of counterfactual dependence in order to answer 
a range of what-if-things-had-been-different questions. That is, they explain by showing how 
certain changes in the explanans (i.e., changes in the value of C) would have yielded changes in 
the explanandum phenomenon (i.e., changes in the value of E). 
According to Zwier (2017), this interventionist framework captures thermodynamic 
reasoning in two ways. She first argues that thermodynamic equilibrium is an inherently 
manipulated state, with the boundary conditions acting on a system as interventionist causes. These 
manipulated equilibrium states are central to thermodynamic theorizing, since most 
thermodynamic explanations describe the movement of a system from one equilibrium state to 
another. Second, according to Zwier, the “driving force” that pushes a thermodynamic system from 
one equilibrium to another is an external intervention on the system’s boundary conditions. 
Because interventionist causes play these two important roles in thermodynamics, Zwier concludes 
that “interventionist reasoning is inseparable from the structural foundation of thermodynamic 
theory” (Ibid., 1307).  
Let us look more closely at these two ways in which boundary conditions can function as 
interventions on thermodynamic systems. First, they intervene on a thermodynamic system in 
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order to enable it to reach equilibrium. To even conceive of a system at thermodynamic 
equilibrium, we must consider the constraints imposed by the boundaries on the system: it is 
impossible to have a system at equilibrium “unless the boundaries of the system are well defined” 
(Ibid., 1305). Boundary conditions constrain the system by setting the value of certain 
thermodynamic variables. For instance, the temperature-controlled greenhouse in the example 
above serves to set the temperature of the thermodynamic system—i.e, the plant cell—to the 
ambient temperature, which is set to a particular value by the thermostat. Even a natural 
thermodynamic system, such as a plant cell, is at quasi-equilibrium only because it is constantly 
being intervened upon to maintain its boundary conditions. It is for this reason that Zwier considers 
thermodynamic equilibrium to be an “inherently manipulated state” (1306). The equilibrium states 
that figure in most thermodynamic theorizing are similarly manipulated. Since the boundary 
conditions always intervene upon the system in order to fix certain thermodynamic variables, 
Zwier argues they “constitute external interventions on the system” that are “entirely consistent 
with the concept of an intervention that has been developed by Woodward” (Zwier 2017, 1305-6). 
On her view, because the boundary conditions distinguish the system from its surroundings, they 
are not part of the system itself and therefore can be construed as external interventions.  
As external interventions, boundary conditions themselves can be the cause and can 
therefore explain why certain thermodynamic variables take on particular values. On this view, 
even for a thermodynamic system at equilibrium, such as a gas in a box, we might say that the 
temperature of the gas is the cause of its pressure, if the box has rigid walls and the temperature is 
maintained by a temperature reservoir. Given this setup, the fact that the experimenter set the water 
bath to a certain temperature rather than another explains why the system is at a particular pressure 
rather than another. Even though no change in temperature actually occurs, because we can 
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interpret the temperature as changeable or variable, it reveals a counterfactual dependence relation 
between temperature and pressure and therefore tells us something about the conditions under 
which the pressure would have been different.143 In sum, boundary conditions can be construed as 
intervening on a system, setting thermodynamic (cause) variables to particular values which can 
then be cited to explain the values of other (effect) variables at equilibrium.  
The second way boundary conditions function as interventionist causes fits more naturally 
within the interventionist framework. In this case, those boundary conditions that define the system 
at equilibrium and distinguish it from its surroundings are relegated to the status of background 
conditions. The conditions that are directly manipulated are construed as interventionist causes; 
they are the ones that lead to a change in the equilibrium state of the system. Consider this example 
from Frigg (2008). An ideal gas, initially confined by a barrier to one half of a box, with perfectly 
rigid and insulated walls, is at equilibrium. The barrier is then removed, and the gas molecules 
disperse throughout the new volume until the system reaches a final equilibrium state. This final 
state differs from the initial state in that the volume V will have doubled upon removal of the 
barrier and the pressure P will have halved. We know this from the application of the ideal gas 
law, PV = nRT, to the system. Because of the thermally insulated walls, the temperature T is 
constant.144 Therefore, this manipulation of the system, which doubles the volume, also causes the 
pressure to halve.  
 
143 See Woodward (2003), p. 234 for a similar example. The details of the setup matter, according to Woodward. If a 
particular thermodynamic parameter is construed as a constant rather than a variable, then even though it can be 
derived from the ideal gas law and the values of the other thermodynamic parameters, it is not explained by them.  For 
instance, given the above experimental setup, the pressure does not explain the volume of the system, even though the 
volume can be derived using the ideal gas law and the pressure and temperature. In this case, the pressure does not 
explain the volume because the box in this setup is rigid and will not vary given changes in pressure. 
144 Because of the insulating walls, the energy remains the same and hence also the temperature, since for an ideal gas, 
internal energy is proportional to temperature. In this case, the moles of gas (n) also remain constant.  
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Unlike the previous case, this second case does not focus on the role of boundary conditions 
in enabling and maintaining the equilibrium state, but instead focuses on a particular manipulation 
of the boundary conditions that drives the system from one equilibrium to a new equilibrium state. 
It is thus quite natural to think of this manipulation of the boundary conditions—i.e., the removal 
of the barrier—as an ideal intervention on the system. It changes the volume of the system by 
setting this variable to a new value, which in turn drives the system to a new equilibrium with a 
new value for the pressure variable. The boundary condition that was manipulated in this second 
case counts as an interventionist cause, and the new volume of the gas, along with the ideal gas 
law and the fixed temperature, can be cited to explain the new pressure of the system. This second 
case considers boundary conditions to be causes only insofar as they are manipulated to drive the 
system from one equilibrium state to another. 
Zwier (2017) considers in further detail this second way changes in the boundary 
conditions can act as interventions in thermodynamic analysis. The First and Second Laws of 
thermodynamics which require the conservation of energy and the maximization of entropy, 
respectively, coupled with the boundary conditions, determine the equilibrium state of any given 
thermodynamic system. Thermodynamic reasoning begins with equations of state, such as the 
ideal gas law, and thermodynamic potential functions that relate small changes in state variables 
to changes in internal energy (U) and entropy (S). If we consider what happens to two isolated 
thermodynamic systems A and B at different temperatures (TA ≠ TB), which are thermally isolated 
from their surroundings, we can derive an equation that relates the total entropy of the combined 
systems to their internal energies, volumes, and particle numbers. Since we assume that the particle 







) 𝑑𝑈𝐴 . 
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By definition, at equilibrium, there will be no change in entropy in the system (dStotal = 0), and this 
will occur when the temperatures of the two bodies are equal (TA = TB).  
Zwier argues that this thermodynamic analysis does more than derive the well-known 
result that two bodies at different temperatures will reach equilibrium when they are both at the 
same temperature. It also shows that the difference in temperatures between system A and B—i.e., 
the nonzero value of this term—“act[s] as a driving force,” causing a change in the internal energy 
of system A (Zwier 2017, 1310). According to Zwier, this “‘driving force’ language,” as well as 
the thermodynamic changes it describes, “matches the way in which thermodynamic variables 
would be modeled in the interventionist account of causation” (Ibid.). In the temperature 
equilibration case, the act of bringing system B into thermal contact with system A is the primary 
intervention. The fixed boundary conditions that set and maintain the other thermodynamic 
variables such as the volume and particle number are what Zwier calls “auxiliary interventions” 
(Ibid., 1311). These auxiliary interventions are set up in just such a way to render the primary 
intervention an ideal intervention. Since all other variables are held fixed by these interventions, 
we can see how the primary intervention affected the internal energy of the system. According to 
Zwier, the interventionist framework demonstrates that “TA is an interventionist cause of UA” 
(Ibid.).  
Most thermodynamic theorizing fits this model: some boundary condition is modified or 
some constraint on a system is lifted, and the system then tends toward a new equilibrium that 
maximizes the entropy of the system. It is the intervention on the system at equilibrium—in the 
above case, the removal of the thermal barrier between systems—that leads the system to move 
toward a new equilibrium state. That intervention thus reveals one thermodynamic parameter (T) 
to be the cause of another (U). Within the interventionist framework, we can therefore cite the 
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manipulation of the boundary conditions to explain why a system will have a new value for other 
parameters when it reaches its new thermodynamic equilibrium.  
5.4.2 Interventionist Interpretation of Ensemble Explanations 
In order to apply the insights from thermodynamics to the case of ensemble explanation, 
we first need to clarify the meaning of certain concepts—viz., system and equilibrium—in this 
context. The relevant thermodynamic system, in this case, is the set of protein molecules. The 
representation of the system used in ensemble explanations does not explicitly include other 
features of the local environment. It does not represent the solvent or other chemical or biological 
factors. However, these contextual environmental factors are implicitly included in the 
representation of the system, since these factors will affect the thermodynamic stability of the 
microstates and will thus be reflected in the ∆Gj for each microstate. Like the physical 
thermodynamic systems Zwier (2017) discusses, these biological systems also require the 
maintenance of boundary conditions. For example, in vitro, the temperature of the system will 
remain approximately constant because the ambient temperature of the lab is kept constant, and in 
vivo, metabolic activity will maintain the cellular temperature of endothermic organisms. The 
maintenance of the boundary conditions is a necessary precondition for a system to reach 
equilibrium. However, in ensemble explanations of protein behavior, these boundary conditions 
are not typically manipulated and thus function as implicit background conditions. 
The relevant equilibrium of the system is the equilibrium distribution of protein molecules 
across microstate structures. Because of theoretical and empirical evidence, we know that 
individual protein molecules in solution are in constant motion, wandering around conformation 
space. At any moment in time, a population of the same type of protein molecules in solution will 
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be structurally heterogeneous. Although individual molecules do not have stable 3D 
conformations, the ergodic hypothesis tells us that the temporal evolution of all the individual 
molecules is replicated in the instantaneous ensemble distribution of microstates (Hilser et al. 
2006). When the system is at equilibrium, a certain fraction of individual molecules will occupy 
each microstate. More stable, lower energy microstates will be more populated than less stable, 
higher energy microstates. (Recall that the thermodynamic stability of each microstate (∆Gj), 
along with the stabilities of the other microstates in the ensemble, determines the probability for 
the microstate (Pj).) At thermodynamic equilibrium, individual molecules will continually move 
through different conformations, but there will be no net change in the fraction of molecules in 
each microstate at any time. Since the distribution of molecules across the ensemble of microstates 
is unchanging, this is called the equilibrium distribution. 
Since the ensemble representation is imported from statistical mechanics, it is unsurprising 
that this representation of proteins is similar to that used to describe simpler thermodynamic 
systems, such as an ideal gas in a box. In both cases, at equilibrium the molecular arrangement—
i.e., which molecules are in which microstates—is constantly changing, but the overall distribution 
of molecules across microstates remains constant (Frigg 2008). The equilibrium distribution of 
microstates is fixed by the set of thermodynamic parameters, or boundary conditions, of the 
system. In other words, the probability associated with each microstate at equilibrium will be fixed 
for any particular set of thermodynamic parameters (e.g., temperature, volume, pressure, internal 
energy, etc.). Changes in these parameters or other external interventions will cause the system to 
re-equilibrate at a new equilibrium state. For example, in the protein case, changes to the 
temperature of the system or other parameters that affect the relative stability of microstates (e.g., 
polarity or pH of the solvent) will lead the ensemble of protein molecules to adopt a different 
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equilibrium distribution, causing certain microstates to become more stable (and therefore more 
frequent) and others to become less stable (and less frequent).  
Having clarified the key concepts, we can now turn to consider the role equilibrium states 
play in ensemble explanations. Compared to their role in canonical equilibrium explanations, the 
equilibrium states in ensemble explanations are less informative and less explanatory. What is 
cited to explain protein behavior is not the equilibrium distribution itself, but rather the change in 
equilibrium distribution upon perturbation of the system. As I will argue in Section 4.3, it is this 
focus on the change in equilibrium distribution and the cause of the perturbation that makes 
ensemble explanations of allostery causal.  
To highlight this difference in the explanatory role of equilibrium states, let us have another 
look at Sober’s (1983) account of equilibrium explanation. Reasoning from Fisher’s explanation 
for the one-to-one sex ratio, he claims that equilibrium explanations explain how and why a 
population exhibits the equilibrium ratio. The explanation works by revealing structural features 
of the system as well as the internal dynamics that describe its evolution. In Fisher’s case, the 
system is conceived as having a stable equilibrium state, but the internal dynamics of the system 
are such that a population could temporarily move to a non-equilibrium state. The population could 
be perturbed from equilibrium by any number of evolutionary forces (e.g., drift, mutation, 
migration, etc.). But when the population moves away from equilibrium, it will be brought back 
by the force of natural selection acting against parental pairs that overproduce the majority sex. 
Forces that perturb the system away from equilibrium, as well as the countervailing force of natural 
selection, are thus built into the internal dynamics of the system. According to Sober, explanations 
of this sort “are made possible by theories that describe the dynamics of systems in certain ways” 
(207). Or, more specifically, on this account of equilibrium explanation “the occurrence of an 
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equilibrium state can be explained by exhibiting it as an equilibrium” (Kuorikoski 2007, 150).145 
Fisher’s theoretical description of the system thus counts as an explanation, according to Sober, 
because it demonstrates that within a system governed by these particular dynamics, the one-to-
one sex ratio is a stable equilibrium state.  
The thermodynamic equilibrium in the protein or ideal gas case plays a very different role 
than the equilibrium cited in Fisher’s explanation. Both the representation of the system at 
equilibrium differs, as well as the role of the equilibrium in explaining the behavior of the system. 
The thermodynamic equilibrium is construed as an ideal equilibrium, occurring in a perfectly 
isolated system, such that once it has reached an equilibrium distribution nothing internal to the 
system will shift it from that distribution. Once the system has reached its equilibrium state there 
are no internal dynamics that can move it away from that state. Although changes occur all the 
time at the micro-level, by definition, no change occurs at the macro-level. (Otherwise, the system 
would not be at thermodynamic equilibrium.) Therefore, any perturbations to the system caused 
by changes in thermodynamic parameters or boundary conditions that lead the system away from 
equilibrium are represented as external to the system. They are not included in the internal 
dynamics of the system.  
Defined in this way, the equilibrium in an ensemble explanation, by itself, is not that 
informative.146 By using the ensemble representation, scientists aim to represent the dynamic 
properties of protein molecules so that these dynamics can be taken into account in explanations 
of protein behavior. But the mere fact that individual protein molecules will adopt an equilibrium 
 
145 In this quotation, Kuorikoski summarizes Sober’s position. Kuorikoski (2007) ultimately argues that this view is 
mistaken, since he thinks equilibrium explanations primarily explain patterns rather than token events.   
146 For a canonical equilibrium explanation, showing that a particular state is an equilibrium state can be cited to 
explain why a given system is at that state. (I will discuss this further in the following section.) 
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distribution does not explain allostery or any protein behavior. Moreover, the goal of an ensemble 
explanation is not to show that or explain why a protein has a particular equilibrium distribution. 
Instead, the fact that protein molecules (or any molecules, for that matter) will adopt an equilibrium 
distribution is an assumption, supported by the laws of thermodynamics, used to justify the 
ensemble representation of protein molecules.  
The thermodynamic equilibrium is therefore not a property of the structure and dynamics 
of the system that can be used, on its own, to explain the evolution of the system. It is thus unlike 
canonical equilibrium explanations that reveal the structure and dynamics of a system to show why 
a particular equilibrium state is to be expected. Consider Potochnik’s (2015) example of an 
everyday equilibrium explanation to explain the temperature of her coffee. To explain the fact that 
her once hot coffee is now at room temperature, she cites the fact that it is in an open ceramic mug 
and has been sitting her desk for the past four hours. These two conditions show that whatever the 
initial temperature of the coffee, in four hours, it will have thermally equilibrated with the ambient 
temperature of her office. On her view, the explanation “must include the assumptions needed to 
generate the domain of attraction, that is, the range of conditions that would lead to the equilibrium 
value” (1179). This counts as an explanation because it shows that the system has an attractor and 
that the initial conditions in the given case fall within the range of that attractor. This everyday 
example differs from ensemble explanations regarding its use of the equilibrium. In Potochnik’s 
case, the explanandum is the temperature of her stale coffee, and she can therefore explain its 
temperature by showing that it is at the equilibrium state, as expected. The goal of an ensemble 
explanation, in contrast, is never to explain why a given system is at equilibrium, since by 
definition the system is at equilibrium unless perturbed. A single equilibrium distribution, by itself, 
cannot be used to explain the behavior of proteins. Although they cite equilibria, ensemble 
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explanations do not explain the behavior of a system by identifying the equilibrium state or 
explaining why it emerges from the dynamics of the system. Nor does an ensemble explanation 
explain why a particular system is in a particular state by showing that state to be an equilibrium 
distribution.  
Instead, the relevant feature of an ensemble explanation is the change in equilibrium upon 
perturbation of the system. That protein molecules adopt an equilibrium distribution of microstates 
is taken as given. This is not to say that there is no explanation for why a population of protein 
molecules in solution will obtain an equilibrium distribution across a set of structurally distinct 
microstates. To the contrary, we have good theoretical and empirical reasons to believe that protein 
molecules in solution are dynamic, undergoing significant structural fluctuations (Cooper 1976, 
1980; Cui and Karplus 2008). However, an ensemble explanation of allostery, or other protein 
function, does not seek to explain these facts about protein equilibria. Merely showing that a 
particular distribution is an equilibrium distribution cannot explain protein function; a single 
equilibrium distribution, on its own, is not explanatory sufficient. In this case, the equilibrium is a 
red herring, since the equilibrium does not explain anything. Rather, it is the change in equilibrium 
that does the explanatory work in ensemble explanations. 
5.4.3 Ensemble Explanations are Causal 
This emphasis on the change in equilibrium and the cause of that change, supports my 
contention that ensemble explanations are more similar to paradigmatic cases of causal explanation 
than equilibrium explanation. Recall that an explanation for allostery involves two different why-
questions: (1) why does a protein-ligand system exhibit changes in affinity upon addition of an 
allosteric ligand, and (2) why (and how) does the allosteric ligand lead to a change in the 
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equilibrium distribution of microstates. The ensemble explanation answers both of these by citing 
external causes that move the system from one equilibrium state to another. The explanatory 
account given by an ensemble explanation in response to the first question focuses on the change 
in equilibrium distribution of microstates caused by the perturbation to the system, in this case, the 
allosteric ligand. The observed increase in binding affinity for the second ligand is attributed to 
the shift in the equilibrium distribution caused by the perturbation. Compared to the previous 
equilibrium, the new one favors microstates that can bind the second ligand. The change in 
equilibrium distribution upon perturbation therefore explains the observed changes in ligand 
binding.  
The second why-question could be construed as a follow-up question, a request for 
additional information. To answer the first question, one need only cite the change in equilibrium 
distribution of microstates caused by the perturbation and demonstrate that the new equilibrium 
favors certain microstates over others. But one might then ask, how does the addition of the 
allosteric ligand perturb the system? Here the answer follows from the ensemble representation of 
the system, along with the laws of chemistry and physics. The allosteric ligand causes the change 
in equilibrium distribution by binding to the subset of microstates that have the appropriate ligand 
binding site (Hilser et al. 2012, Motlagh et al. 2014). When protein molecules in a given microstate 
bind the allosteric ligand, it increases the stability of those microstates, lowering their free energy 
(∆Gj). The addition of the allosteric ligand thus intervenes on the system by setting the free energy 
values for certain microstates lower than they were before. This increases their stability relative to 
those microstates the ligand was unable to bind, which in turn leads to the change in probabilities 
(Pj) of all the microstates in the ensemble. This change in probabilities constitutes a re-
equilibration of the system, leading individual protein molecules to redistribute from higher energy 
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microstates into lower energy ones. The redistribution of molecules across the microstates caused 
by the addition of the allosteric ligand to the system is at the heart of the ensemble explanation of 
allostery: allostery occurs, on this account, if the new equilibrium favors microstates that can bind 
the second ligand. The allosteric ligand, which caused the change in equilibrium, explains this 
second why-question.   
The answer to both why-questions cites the addition of the allosteric ligand as the cause of 
the change that is used to explain the allosteric effect. In the first case, the allosteric ligand is 
represented as intervening on the ensemble distribution, perturbing the existing equilibrium state 
and leading it to adopt a new equilibrium state. This intervention on the equilibrium distribution 
of microstates is then cited as the explanation for the change in protein behavior. In Figure 13, the 
causal structure of this explanation is represented by a directed graph.  
 
Figure 13 Causal Representation of Allostery. 
 
When it is added to the system, the allosteric ligand (X) alters the equilibrium distribution (Z) in 
such a way as to result in allosteric behavior (Y). The precise details of how ligand binding leads 
to this change in equilibrium are blackboxed from this abstract causal explanation. Pitched at this 
level, the ensemble explanation is similar to abstract mechanistic explanations for allostery. 
Mechanistic explanations of allostery exhibit the same causal structure, but the intermediate causal 
variable differs. In mechanistic explanations, the allosteric ligand (X) acts upon the structure of 
the protein molecule (Z) in order to bring about a particular allosteric effect (Y). Abstract 
mechanistic and ensemble explanations share the same general causal structure, but cite changes 
to different intermediate causal variables as the proximate cause of the allosteric effect. Therefore, 
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if we think that mechanistic explanations of allostery are straightforwardly causal explanations, 
then ensemble explanations, which share the same structure, must also be causal explanations. 
To answer the second why-question, we must flesh out this abstract causal explanation to 
reveal the intermediate causal variables that connect the allosteric ligand to the equilibrium 
distribution. In other words, we must show how the allosteric ligand ultimately leads to change in 
equilibrium distribution. For an ensemble explanation of allostery, this causal chain is something 
like the following: when added to the system, the allosteric ligands bind a subset of microstates, 
which in turn alters the thermodynamic stabilities of those microstates (∆Gj). The change in their 
stabilities leads to a change in their probabilities (Pj), which in turn leads to a change in the 
probabilities for all the microstates, and this change in the probabilities of all the microstates 
constitutes a change in the equilibrium distribution of the system. We can represent this chain of 
intermediate causes using another directed graph (Fig. 14). 
 
Figure 14 Causal Representation of Allostery with Intermediate Causal Variables. 
 
 
Again, the allosteric ligand (X) causes the observed allosteric effect (Y), but additional 
intermediate causes are also specified (Z1, Z2, etc.) that ultimately lead to a particular equilibrium 
distribution (Z) that gives rise to the observed behavior of the system (Y). A similar elaboration of 
intermediate causal variables could be requested of the abstract mechanistic explanation given in 
response to the first why-question, which cited a change in structure caused by the allosteric ligand. 
However, unlike in the ensemble explanation, the intermediate causes would likely be unique to a 
particular protein-ligand system. They would have to show how the binding of the allosteric ligand 
at one site leads to local structural changes that ripple through the protein to ultimately affect the 
structure of the second binding site. This is precisely the level of causal detail that Perutz (1970) 
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aimed to provide to explain the allosteric behavior of hemoglobin oxygen-binding. His account 
showed how oxygen binding led to a structural change in hemoglobin, just as Figure 14 shows 
how the addition of the allosteric ligand to the system leads to a change in the equilibrium 
distribution of microstates. If we take Perutz’s mechanistic explanation for allostery to have the 
similar causal structure to the more concrete ensemble explanation, with its additional intermediate 
variables, we once again must conclude that ensemble explanations of allostery are causal 
explanations.   
This analysis of ensemble explanations shows that they can be interpreted as causal using 
the interventionist account. In that respect, ensemble explanations of allostery are similar to 
mechanistic explanations of allostery. Both recognize the allosteric ligand as the cause of the 
allosteric effect, but they differ in the intermediate causes they posit. While mechanistic 
explanations cite changes in protein structure, ensemble explanations cite thermodynamic changes 
in the equilibrium distribution of microstates. The latter are therefore similar to the causal 
explanations in thermodynamics that Zwier (2017) analyzes. She describes cases in which the 
boundary conditions of a thermodynamic system are manipulated and argues that changes in the 
boundary conditions are “driving forces” that move the system from one equilibrium state to 
another. In the case of allostery, the intervention on the system is more easily interpreted as 
external to the system. First, the addition of the allosteric ligand satisfies the requirements for an 
intervention, since it manipulates the ∆Gj values for the microstates to which it binds, setting their 
values lower than before. Second, the addition of the allosteric ligand is an intervention on the 
system that is unambiguously external. The allosteric ligand is not part of the boundary conditions 
that enable the maintenance of equilibrium nor can the addition of allosteric ligand be conceived 
as removing a constraint on the system. In the laboratory setting, an experimenter adds an aliquot 
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of the allosteric ligand to a cuvette or test tube containing a known concentration of the protein 
and measures the response. This is precisely the sort of surgical intervention required by the 
interventionist account. Thus, even those skeptical of the application of the interventionist 
approach to thermodynamics should therefore agree that the allosteric ligand is the external cause 
of the change in the equilibrium distribution of protein microstates. 
5.4.4 Novelty of Ensemble Explanations in Biological Sciences 
I have just argued that ensemble explanations are a type of causal explanation, similar to 
explanations in equilibrium thermodynamics. In this section, I briefly highlight the novelty of 
ensemble explanations. I first distinguish these explanations in structural and molecular biology 
from the cases of causal explanation in physics that are the focus of Zwier’s analysis. I then show 
how they differ markedly from the mechanistic explanations that tend to dominate these biological 
fields. Finally, I suggest that one major advantage of ensemble explanations of allostery is their 
ability to unify phenomena and provide a unified explanatory strategy for understanding the 
behavior of proteins.   
Even though they import theoretical and mathematical structure from statistical mechanics, 
ensemble explanations differ from similar causal explanations in physics. For one, ensemble 
explanations are quite different from thermodynamic explanations that invoke the ideal gas law. 
Causal explanations that cite the ideal gas law to explain changes in the thermodynamic parameters 
of a system are silent about the properties of the microscopic constituents of the system. They do 
not even cite the distribution of gas molecules across microstates but instead focus on their average 
thermodynamic properties. As we have seen, ensemble explanations do require consideration of 
the distribution of molecules across microstates. However, this difference from ideal gas law 
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explanations does not distinguish ensemble explanations from the majority of explanations in 
statistical thermodynamics. The ideal gas law, as it turns out, is a rather unique higher-level 
generalization. Most other explanations in statistical thermodynamics require partitioning the 
system into microstates and then tracking the change in distribution of molecules across 
microstates (Frigg 2008).  
Although they also track changes in the distribution of molecules across microstates, 
ensemble explanations differ from these thermodynamic explanations as well. In the physics case, 
the change in the system is explained by showing how the intervention caused a change in the 
distribution of molecules across microstates. After a perturbation that increases the thermal energy 
of the system, for example, more molecules will be occupying higher energy microstates that were 
rarely populated before. An explanation of the system’s thermodynamic parameters after the 
perturbation will cite this change in the distribution of molecules to account for the new 
equilibrium values. But the microstates themselves do not change. That is, although the 
intervention affects the distribution of molecules across microstates, it in no way alters the 
microstates or their properties.147  
In the biological case, in contrast, the microstates are themselves altered by the 
perturbation. Consider the ensemble explanation for allostery. The system is partitioned into a set 
of structural microstates, which each have three explanatorily relevant properties—
thermodynamic stability (∆Gj), binding affinity, and probability (Pj). The addition of the allosteric 
ligand perturbs the system both directly and indirectly. Directly, it binds those microstates that 
 
147 To elaborate, an ideal gas molecule traveling with a certain momentum has exactly the same energy in a hot and a 
cold gas. In a hot gas there are just more molecules that have high momentum. In the ensemble representation of 
allostery, ligand binding changes the energy associated with the individual microstates. The microstates thus have 
different properties, and the changes in distributions are the result of these changes in the microstates. I thank Gal Ben 
Porath for assistance with this example.  
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have the appropriate binding site and stabilizes them, lowering their ∆G values. This change in the 
thermodynamic stability of certain microstates then indirectly affects the Pj values for all the 
microstates, since Pj is a relative rather than an individual property of a microstate. The 
perturbation of the ensemble by the allosteric ligand therefore remodels the energy landscape of 
the entire system: it alters the properties of all the microstate structures in the system, resetting 
their ∆Gj or Pj values (Motlagh et al. 2014). The perturbation to the system leads to the 
redistribution of individual protein molecules across microstates, similar to the physics case, but 
in this case, the redistribution occurs because the energetic properties of the microstates themselves 
were differentially altered by the allosteric ligand. In this way, ensemble explanations of protein 
behavior are different than the change of distribution associated with change of temperature of a 
gas in a box. 
The major innovation of ensemble explanations, however, is the application of insights 
from thermodynamics to a biological context. In particular, these explanations have been 
developed as an alternative to mechanistic explanations of protein behavior. Since the heyday of 
classical molecular biology, most research on protein function has been driven by a commitment 
to the structure-function rule, which holds that protein structure determines protein function 
(Sarkar 2008). Commitment to this rule has led to the dominance of mechanistic explanations in 
the molecular life sciences (Machamer et al. 2000, Craver 2007).  
Under the mechanistic framework, scientists cite structural changes in proteins to explain 
their behavior. For example, mechanistic explanations of allostery look for a causal pathway 
through the protein that connects the allosteric binding site to the second binding site. Structural 
changes in the protein that occur at the allosteric site upon binding the allosteric ligand are 
presumed to ripple through the protein, causing a series of local structural changes that ultimately 
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affect the second binding site. Biophysicist Alan Cooper describes this type of explanation for 
allostery as following a “clockwork model,” which posits “a very discrete…sequence of events 
like a clockwork mechanism” that connects the two binding sites. This mechanism aims to explain 
allostery through analogies to “rods, pullies, [and] a mechanical mechanism.”148 Since the earliest 
abstract mechanistic explanations of allostery were developed in the 1960s, many scientists 
working in this field have tried to develop mechanistic explanations of this sort, analyzing 
structural changes in allosteric proteins  (Perutz 1970).  
Although this research has produced some explanatory successes, the mechanistic strategy 
has a major shortcoming in that it leads to an almost exclusive focus on protein structure rather 
than dynamics (Hilser et al. 2012). There is good theoretical and empirical evidence that proteins 
are highly dynamic molecules, and we now know that many proteins exhibit functional behavior, 
such as allostery, even though they lack a rigid 3D structure (Wright and Dyson 1999, Hilser and 
Thompson 2007, Tompa 2011). But mechanistic explanations of protein behavior cannot easily 
take into account protein dynamics, since they rely on average 3D protein structures.  
Ensemble explanations were developed to correct this shortcoming. In ensemble 
explanations, the representation of the protein as an ensemble of microstate structures replaces the 
average structure used in mechanistic explanations. The ensemble representation encodes the 
dynamic properties of the protein in solution: more thermodynamically stable structures are more 
probable within the equilibrium distribution. Reasoning about changes in the equilibrium 
distribution of microstates rather than changes in the average structure therefore ensures that 
ensemble explanations consider both structural and dynamic changes as potential causes of protein 
behavior. They can provide better explanations of protein behavior, since they consider all and 
 
148 Video interview by the author with Alan Cooper, 27 May 2019. 
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only explanatorily relevant features of proteins. In cases in which the allosteric effect is caused 
solely by changes in dynamics, ensemble explanations provide the only explanation. In fact, the 
earliest account of dynamic allostery focused on just such cases—i.e., cases in which allostery 
coupling occurred because of changes in protein dynamics without any change in the average 
structure of the protein (Cooper and Dryden 1984). The thermodynamic description of the 
ensemble also facilitates the development of quantitative accounts of allosteric coupling, 
identifying both the sign and magnitude of the energetic coupling between two sites on a protein 
(Hilser et al. 2012). This allows for the comparison of allosteric effects within different protein-
ligand pairs. In sum, one major innovation of ensemble explanations arises from the application of 
thermodynamic reasoning to proteins and ability of the ensemble to represent the dynamic features 
of proteins typically excluded from mechanistic explanations. 
A final advantage of ensemble explanations—one emphasized by their scientific promoters 
(Motlagh et al. 2014)—is their ability to provide a unified framework for explaining allostery and 
other protein behaviors. These explanations cite a change in the equilibrium distribution of 
microstates to explain allostery. The allosteric ligand perturbs the thermodynamic system driving 
it from one equilibrium distribution to another, and this change in the distribution explains 
allosteric coupling. For example, if the new distribution favors microstates that can bind the second 
ligand, then the allosteric ligand is a positive effector and the protein-ligand system exhibits 
positive allostery. This explanation of allostery focuses attention on the equilibrium distribution 
of microstates rather than the average protein structure. The equilibrium distribution is an 
intermediate causal variable that is shared by all cases of allostery. Thus, one important result of 
the development of ensemble explanations of allostery is that these explanations reveal the 
equilibrium distribution to be a causal variable in a shared causal pathway (Ross 2016, 2018). Any 
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perturbation to the system that alters the equilibrium distribution of microstates has the potential 
to produce a positive or negative allosteric effect (Fig. 15).  
 
Figure 15 Unified Causal Structure of Ensemble Explanation. 
 
The directed graph shows how interventions on the equilibrium distribution (Z) can mediate the 
causal relationship between the allosteric ligand (X) and the allosteric effect (Y). Anything that 
can alter the equilibrium distribution of microstates, by affecting their relative stabilities, has the 
potential to alter a protein’s affinity for a ligand. In the case of allostery, the intervention is an 
allosteric ligand (X), but other perturbations to the system will also drive it from one equilibrium 
distribution to another. The additional causal variables in the directed graph in Figure 15—viz., A, 
B, and C—could be temperature, pH, or another ligand. Any perturbation to the system is funneled 
through the common pathway variable: Z, the equilibrium distribution.  
Ensemble explanations thus have additional benefits over mechanistic explanations of 
allostery. For one, they can capture all cases of allostery within this unifying framework, even 
those cases in which there are no changes in average protein structure. Moreover, the causal 
structure of ensemble explanations reveals the equilibrium distribution as a common pathway 
variable that accounts for this protein behavior.149 By shifting scientific attention from away from 
average protein structure and toward the equilibrium distribution of structural microstates, the 
ensemble framework helps guide attempts to explain and intervene upon protein behavior.  
 
149 Although I have focused on the causal structure here, this account of unification has affinities with Kitcher’s (1989) 
account of explanatory unification. The thermodynamic framework of the ensemble explanation is a shared pattern of 
explanation that can be used to explain any case of allostery.  
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5.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have presented and analyzed a novel type of explanation in molecular and 
structural biology. These ensemble explanations merit philosophical analysis since they are 
becoming increasingly common and are strikingly different from mechanistic explanations. My 
analysis has shown that ensemble explanations of protein behavior do not match philosophical 
accounts of equilibrium explanation. Although they involve equilibrium states, any single 
equilibrium state does little explanatory work, since the system is assumed to be at equilibrium 
unless perturbed. I have argued that it is the change in equilibrium, caused by the allosteric ligand, 
that ensemble explanations cite to explain allostery. The addition of the allosteric ligand perturbs 
the system, driving it from one equilibrium distribution to another, thereby affecting its binding 
behavior with respect to a second ligand. This description suggested not an equilibrium 
interpretation but rather an interventionist interpretation of ensemble explanations. I therefore 
turned to Zwier’s (2017) account of interventionist causation in thermodynamics. Most 
thermodynamic reasoning aims to explain the movement of a system from one equilibrium state 
to another, caused by some manipulation of the system. According to Zwier, thermodynamic 
explanations of this sort fit the interventionist account and are therefore causal explanations. 
Following similar reasoning, I have argued that ensemble explanations are also best interpreted as 
causal explanations. Although the interventionist account of thermodynamic reasoning sheds light 
on how ensemble explanations work, I have shown that there are also certain key differences 
between causal explanations in the thermodynamic context and in the biological context. 
Ultimately, I have argued that the major import of ensemble explanation of protein behavior lies 
in their differences from the mechanistic explanations that dominate structural and molecular 
biology.   
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6.0 Conclusion 
Proteins, we can conclude, are an object as fruitful for historical and philosophical study 
as they are for scientific study. This dissertation has demonstrated that proteins, specifically, as 
well as the history of the molecular life sciences, more generally, offer fertile ground for 
philosophers of science and biology interested in scientific explanation, representation, and 
conceptual change.  
I have focused on the recent history of structural biology, during a time in which the 
molecular sciences underwent a dramatic shift in worldview from static to dynamic. In the first 
half of the dissertation, I have developed a historical account of protein science over the last 
century, explaining the origins of the static view in the early twentieth century and the eventual 
emergence of the dynamic view of proteins in the latter half of the century. I have argued that 
explanations of protein function, such as allostery and catalysis, did not represent a serious 
challenge to the static view in the 1950s and 1960s. In fact, even though they admitted a limited 
role for protein dynamics, I have argued that these early accounts of protein function were 
compatible with the structure-function rule as well as the static view of proteins. They were 
representative of most explanations of protein behavior at that time, providing mechanistic 
accounts that treated proteins like molecular machines. Looking at the transition from the static to 
the dynamic view, I have argued that theory and theoretical commitments played an important and 
overlooked role in the emergence and spread of the dynamic view of proteins. Before the great 
technological advances in structural biology at the turn of the century, certain theoretically trained 
scientists were already committed to treating proteins as small thermodynamic systems, and these 
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scientists led the search for empirical anomalies in the 1980s and 1990s that would support the 
dynamic rather than static view of proteins.  
In the second half of the dissertation, I have analyzed certain representational and 
explanatory practices in protein science. I have characterized the epistemic relationships that 
obtain between the structural and dynamic protein concepts and their associated representations. I 
have argued that conceptual replacement is happening in protein science. On my account, the 
dynamic concept of the protein, which maintains the importance of both structure and dynamics, 
is replacing the structural concept, with its exclusive focus on structure. Representations 
compatible with the structural and dynamic concept, I have argued, are typically related via 
abstraction. Turning to explanation in structural biology, I have presented  an account of ensemble 
explanations, which were developed to explain the role of dynamics in protein function. I have 
argued that these are distinct from mechanistic explanations, which rely on static structural 
representations of proteins. As I have shown, these explanations capture protein dynamics by 
representing proteins not as single, rigid structures but as ensembles of structurally distinct 
microstates. Although they involve equilibrium distributions, I have argued that these explanations 
are different from the standard accounts of equilibrium explanation in the philosophical literature. 
Instead, I have argued that ensemble explanations are a type of causal explanation. My account 
has thus demonstrated how scientists have had to develop new explanatory strategies to account 
for the complexity introduced by dynamics.  
Looking ahead, there is still much untapped potential for philosophical work in the 
molecular life sciences. I have touched on some areas for additional work during the course of the 
dissertation, but two future directions are worth elaborating here. First, my account of ensemble 
explanation has left the question of reduction largely unexplored. While I have argued that this 
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type of explanation is distinct from mechanistic explanation, I have not argued that ensemble 
explanations of protein behavior are either reductive or emergent. However, I believe that further 
analysis of these explanations and similar explanations that consider dynamic will prove 
illuminating for this philosophical topic. I have a hunch that these explanations resist the standard 
classification of reductive and emergent explanation, although they have affinities with both. If 
my hunch proves correct, then the failure of ensemble explanations to fit neatly within this debate 
will suggest that the current philosophical debate between reductionists and anti-reductionists 
offers us a false choice, obscuring a class of explanations that falls between the two extremes. 
Considering this novel type of explanation in protein science, therefore, might help us to rethink 
this seemingly intractable debate. 
Second, my dissertation has only scratched the surface when it comes to understanding 
how scientists working in the molecular life sciences incorporate knowledge from different 
perspectives. I have shown how borrowing from the representational and explanatory practices in 
physics has been important for the emergence of the dynamic view of proteins and the development 
of ensemble explanations in structural biology. However, more work needs to be done to fully 
understand the successes and failures of different methodological and epistemic strategies, such as 
reduction, unification, and integration, in solving the problem of connecting knowledge from 
different perspectives. Because the molecular life sciences are at the intersection of biology, 
chemistry, and physics, successful explanations and interventions likely require different strategies 
to combine these perspectives. With careful philosophical analysis of these strategies and the 
conditions that determine their success, we can hopefully address questions of how science ought 
to proceed if we want to intervene in the world in various ways.  
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